Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73)

“How shall we call such a thinking man as Thucydides? The word ‘historian’ is somehow not satisfactory.”
Leo Strauss, Lecture 17

"Neither historians nor political scientists can deal with the complexity of true strategy and statecraft. Thucydides does so because his narrative is literature, and literature does not restrict itself. It can say anything that needs to be said."
Grand Strategy: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order by Charles Hill (Yale University Press, 2010), page 34

What started as a lark…listening to Leo Strauss’ lecture series on Thucydides available at the Leo Strauss Center during my commute…ended up as a series of posts since I found the course so engaging. As I disclaim on the lecture posts, I don’t cover everything in the lecture and, while I do my best, the quotes are not always exact. I also refer to my posts on Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War in many of the posts.

The lectures can be discomforting at times knowing Strauss died a few months after the end of this course. In the lectures, Strauss provides recaps of the events and places them in both the immediate context and overall framework of the history. He constantly questions what Thucydides meant by presenting facts and speeches the way he did—why certain things are included, why others items are excluded, how presentations are framed, etc. Strauss' translation of the original Greek text helps clarify some items and provides nuance that Thucydides must have intended. Strauss highlights certain items he seems to be struggling to understand in a greater context, such as why the gods are mentioned at certain times or what it means when Thucydides provides paraphrases and quotes a speech. At all times going through the book, Strauss challenges the reader to look beyond the events of the history and see why Thucydides believed his work to be “an everlasting possession.”

List of lecture posts

Lectures 1 – 4

Lectures 5 – 8

Lectures 9 – 10

Lecture 11

Lectures 12 – 14

Lectures 15 – 17

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lectures 15 - 17

The lectures/recordings on this course can be found at the center's site.

What follows are some of my notes on topics I found of interest in these recordings. I don’t pretend to cover everything he discusses in the lectures and my quotes are close but may not be exact. His class uses the Rex Warner translation while I mention and quote from the Thomas Hobbes translation, which can found here. On a final note I'll refer to my summary page for my posts on The Peloponnesian War.

Lecture 15
Before moving on to Book VII, Strauss takes some time to look at descriptions of Nicias in Book VI since he ends up with sole command on Sicily. In Chapter 46, the Athenian generals (except for Nicias) are disappointed in native lack of support and money: “Nicias had the better judgment of the situation in Sicily than the others.” In Chapter 63, though, his extreme caution (as demonstrated byhis lack of aggression against the Syracusians) shows the “defective character of Nicias’ generalship, that he doesn’t go straight to the goal against Syracuse… .” Nicias’ preference for “rest” instead of “motion” ties back to an opening claim in the history. “What is Thucydides’ judgment about this after all? Thucydides is known because of his reticence. Hobbes said of him he was the most politic historiographer that ever was, by which he meant that he was very reticent in his judgment and let his reader to discern what the virtues and vices of the various characters are.”

Book VII
Book VII begins with the Spartan general Gylippus traveling to Syracuse, allowing Thucydides to compare and contrast him with Nicias. In response to a question about the Athenians and a possible lack of nerve, Strauss addresses one reason Nicias had been appointed general: “He had an unblemished record. He had always been lucky. And according to the way of thinking of the Athenians you choose rather a general who never lost a battle than any other general who may be much brighter but who was not so lucky. It is, you can say, an irrational consideration given the irrational character of chance and intelligence.”

In response to another question on the generalships: “That is the point. The Athenians were, on the one hand, enamored of Alcibiades’ brilliance and daring, and on the other hand they were god-fearing, and the two things were in conflict. And in Alcibiades’ absence the enemies of Alcibiades strengthened the side of what might be called by nasty people 'fundamentalism' in Athens and therefore they called him back—they didn’t know that they would harm themselves much more [by the recall].”

Strauss delves into the decision-making process in Athens, focusing on the difference of influences from the ruling circles and the general population. Thucydides highlights the different characteristics of a city and its rule—unity (real or apparent) and composite (which may disintegrate at any time). One of my favorite quotes from the course occurs at this point during a wide-ranging discussion. Strauss raises the point that Nietzsche called the state “the cold monster,” “an expression which was taken up by De Gaulle. But I believe with this difference. Whereas Nietzsche truly shuddered, De Gaulle stroked it.”

Chapter 18: “This is the difference between Sparta and Athens—the Spartans trace their misfortune in the first war, and which terminated in the Pylus/Pylos affair as a misfortune…as lack of luck…which was deserved because they had broken the treaty. And here their piety, of course, is behind them. You can’t break oaths without paying for it—the gods will interfere then. But this is the Spartan belief. Whether Thucydides believes this is an entirely different question.”

Chapters 47-49 covers he Athenian generals’ council after the defeat at night and Nicias’ hesitancy to withdraw for fear of potential claims: “The nature of the Athenians are a major factor. And you must never forget that when you read that statement in Book II, Chapter 65 of Thucydides’ overall judgment on the overall Peloponnesian War at the end of his eulogy of Pericles. The war could have been won, and he speaks there of some derivative things—the rivalries between the people who would like to take the place of Pericles, but there was a deeper underlying reason and this was the natures of the Athenians which gave these particular rivalries their characters and made it possible, for example, it made possible the expulsion of Alcibiades and his recall. But Nicias is still hesitant because he has hopes that an agreement could be reached with Syracuse and the fear of what the Athenian demos might do to him if he were to leave Sicily.”

Chapter 50, the eclipse, and the Athenians waiting twenty-seven days before doing anything: ”So here this other factor which is crucial, and it is connected with Nicias’ character as a whole, is being given exaggeratedly to divination and frenzy…(one could also say superstition) and has the opposite of a helpful effect on the situation of the Athenians. “

End of Chapter 67 (Hobbes’ translation):

Overwhelmed with calamities, and forced by the difficulties which they [the Athenians] are in at this present, they are grown desperate; not trusting to their forces, but willing to put themselves upon the decision of fortune, as well as they may; that so they may either go out by force, or else make their retreat afterward by land, as men whose estates cannot change into the worse.

Strauss: “So the Athenians minded by the sober, cautious Nicias are brought into a situation in which they can only trust chance and not any human foresight or deliberation. So much has the situation deteriorated.” Nicias’ reply to this turn of events involves an appeal to anything that might help, including the ancestral gods—the more critical the situation, the more the gods are mentioned and called on.

Chapter 71, during a naval battle between the Athenians and Syracusians (from Hobbes’ translation):

For the Athenians, who had their whole fortune at stake in their galleys, were in such a fear of the event as they had never been in the like: and were thereby of necessity to behold the fight upon the water with very different passions . For the sight being near, and not looking all of them upon one and the same part, he that saw their own side prevail took heart, and fell to calling upon the gods, that they would not deprive them of their safety”.

Strauss: ”And they call on the gods only if there is hope, they might win. Not in the other case. Despair and piety—they are understood by Thucydides as incompatible.” As I mentioned in this post, Nicias’ speech before the battle was already dependent on hope. Here is another indicator that hope was all the Athenians had at this point. Or as highlighted by Thucydides, Nicias’ hope is greater than his fear.

Nicias’ speech in Chapter 77 stresses his hope and places faith in the gods. Strauss: “Now here we have, in this short passage, what one could call Nicias’ theology, in contra-distinction to the theology of the Athenian ambassadors on Melos. You remember what they say: ‘the stronger rules the weaker.’ And the gods are the stronger and they do what they want. And Nicias injects an ingredient of justice into the gods. But the question is his alternatives do not exhaust the possibilities but they are at extreme opposites which Thucydides faces.”

Thucydides’ short eulogy to Nicias in Chapter 86 uses Nicias’ theology while at the same time refuting its conclusion—Nicias least deserved this fate, yet that’s exactly what happened. The theology of the Athenian ambassadors at Melos is confirmed, even if Thucydides remains silent on this point.

Lecture 16

Book VIII
Book 8 opens with Thucydides remark that the Athenian population, upon finding out about the Sicilian debacle, blames everyone but themselves. Or rather they blame the public speakers and soothsayers who “encouraged them.” Strauss notes at the end of the first chapter a miracle occurs, but not the kind that would have been foreseen by soothsayers—the Athenians return to moderation and frugality along with additional oversight in the city (of elder men, not younger impressionable men). This resilience demonstrated by the Athenians, despite their earlier folly, extends the war.

Chapter 3 provides foreshadowing of Sparta’s behavior once the war is over as they levy money, demand hostages, and order ships to be built by their so-called allies. Evidently these other cities did not think Sparta would become like Athens if they won the war. While allies of Athens begin to revolt, a schism between Spartan kings in addition to conflicts within the Persian royal family occurs—no one is presenting a unitary front. Note Alcibiades’ surreptitious presence early in the book.

Strauss has touched on the inclusion of treaties in the history several times: “There are a few of these treaties in Book Eight, more than elsewhere. They are the Book Eight substitute for Thucydidean speeches. … A Thucydidean speech is a speech made by an individual or a group of ambassadors from a particular point of view, say Athenian/Spartan/Persian. Here these treaties are also from a particular point of view, say here Persian-Spartan versus Athens [Chapter 18], but not from one particular city, says Athens or Sparta or Persia, but of a number or two of them. So they approach the impartiality, as I called it, of Thucydides own logos.”

From Chapter 24, an important sentence comparing the Chians to the Spartans for joining “advisedness to prosperity; and the more their city increased, had carried the more respect in the administration thereof to assure it.” (Hobbes’ translation) Strauss: “So the Spartans are the top, from this point of view. They’re sober in good fortune. That’s quite an achievement. … An error of judgment does not bespeak hubris, overconfidence. It was a sober judgment at the time. It was a safe risk, but it was a risk nonetheless [by the Chians], as the facts show.”

Chapter 39 through 44 highlights some of the infighting in Sparta and friction between Sparta and Persia, which benefits the neutrals as well as Alcibiades. The Persians benefit by continued conflict in Greece. The treason by Phrynichus of Athens (deemed a wise man in Chapter 27) in Chapter 50 shows the moral order of the day—“Personal safety comes first.”

Thucydides’ comments on the rule of the Five Thousand (after the removal of the Four Hundred)—Chapter 97 (Hobbes’ translation):

“And now first (at least in my time) the Athenians seem to have ordered their state aright: which consisted now of a moderate temper, both of the few and of the many. And this was the first thing, that after so many misfortunes past made the city again to raise her head.”

Strauss: “That is an amazing statement for this book. Not Athens under Pericles but Athens under the Five Thousand, as reorganized, was the best regime. That it didn’t last very long, that is not an argument against it according to Thucydides because the principle underlying the whole thing was much more sensible. In Pericles’ case, the stability depended entirely on the survival of a single man—Pericles. Here there was a large group, of five thousand, the people who counted in the city who were in control.”

More topics discussed: Does the placement of this judgment near the end of the work mean the work is complete? How should we view the regard for the stability in Sparta versus the outstanding men of Athens? Accuracy of treaties: “Thucydides was not a model scientific historian—he was after bigger game.”

Lecture 17

I'm not going to quote from this lecture. What started off as an “are there any questions” quickly moves to points Strauss wants to reiterate from the course, although it is helpful here in the context of the overall history. A wide-ranging lecture and Q&A session in addition to a good recap of several of the major topics. Most of the notes I made have been raised elsewhere in the course, although it's helpful to hear them here so they can be put in context.

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lectures 12 - 14

The lectures/recordings on this course can be found at the center's site.

What follows are some of my notes on topics I found of interest in these recordings. I don’t pretend to cover everything he discusses in the lectures and my quotes are close but may not be exact. His class uses the Rex Warner translation while I mention and quote from the Thomas Hobbes translation, which can found here. On a final note I'll refer to my summary page for my posts on The Peloponnesian War.

Lecture 12

Continuing Book VI
In this lecture the Athenian debate about the invasion of Sicily continues, starting with Alcibiades’ speech. Strauss looks at Alcibiades’ attitude, noting he “doesn’t hesitate to question a certain simplistic democratic notion. In a democracy people are not equal. Some are rich, some are poor. Some gifted, some ungifted. And so on.” Strauss summarizes the effect of Alcibiades’ speech on the Athenians: “The main point is that precisely the alleged effect of Alcibiades and the admitted virtue of Nicias, together, will produce a winning combination. And therefore Nicias’ argument is defeated.” The oaths the Athenians swore to help allies on Sicily are noted again. “You see the oaths play a very great role before the Athenian demos, who are more pious than the upper strata. And that leads to interesting developments later on.” After Alcibiades’ speech: “So it is said Nicias thinks he has lost the argument and he cannot fall back on what he has said in his [???opening???] speech. So he [Nicias] must persuade the Athenians in an entirely different way—that the gamble is too great.”

In Chapter 20 Nicias raises the expectation that certain groups of people on Sicily will join them because of their racial connection. “Keep this issue of racial connection in mind. It plays a considerable role—not too strong an emphasis, but it is always there. That is the great hope of the Athenians, that the racial diversity of the Sicilians might be helpful to the Athenians.” Why do the Athenians go along with Nicias’ exaggerated requirements for the Sicilian invasion? “Because Nicias shows them a way of how to overcome that obstacle. He shows Sicily is a tough proposition but [paraphrasing Nicias] ‘I see a way to overcome that if we make the proper preparations’. And therefore he proves … that the combination of Nicias’ long experience and Alcibiades’ tempestuous temper is wonderful for that purpose.” The exaggerated requirements backfire since they show Nicias as a good planner and leader.

Strauss, continued: “Nicias is a very fine gentleman but he doesn’t belong to the top drawer. Thucydides never says that. Thucydides is such a decent man he would never compromise a noble character like Nicias. But for those among us who are willing to learn something, he indicates it clearly enough—that in a tough situation [??????] Nicias is not good enough. … That is the point: Nicias’ judgment is not the best.”

After the mutilation of the statues of Hermes, decrees were passed granting immunity to anyone providing information on this or any other sacrilegious act. “That is a key point: wholly unexpected impious acts, which of course would endanger the military enterprise in the opinion of the people.” When Alcibiades’ name is mentioned in connection with mock celebrations of the mysteries of Eleusis, Strauss interrupts: “May I mention here in passing a suspicion of mine which I believe is not entirely groundless. Most of you will have read Plato’s Banquet [Symposium] and there at the end a drunken Alcibiades comes in. … In the banquet, Socrates divulges mysteries, and the dramatic date of the Symposium is a year before the Sicilian expedition, 416 [BC]. In brief, what I think what Plato jocularly does in the Banquet is to tell the true story of what happened prior to the Sicilian expedition. They [the terrified Athenians persecuting Alcibiades] are all wet, that is what Plato is saying. The truth is Alcibiades didn’t divulge anything. … But some secret, some mystery was divulged, maybe by Socrates.”

Before I leave these speeches, I wanted to mention that Strauss mentions Thucydides’ comment on Pericles (Book II, Chapter 65) and the alignment of his concern for public and private good. The obvious comparison is Alcibiades since he presses for the expedition for private gain, at least according to Thucydides. Not discussed here, but I think something that would be an interesting topic for a paper, is Nicias’ alignment. How does his emphasis on what’s best for Athens line up or impede his own personal good in the first speech and the third speech? Untangling the multiple layers of meaning is a lot of fun.

The lecture continues with quick summaries about the Athenians setting sail for Sicily, the Athenian generals’ plans, speeches in Syracuse about appropriate actions to take, the failure to obtain alliances on Sicily, and Alcibiades’ recall to Athens. From this section I’ll focus on Strauss’ comments on Athenagoras. I noted in my initial post on this section that Athenagoras sounds like Nicias at times. Regarding chapters 38 through 40 and their ringing defense of democracy, Strauss opined “This is the democratic argument in Thucydides, not in the funeral speech—but this one. … It is usually not considered, when people consider the point of democracy in Thucydides, [instead] they think of Pericles’ speech. Thucydides says that the regime [in Athens] was called in name a democracy but in fact it was the rule of the first man [during Pericles’ rule].” Later in the lecture Strauss, in answering a question on why Athenagoras was so wrong on his predictions about Athens’ invasion of Sicily: “He [Athenagoras ] was blinded by his notion of democracy. He thought that all democrats [democracies] must be such nice people as the Syracusian model.”

Lecture 13

The Athenian expedition in Sicily (Book VI continued)
Crucial items such as the lack of Athenian cavalry, leaving the troops exposed to Syracusian cavalry and the failure to take advantage of racial antagonism on Sicily (to line up allies) happen shortly after landing on the island. Chapter 53—Alcibiades is recalled to Athens for alleged sacrileges regarding profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermes statues. Thucydides notes that the Athens were concerned for acts that might lead to a return to tyranny, leading to the digression on the banishment of tyranny in Athens. Strauss: “One can say the story which Thucydides tells [VI, starting with Ch. 54] concerns the democratic myth about the tyranny in Athens. And he has his version.”

Returning to the Sicilian expedition, Strauss doesn’t completely articulate his hypotheses on what Thucydides is doing with mentions of the gods but I think this comes close to summing things up: “Later on, when the going gets rough, or tough, and the Athenians approach defeat, then Nicias comes to the fore with his piety, and there with constant reference to the gods. And therefore the silence about gods here, as it were, was a foil to Nicias’ speaking about the gods.” As Strauss mentioned in Lecture 11 when Archidamus finally appeals to the gods, most of the characters in the history are silent about the gods until after they experience some profound change—something beyond their control or understanding—which causes them to call on or rely on the gods.

(The following occurred during the discussion of Hermocrates’ speech at Camarina, starting in Ch. 76) Strauss: “That is a great theme, the racial antagonism within Sicily. And the Athenians come to the help of their kinsmen, the Chalcideans. But the very same kinsmen in Euboea, i.e. men near Athens, are subjugated by the Athenians.”

The reply to Hermocrates at Camarina is given to Euphemus, an ambassador from Athens. Strauss analyzes his speech closely and I found the comparison of Euphemus’ speech to that of the Athenians in Sparta (in reply to the Corinthians, Book I Chapter 75) particularly interesting. In the earlier speech the Athenian ambassadors linked Athenian’s actions in expanding its empire to fear, honor, and profit (Hobbes’ wording). Euphemus, in his speech, starts with ‘security’ as the reason for Athens’ actions but then links security directly to fear. This speech, in conjunction with Pericles’ funeral oration and the Melian dialogue, cements Athens’ reputation as a “tyrant city” in the history. Strauss: “Athens is a tyrant city, as Pericles had said [??????] before, and Cleon also, and even Euphemus in his euphemistic speech cannot deny it. And everything else is implied, so that the Melian dialogue is only an extreme formulation of what was simmering beneath the surface… .”

Strauss, commenting on the tyrant expanding power through fear: “And we learn from a later man, who presents a somewhat different picture, and in many ways the same: The foundation of justice is fear: Hobbes. And [the fact] that Hobbes translated Thucydides, it was his first work that he did, is no accident. He was very much attracted to that. And only Hobbes saw that this would lead not only to justice (of course, that’s also what Thucydides says in his way) but to much greater justice than from any other principle.”

Strauss takes a break and looks into a question he has raised several times: why does Thucydides quote some speeches and why does he sometimes only report (paraphrase) a speech? Strauss doesn’t go into great detail, but notes “In Sparta, old-fashioned Sparta, the punishment, human or divine, plays a much greater role than in Athens.” … “What seemed to him, to Thucydides, enters into the speeches but not into the narrative of actions. In the narrative of action he lays down what he has found out as actually having been done. But in the case of speeches, what seemed to him the right thing to say for this man in this circumstance.”


Lecture 14

After a brief recap of where we are in the history, the lecture starts with the Syracusians asking for aid against the Athenians from the Corinthians and Spartans (Book VI, Chapter 88). Alcibiades, having fled during his recall, makes an eloquent speech to the Spartans. Strauss has all of Alcibiades’ speech read to the class, commenting as it unfolds. Reading and hearing Alcibiades’ speech again, I have additional respect for him. I’m sure that was the intent.

Beginning of Chapter 92 (Hobbes’ translation): “Now I must crave this: that I be neither the worse esteemed, for that having once been thought a lover of my country, I go now amongst the greatest enemies of the same against it; nor yet mistrusted, as one that speaketh with the zeal of a fugitive.” The Warner translation (and others) uses “exile” here. Strauss ties this argument in with another student of Thucydides: “This is no feeling of an exile who wants to return home and take revenge on his enemies. There is a beautiful chapter on this subject in Machiavelli’s Discourses…that exiles are very unreliable…, because their longing for their homeland deceives them.” Strauss then points out, consistent with many sections in Machiavelli, there are multiple levels of possible meaning in such a claim.

Strauss spends plenty of time on Alcibiades and his mention in other works (including the difficulty of finding an equal in other historical figures), as well as discussion of loyalty versus treachery (with emphasis on Plato’s Crito). Strauss then discusses the split-personality nature of Athens and the problem of Alcibiades: “It was the tragedy of Athens. Athens could have won on Sicily if it had a military leader like Alcibiades, or, more precisely, Alcibiades had been the military leader. But on the other hand they couldn’t trust Alcibiades because of the [??????] of their forefathers. They knew Alcibiades wasn’t [?????sound ??????]. What should they do? And therefore when these rumors came, these ugly rumors of the slanders, they believed the slanders. And so they called him back and ruined the [expedition].” The reader witness the struggle in the Athenians between piety and justice, on one hand, and what is necessary to protect the state. Thucydides' everlasting possession has proved to be exactly that for all these years.

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lecture 11

The lectures/recordings on this course can be found at the center's site.

What follows are some of my notes on topics I found of interest in these recordings. I don’t pretend to cover everything he discusses in the lectures and my quotes are close but may not be exact. His class uses the Rex Warner translation while I mention and quote from the Thomas Hobbes translation, which can found here. On a final note I'll refer to my summary page for my posts on The Peloponnesian War.

Lecture 11

Strauss begins the lecture with a final comment on the Melian dialogue. He had stated that during the dialogue the Melians do not bring up the subject of the gods, they only mention them in reply to an Athenian statement. He modifies that claim here after reading Book V, Chapter 103: “The question is did the Athenians bring it [the subject of the gods] up? And there is a slight difference of opinion. I would now put it this way. They [the Athenians] mention it only in passing. … Someone can say it was not brought up by anybody, which would be somewhat closer to the truth. … That is my proposal.” He further clarifies this stance by saying no one directly speaks of the gods but the divine (something much vaguer) is mentioned. What does Thucydides precisely say about the gods? Thucydides evades answering that question, but Strauss says he has started looking at the mention of the gods and will share some of his study later in the lecture.

He steps back in the text to the battle of Mantinea. If the Sicilian expedition is the Athenian tragedy, Strauss calls Mantinea the Spartan comedy, winning through unorthodox means. ”This fantastic story of the battle of Mantinea, it restored the prestige of Sparta. It was achieved in a wholly unorthodox way by a Spartan king who was not completely above suspicion of treachery. And all kinds of changes were made, we have seen, against the ancient law. And this is a kind of premonition the changes Sparta might be willing to undergo if necessary.”

Strauss returns to his earlier comments and says he thinks studying the inclusion and exclusion of the gods during the speeches may give some clarity on Thucydides view of the gods, especially their role in the war. This is long but I think worth including in detail here. (Strauss had only finished this through the early part of Book II. Also, I have not checked his claims with the text.)

I. Opening—claims
  a. The “bigness” of the Peloponnesian War
    i. The weakness of the ancients versus the strength of the present—nothing is said about the gods.
    ii. The greatness of the sufferings—the Greeks inflicted more suffering on each other than they received from the Persians or from the Trojans (I, 23). The sufferings are tacitly divided into two groups:
      1. Those that human beings inflict on one another—no mention of the gods
      2. Those inflicted by something else (earthquakes, famines, etc.)—sufferings from “demonic” origin, “demonic” being ambiguous. May be the gods, may mean anything outside the human (approaching the meaning of what we call natural). The term gods or demons is not used.

II. Speeches in Book One (direct or paraphrased)
  a. Corinthians and Athenians (Corcyra)—the gods are not mentioned
  b. The four speeches in Sparta (I, 68-86)
    i. Corinthians—appeal more emphatically to the gods who watch over the performance of oaths than the Athenians or Sthenelaidas
    ii. Athenians—mention the gods
    iii. Spartan king Archidamus—completely silent on the gods. Keep in mind Thucydides introduced him as having only the reputation of wisdom and temperance (the only one of the four that Thucydides dignifies by giving an epithet or praise, although obviously qualified).
    iv. Spartan ephor Sthenelaidas—mention the gods
  c. Speeches in Sparta (only the Corinthian speech is presented by Thucydides)—they refer to the oracle of the god
  d. Mutual recriminations between Spartans and Athenians on religious pollutions (I, 126). Thucydides refrains from judging on the merits of the cases. The Spartans note that their pollution was responsible for a big earthquake that hit Sparta. Note this is the Spartan opinion, not necessarily Thucydides’ opinion.
  e. Fate of final leaders of the Persian Wars (Spartan Pausanias and Athenian Themistocles—128) contains quotations from the generals' correspondence to the king of Persia (something approaching speeches by Thucydidean characters )—no references to gods. The god in Delphi (Apollo) had a weighty word to say about the Spartan king after he was stabbed to death for his treachery.

III. Speeches by Pericles—completely silent on the gods as Archidamus, with one exception
  a. End of Book One—no mention
  b. Funeral speech—refers in passing to sacrifices (part of the festivities of the things Athens performs).
  c. Final speech (II, 64)—no mention (see below)

IV. Speeches and narration in Book Two
  a. Speech by Archidamus to supreme commanders of Spartans just before invasion of Attica (II, 11)—no reference to gods
  b. Periclean speech to Athenian popular assembly that Thucydides paraphrases—Pericles mentions “the goddess”. Here he is referring to the most valuable statue Athens has with an eye toward its monetary value. (II, 13)
  c. Thucydides has quite a few things to say about the gods in his narrative of the plague
  d. Speech between the Spartans and the Plataeans—the exchange is based on relevant oaths. The Spartan king Archidamus begins his final reply to the Plataeans by calling on the gods and heroes who possess Plataean land to be witnesses to the justice of the Peloponnesian cause (II, 19)—a cause of somewhat dubious claim. Archidamus, who has been silent on the gods, suddenly appeals to the gods. In this context, it must mean that the whole moral political situation has undergone a profound change. Merely human means and motives are not sufficient anymore.

Book VI—The Athenian vote to invade Sicily

Strauss recommends Plutarch’s biography on Nicias. In Nicias' first speech (starting in chapter 9), attempting to discourage the Athenians from pursuing the Sicilian expedition, Strauss emphasizes (stronger than I did) that Nicias tries to discredit the peace (the peace that Nicias had helped negotiate) by pointing out its weaknesses. Another important point that Strauss raises that I didn’t discuss:

”These people [the majority that had voted to attack Sicily] are prepared to put into jeopardy what is available—what they have—for the sake of invisible things (the grandeur of [??????]). It’s very remarkable because later on Nicias himself will be compelled to put all his faith in invisible things when things go wrong in Sicily. But for the time-being, he is just a sober, practical, matter-of-fact man who says ‘We don’t need further conquests. We don’t need to endanger all we possess for a dubious prospect.’”

All of Nicias’ first speech against the expedition is read in class and looked at, setting up Alcibiades’ reply (in the next lecture). Strauss has noted several times that if there are three items, such as the three speeches here, the place of “honor” or emphasis is the middle item. What could Thucydides hope to stress or emphasize by placing Alcibiades’ speech in the middle?

Posting in this series will resume Tuesday—I’m accompanying a kindergarten class to the aquarium on Monday.

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lectures 9 - 10

The lectures/recordings on this course can be found at the center's site.

What follows are some of my notes on topics I found of interest in these recordings. I don’t pretend to cover everything he discusses in the lectures and my quotes are close but may not be exact. His class uses the Rex Warner translation while I mention and quote from the Thomas Hobbes translation, which can found here. On a final note I'll refer to my summary page for my posts on The Peloponnesian War.

Lecture 9

I don’t always discuss Strauss’ initial discussions in his lectures—usually he raises a question or topic and talks about it before turning to the text. Sometimes it’s difficult for me to see the connection between the discussion and the text, other times they fit together in an obvious manner. In the opening discussion for this lecture, Strauss looks at Thucydides from the standpoint of history versus philosophy (taking into account religion).

Some quotes and comments from all of the lecture:

• “To state this as harshly as possible [about the history], there is no shred of evidence for gods, but there is a lot of evidence, according to Thucydides, for the need for gods. But there is no confusion, no darkness in Thucydides’ mind caused by the possibility of gods. After all, Thucydides could be called an agnostic."

• This lecture continues in Book 4, reaching Thucydides’ introduction to the Spartan general Brasidas. At the same time we meet him, however, Thucydides relays the following incident to color the reader’s attitude toward Sparta (Book IV, Ch. 80, Hobbes’ translation):

For they did also this further, fearing the youth and multitude of their Helotes: for the Lacedæmonians had ever many ordinances concerning how to look to themselves against the Helotes. They caused proclamation to be made, that as many of them as claimed the estimation to have done the Lacedæmonians best service in their wars, should be made free; feeling them in this manner, and conceiving that, as they should every one out of pride deem himself worthy to be first made free, so they would soonest also rebel against them. And when they had thus preferred about two thousand, which also with crowns on their heads went in procession about the temples as to receive their liberty, they not long after made them away: and no man knew how they perished.

Strauss, as an aside, compares this to the Katyń massacre of the Polish officers by the Russians during World War II. “The tragedy is absolutely shocking, but it was part of the secret of Spartan power.” … “This is the other Sparta—the non-Brasidean Sparta. And Brasidas is of course simply an organ, an instrument of that Sparta. So that all admiration for Brasidas’ nobility of character must be qualified.”

• The lecture turns to the topics of Delium and Amphipolis. About Delium and Socrates’ participation in the battle: “Further, as [historian George] Grote observes…Socrates was exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Aristophanes was exposing him to derision in the comedy of The Clouds as a dreamer, [????] morally worthless and physically incapable.” (Strauss notes some people don’t believe Socrates was present at the battle.)

• The speeches before the (first) battle of Amphipolis are compared—Pagondas (Theban general, ch. 92) and Hippocrates (Athenian, ch. 95). “What is most [?????] difference between the Boeotian and the Athenian speech? The complete absence of any reference to the gods in the Athenian speech. And what happens? The Athenians are terribly defeated. So even assuming that Pagondas was [???an unbeliever???], his hypocrisy helped him.”

• Strauss lightly covers the(first) battle of Amphipolis, noting Thucydides’ generalship (and subsequent exile) is mentioned. Strauss highlights the fact that Brasidas (Spartan) is given a speech by Thucydides while Cleon (Athenian) isn’t. With Thucydides you always have to ask why one side is given airtime but the other isn’t (and look beyond the obvious answer that inclusion doesn’t suit his purpose)—what was Thucydides trying to show or shape in his presentation? Arguments can be supported by including some data and excluding other facts. Add the framework of dramatizing the history and you have several dynamics at work within his history beyond simply what happened.

One thing Strauss pointed out I completely missed in my initial reading last year. In Book Four, Chapter 132, the Spartans

took with them from Sparta, contrary to the law, such men as were but in the beginning of their youth, to make them governors of cities, rather than commit the cities to the care of such as were there before. (Hobbes’ translation)

Compare this action to Brasidas’ speech to the men of Acanthus, particularly the start of Chapter 86—“ I come not hither to hurt, but to set free the Grecians: and I have the Lacedæmonian magistrates bound unto me by great oaths”. Now that Sparta sets up puppet governments where they claimed to fight for freedom we see what their word is worth.

Strauss turns to Book Five and quickly covers the second battle of Amphipolis. Once again he raises the conflict between public and private good (see Lecture 8) as highlighted by Thucydides in Book Five, Chapter 16:

But when also this other overthrow happened to the Athenians at Amphipolis, and that both Cleon and Brasidas were slain: the which on either side were most opposite to the peace; the one, for that he had good success and honour in the war; the other, because in quiet times his evil actions would more appear and his calumniations be the less believed : those two that in the two states aspired most to be chief, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, and Nicias the son of Niceratus, who in military charges had been the most fortunate of his time, did most of all other desire to have the peace go forward. Nicias, because he was desirous, having hitherto never been overthrown, to carry his good fortune through, and to give both himself and the city rest from their troubles for the present; and for the future to leave a name, that in all his time he had never made the commonwealth miscarry; which he thought might be done by standing out of danger, and by putting himself as little as he might into the hands of fortune; and to stand out of danger is the benefit of peace. (Hobbes' translation)

Strauss calls the Melian dialogue the most theoretical part of Thucydides’ work. It’s difficult to say what Thucydides thinks about this dialogue. On one hand, the Sicilian expedition comes soon after this dialogue (compare to the plague in Athens following Pericles’ speech). Yet the Sicilian expedition, as disastrous as it was, did not cause Athens to fall. “As Thucydides says, the Athenians had an amazing resiliency. And if I read him correctly, what brought the Athenians down was folly. The leading Athenians of that time, in disregarding Alcibiades’ advice regarding a naval battle [??? … ???], they are defeated and that led to the ruin of Athens.”

Lecture 10

Strauss revisits (at the beginning and the end of the lecture) the comparison between the Peloponnesian War and Thucydides’ combining two distinct fighting periods with the so-called ‘peace of Nicias’ between them to World War I and World War II—what was intended as a peace treaty proved to be only a temporary armistice. Thucydides addresses this issue in his second preface of the history in Book V (chapters in the mid-20s). Strauss jumps ahead to Book VII when he looks at the Spartan feelings of guilt for breaking the peace, which they believe leads to their defeats in the first section of the war. Since it is much clearer that the Athenians broke the peace of Nicias and started the second section of the war, the Spartans believe this helps lead to their ultimate victory.

Strauss takes plenty of time to go through the Melian dialogue, reading the dialogue and pausing to recap and discuss parts of it. Since the dialogue is pretty straightforward, I’ll only provide one quote from Strauss that puts the dialogue in company with other literary discussions:

“So this situation in which the conversation takes place is in the absence of the common people. … Melos being a Spartan colony means it is not a democracy, and they don’t want the common people to have any say in the matter. And that is of some interest because the three most famous documents of what is now called Machiavellianism, or maybe extreme Machiavellianism, we have from antiquity—the Melian dialogue, Thrasymachus’ speech in the first book of The Republic, and Callicles’ speech in Plato’s Gorgias—are all behind closed doors (are not public speeches).”

The dialogue raises many questions. Some topics mentioned by Strauss includes the truth of the Athenian declaration—is justice only possible between two equals? Did the Melians make the right decision not to submit? Another question, mentioned at the end of the last lecture, involves how to interpret Thucydides’ attitude toward the dialogue. Similar to Pericles’ funeral oration, a terrible setback immediately follows a speech or dialogue. Even though Thucydides makes it clear the Sicilian expedition was not the immediate cause of Athens’ fall, it did play a role and set the tone in leading to the city’s ultimate demise.

The next post will look at lecture 11.

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lectures 5 - 8

The lectures/recordings on this course can be found at the center's site.

What follows are some of my notes on topics I found of interest in these recordings. I don’t pretend to cover everything he discusses in the lectures and my quotes are close but may not be exact. His class uses the Rex Warner translation while I mention and quote from the Thomas Hobbes translation, which can found here. On a final note I'll refer to my summary page for my posts on The Peloponnesian War.

Lecture 5

The lecture begins with a side-note on claims and comparisons:

• The greatest war (demeans previous wars). But Thucydides was not just an observer of this war but a participant. How does that impact his claim and history?

• Instead of speaking about Greek “culture”, Thucydides talks about the emergence of “Greekness.”

• When Thucydides compares the Peloponnesian war to the Trojan War he also engages in a battle with Homer (“never forget that”). Thucydides also stresses the importance of the “demonic” (divine) in the Trojan War. Keep an eye on the differences between human and demonic things.

• The distinction Thucydides presents between rest and motion: what items are at rest? What items are in motion? Why is rest a higher level of being than motion? Can we have rest without motion? How does mastering unrest fit into this distinction?

• How to size up Athens and Sparta: “These two cities are distinguished from one another not only by their political and military arrangements but also by their state of mind, their spirit. Therefore, they must be understood not merely in terms of the cleverness and the stupidity of their policies but must also consider their form, their character, their ideals.”

Strauss finishes going through Pericles’ funeral oration. Strauss makes an interesting claim, saying Pericles only uses the word death at the very end of the speech. Reading back through the speech, there are many references to death and the word is used a few times, although I am reading in translation. Even if the translation is correct, it is striking how little death is referenced in a funeral speech.

Strauss doesn’t mention it directly but a topic he raised in an earlier lecture can be applied here, showing the intent of this speech is to describe the ideal Athens. How does Athens measure up to this ideal as the history progresses? We don’t have long to wait since the plague follows the speech and undermines many parts of Pericles’ speech.

Lecture 6

“All Thucydides’ statements, we can say, are deliberately incomplete. … Yet, Thucydides never continues his incomplete statements.” Strauss is pointing out that Thucydides will have two statements that are related but in different parts of the history but they are not explicitly tied together. The second statement may append the first reference. Or the second statement will have a slight alteration or stress something different.

“One cannot avoid wondering whether there is a connection between Thucydides’ way of writing and his subject. His subject matter is, at least partly, the demonic (daemonic) things (whatever that may be) and of course the city. The relation between those two items is presupposed, not explained. Now this answer to explain Thucydides’ way of writing by his subject matter is manifestly insufficient. Yet how many great writers have dealt with these subject matters and yet without any hidden thoughts. The most obvious example which occurs to me is Thucydides’ alleged continuator, Xenophon, who also deals with demonic things and he also deals with a war.”

Strauss then looks at the difference between Thucydides (“severity and gravity”) and Xenophon (light-hearted, yet shows fear of the demonic). “By thinking of this simple difference between Thucydides and Xenophon one comes somewhat closer to the understanding of why Thucydides writes in the manner of which he writes.”

During his discussion of the Plataeans’ defense before the Spartans and the Thebans argument against Plataea, Strauss raises the issue of how to define a city. What happens when the leaders do not reflect the wishes of the people?

“We hear all the time of the laws of cities. … But what does that mean, the city? Was Thebes, for example, at the time of the Persian invasion, a city? Was the government of Thebes at that time…was this Thebes? Or was it not simply usurpers of power? … So we must make a distinction in each case between the polis, the common, and a part which claims to be or to speak for the common.” … “You see the complication of the political issue that you do not have merely cities, but cities consisting of antagonistic parts. So that does not really help us know what precisely is a city.”

A theme Strauss comes back to several times in this lecture looks at progress vs. non-progress—where do all the uprisings in Book Three fit in such a framework? How to account for the terror and the atrocities committed in this section? In viewing these occurrences, does man…does the history…reflect progress?

Lecture 7

This lecture covers the end of Book Three and begins looking at Book Four and the following items: Sicily and Demonsthenes, Pylos and Sphacteria. During the sections read Strauss highlights the natural phenomena and how much of a role chance plays during the war (important to keep in mind since luck/fortune will be stressed often in arguments for or against something).

Demosthenes is scared to return to Athens after his initial losses in Aetolia. How much does the fear of the Athenian council punishing generals impact decisions in the field? Strauss mentions Machiavelli’s Discourses, Book One, Chapter 28, from which I’ll quote:

The very contrary happened in Athens, for her liberty having been taken away by Pisistratus in her most florid time and under the deception of goodness, so soon then as she became free, remembering the injuries received and her past servitude, she became a harsh avenger not only of the errors of her citizens, but even the shadow of them. From which resulted the exile and death of so many excellent men: From this came the practice of ostracism and every other violence which that City at various times took up against her Nobility.

The stress that Thucydides lays on the Athenian victory at Sphacteria goes beyond a simple battle. At the end of the battle Athens' supremacy seemed a certainty as Sparta begged for peace. This victory provides some foreground to the later Sicilian debacle. Why were the Athenians victorious at Sphacteria? How do the principle characters (Cleon and Demosthenes) compare to principles in the Sicilian expedition? Cleon, encouraged by a mob mentality, makes reckless claims, yet he proves to be successful. How does such reckless behavior stack up against the impetuous nature of the later expedition? (The next lecture explores this topic some more.)

Lecture 8

The first 55 minutes were spent talking about Thucydides as historian—I failed to make any notes on this section of the lecture.

Some excerpts from later in the lecture:

• “There is a post-Periclean conflict between the private good and the common good—in Pericles there was perfect harmony between the two. What Pericles wanted for himself was good for Athens. And that was no longer the case as far as his successors were concerned. That we know. Now we enter on the story of Demosthenes and his concern with the private good. This disruption by the concern for the private good was due not merely to base ambition but to sensible fear of mad men—the demos. And you remember that Demosthenes returned to Athens only after his [???victory???] the following spring, not without fear that he might be impeached, but with less fear, because he had made somewhat of a restitution. One can say that Demosthenes here foreshadows Nicias’ conduct in Sicily. Nicias and Demosthenes were colleagues in Sicily and Nicias was very much afraid of what they would do to him if her were to come back to Athens without having [???defeated???] the Sicilians.”

• “But the success [at Sphacteria] was decisively due, we are [??sorry???] to say, to Cleon…to his madness. Nicias and the other sane men [are] the opposite of madness… they said ‘That’s wonderful, let him go out and he’ll either defeat the Spartans—fine—or he’s defeated and killed—still better.’ But these clever moderate views are themselves defeated, because when he [Cleon] comes back his reputation is higher than it ever was. He makes good his mad promises. They force Nicias, a sober man, to abandon his command to madman Cleon. This also has a parallel later with Sicily where Alcibiades, who one can hardly call a madman…but also one cannot call a moderate man…Alcibiades forces the sober Nicias to share his command with him. And this leads to entirely different results.”

• “It seems that moderation is superior to madness, but when you look at the result…madness proves to be superior to moderation.” Strauss goes into detail how this has parallels to parts of Plato’s Phaedrus.

• After the loss at Sphacteria, the Spartans act hesitant, not willing to commit to conflicts because of fortune’s turn against them. This change in confidence, in a way, returns them to the Spartan caution which the Corinthian delegation complained about in Book One.

The next post will look at lectures 9 and 10.

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lectures 1 - 4

Recently The Leo Strauss Center began providing audio recordings of many of his lectures. I saw a listing for Thucydides and decided to listen to them during my commute. This course was offered during the 1972-73 academic year at St. John’s College in Annapolis. Strauss died later in 1973 but it’s clear to hear his health was failing at the time—he mentions courses he had to cancel due to health reasons and he apologizes for spending time in the hospital. His voice isn’t nearly as clear as the recordings of courses 15 years earlier. Even with these limitations (not to mention uneven recording quality and consistency), these lectures provide some wonderful insights into Thucydides’ history.

I will mention that for the next week or so I’ll be posting comments on these recordings, so if it isn’t your interest right now feel free to check in later. The lectures/recordings on this course can be found at the center's site.

What follows are some of my notes on topics I found of interest in these recordings. I don’t pretend to cover everything he discusses in the lectures and my quotes are close but may not be exact. His class uses the Rex Warner translation while I mention and quote from the Thomas Hobbes translation, which can found here. On a final note I'll refer to my summary page for my posts on The Peloponnesian War.

Lecture 1
Several of the recordings have noticeable gaps. This tape starts during a discussion on the history’s opening claims, specifically the rest vs. motion theme. Several other themes and claims are missing, which were probably covered before this recording starts.

Most of this class looks at the appeals from the ambassadors of Corcyra (Book I, Ch. 32-36) and Corinth (Book I, Ch. 37-43) to the Athenians. It’s nice to see I had touched on or stressed on many of the same topics in this post. Strauss highlights the first word (in Greek) used by each set of ambassadors: “just” for the Corcyraenas, “necessary” for the Corinthians. Strauss notes this could summarize the tone and theme of the entirety of Thucydides’ history—what is just versus what is necessary or expedient. He briefly touches on possible (intended) irony since the Corcyraenas start with an appeal to justice but quickly move to arguments of expediency while the Corinthians start with appeals to necessity but change tactics and talk of justice.

My biggest disenchantment in the course as a whole was learning that Corcyra (modern day Corfu) is pronounced in class as something similar to kor-KYUR-a. And here I was thinking Oom pa-pa mow mow whenever I saw the name during my reading. I’ll recover, I’m sure. On a sidenote, I remember my first exposure to the name Corcyra was in a letter by Edger Allen Poe, using it as an allusion for many names: “Poetry! That Proteus-like idea, with as many appellations as the nine-title Corcyra!”

Lecture 2
This lecture focuses on the Spartan vote on whether Athens had broken the thirty-year peace treaty in their hostilities against Corinth, focusing on the speeches-–who calls for justice and who calls for necessary action.

Before the Spartan Archidamus’ speech, Thucydides stresses he is reputed to be both wise and temperate. Strauss:

“Of course this speech must be, and Thucydides’ judgment of that speech, will only come out through the history as a whole. How did Sparta behave in victory? How did she behave in disaster? How did Athens behave in victory? How did Athens behave in disaster? And now I believe you would find that Athens stood up much better in disaster than Sparta. Much better. And that therefore what Archidamus says is simply not true. And therefore Thucydides has a perfectly good reason in making a distinction between Archidamus’ reputation and Archidamus’ being. He was not as prudent…the speech is not as prudent as he was [as his reputation]. He appeals, as it were, to an ideal Sparta of which one cannot possibly know prior to the war whether it exists or not. It will appear in the sequel that it did not exist. So that we must keep this in mind.”

[Sidenote—implied by Strauss but not said] This standard can be applied to Athens, too. Does it live up to the ideals in the speech presented here by Athenian strangers in Sparta? Or in Pericles’ funeral speech? Of course not…but it seems a matter of who falls less short of the ideals.

Also mentioned by Strauss is Thucydides’ linking the fortunes in war for Athens and Sparta with who felt or seemed to break the peace. When things seemed to turn against Sparta in the first part of the war, many felt it was because Sparta had broken the peace (even if justified by necessity). Athens clearly broke the peace in 415 BC and then the war turned against them. Is Thucydides making a statement on justness vs. the necessity of war in these turns of fortune? [Strauss will cover this in more detail later]

A student makes the point that the Athenian “delegation” argued that actions taken out of fear (necessity) can be called just. Earlier, Thucydides frames the Spartans entering the war out of a feeling of necessity due to their fear of the Athenian increase in power. Can the Spartans be excused in starting the war using the argument from the view of the Athenian “delegation”? Strauss points out that Sthenelaidas, a Spartan ephor, does not use that argument. In other words, Sthenelaidas ‘ successful argument relies on reasoning that is the opposite of Archidamus—less talk and deliberation, more action—which feeds into Strauss’ point that Sparta did not live up to the ideal Archidamus presented.

If you are reading Thucydides for the first time, keep Strauss’ comment on this section in mind: “What is your impression of the two speeches in Sparta? Where does Thucydides stand? After all, when you hear these two men [the speeches by the Corinthians and the Athenians] and see them, and Thucydides makes you see them, you can’t help siding with one or the other. … And that is important, otherwise one does not understand Thucydides. One does not reflect on what he presents to us.”

Lecture 3
Struass opens the lecture focusing on the upcoming section in Thucydides, the Pentecontaetia (the period of time between the end of the Persian wars on Greece and the start of the Peloponnesian War). For this approximate 50 year period, Thucydides provides a fairly bland chronological list of facts. One question Strauss says to keep in mind when reading Thucydides involves the process of the history evolving from a mere chronological presentation to “an everlasting possession” (Hobbes’ translation of Thucydides’ opening claim), conveying the truth about man (at least about man as a political being). In other words, how does Thucydides ascend from the “accidental” occurrences of the Peloponnesian War to the “essential” nature of his history?

Some stray points:

• Strauss also points out that the Pentecontaetia presents the true cause of the war as opposed to the superficial (proximate) causes that have been presented so far.

• Why does Thucydides give the Corinthians a second speech? The first speech was a call to war. This one highlights what they need to be concerned about in war.

• Thucydides does as much harm as help with his praise. In this chapter the subject of praise is Themistocles. Pericles will later be the recipient of Thucydides’ praise.

• In the history of this period, Thucydides highlights the differences between Athens and Sparta, partly by choosing men that “personify” each city—look for the correlation between Sparta and Themistocles as well as between Pericles and Athens.

Lecture 4
Strauss begins the lecture by looking at Nietzsche’s comments about Thucydides in general, then focusing on some points from “What I Owe to the Ancients”. Instead of summarizing, I’ll provide Nietzsche’s lines here:

My recreation, my preference, my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides. Thucydides and, perhaps, Machiavelli's Principe are most closely related to myself by the unconditional will not to gull oneself and to see reason in reality-not in "reason," still less in "morality."

One must follow him line by line and read no less clearly between the lines: there are few thinkers who say so much between the lines. With him the culture of the Sophists, by which I mean the culture of the realists, reaches its perfect expression... Thucydides: the great sum, the last revelation of that strong, severe, hard factuality which was instinctive with the older Hellenes.

In the end, it is courage in the face of reality that distinguishes a man like Thucydides from Plato: Plato is a coward before reality, consequently he flees into the ideal; Thucydides has control of himself, consequently he also maintains control of things.

Strauss looks at claims that Thucydides is guilty of sophistry [no sources given]. While speeches are important in Thucydides’ work, the emphasis lies instead on deeds and actions. [As Strauss pointed out in a previous lecture, many times speeches are given based on an ideal—the important point should be how does the history play out against that ideal?] Don’t forget that Thucydides uses people (whether real, composite, or manufactured) as characters to fill specific roles in his history.

Strauss emphasized the importance of looking at what Thucydides praises. What’s included? What’s excluded? What’s implied? For example, his first mention of Pericles is as follows (Hobbes’ translation, Book I, Chapter 139): “And Pericles the son of Xantippus, the principal man at that time of all Athens, and most sufficient both for speech and action, gave his advice in such manner as followeth.” Which reiterates the point of judging not just what a man says but what he does—in the long run, action appears to be more important to Thucydides. Compare this to Thucydides’ introduction to a Spartan king (Book I, Chapter 79): “But Archidamus their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate, spake as followeth.” Reputed, not was.

Also in this speech by Pericles (Chapter 140): ““Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion, not to give way to the Peloponnessians; (notwithstanding I know that men have not the same passions in the war itself, which they have when they are incited to it, but change their opinions with the events)”. Thucydides provides several subtle descriptions of Pericles that sets the leader apart, not just from the opinion of other men but elevates him above mankind in general. Men change their minds on things, but Pericles remains “of the same opinion”—is there an implication here that he is god-like? The lecture ends covering the first part of the funeral oration by Pericles.

The next post will cover lectures 5 through 8.

Take one of Leo Strauss' courses

The Leo Strauss Center at The University of Chicago has begun to make available audio files from some of the courses Strauss taught and will add transcripts starting next year. The first course released is “Plato’s Political Philosophy: Apology and Crito”. From the page noting the release of this course:

The Leo Strauss Center is proud to publish the digitally remastered audio files of the course given by Leo Strauss on “Plato’s Political Philosophy: Apology and Crito” in autumn quarter, 1966 at the University of Chicago.

This is one of 26 courses (and one reading group) for which a partial or complete audio record exists. The Leo Strauss Center’s goal is to publish the 27 sets of audio by the end of April, 2011. We expect to begin publishing edited transcripts in the spring of 2011 and to complete the publication of all 44 of the course transcripts (and the transcript for one reading group) within the next four years, if sufficient funding is obtained. The Center will not distribute any transcript until it has been published.

If you go to the “Audio & Transcripts” link you will see the list of courses planned for release, many from The University of Chicago but several from Claremont Men’s College and St. John’s College Annapolis as well.