Dean's Lecture Series at St. John's College

I'm a little late in posting this, but here is the 2020 Fall Semester Dean's Lecture Series at St. John's College. There have been two lectures already, one on Hesiod and one on Montaigne. Hopefully the transcripts for these will be available soon at their archives site (link on the Lecture list page). Speaking of which, the archive site looks like it will be fun to explore.

Tomorrow's lecture for Constitution Day will be on the Grutter v. Bollinger case. The remaining lectures cover a wide variety of subjects, from pendulums to Aristotle's De Anima to photography. If you find something good in the archives, let me know!

Roberto Calasso's lecture on “The Last Superstition”

Cynthia Haven, of The Book Haven renown, has helped me in many ways over the past few years of blogging. So when she recommended the René Girard Lecture at Stanford to be given by Roberto Calasso, I arranged to be there. In addition to finally meeting Cynthia (which was great and too short!), I got to hear an impressive, wide-ranging talk titled “The Last Supersition.” The event flyer about the event gave an overview of the lecture’s focus:

Until recently, humans lived with gods. Every society in history defined itself in relation to an invisible world. Only modern society is secular: it doesn’t believe in anything but itself. Why? And are we really less superstitious than our ancestors?

To cut to the chase, Calasso's answer is "No." I’ll point to his Wikipedia entry for a summary of his life and works, as well as taking time and space here in pulling a few quotes from his interview with the Paris Review (found here). The excerpts are long, but they will frame major sections of the lecture.

INTERVIEWER
It’s strange, this desire to turn Adelphi—and yourself—into a political machine. In fact, you are far more interested in transcendence than in politics.

CALASSO
Not so much transcendence, but the perception of the powers in us and around us. People talk a lot about religion, but they might as well be talking about huge political parties. The most delicate point to grasp is that society itself has become the major superstition of our times. This is the pivot of the last section of L’ardore. What I mean is that the belief in society as the ultimate crucible of progress creates a vast amount of bigotry even in the so-called secular world. So in actual fact it’s difficult to find an intellectually rigorous atheist. Though I have met many secular bigots.

INTERVIEWER
The notion of sacrifice lies behind almost everything in your work. The other striking theme is ebbrezza, which seems difficult to translate, as the word is polysemous in Italian.

CALASSO
All of my books have to do with possession. Ebbrezza, rapture, is a word connected with possession. In Greek the word is mania, madness. For Plato it was the main path to knowledge. For us it’s become the main path to the lunatic asylum. So you see that from Schreber up to La folie Baudelaire, the theme runs through my work. Even in my last book, L’ardore, of course. The Vedic people developed the most rivetingly complex theories and rituals about soma, the mysterious plant that provoked rapture.

…

INTERVIEWER
Here is a photo of you and your late friend Brodsky. He wrote a wonderful essay on The Marriage where he talks about self-projection. He draws a parallel between mythology and television. The scales and parameters are different, but myth and TV are both ultimately about self-projection. The seat of both is one’s mind. The altar in both cases is a box. Sacrifice is the remote control.

CALASSO
That’s highly Brodskian. The point is, man has a surplus of energy which he has to dispose of. That surplus is simply life. There is no life without surplus. Whatever one does with that surplus, that decides the shape of a culture, of a life, of a mind. There were certain cultures that decided they had to offer it in some way. It is not clear to whom, why, and how, but that was the idea. There are other cultures, like ours, where all this is considered entirely useless and obsolete. In the secular world, sacrifice shouldn’t have any meaning at all. At the same time, you realize that it does, because the word has remained very much in use. In discussions of the economy, analysts speak all the time of sacrifices, without realizing what is inside the word. Even in psychological terms, sacrifice is a most usual word. It is considered illegal—for instance, if one celebrated a sacrificial ritual in the middle of London or New York, he would do something illegal, he would be put in jail. Sacrifice is connected to destruction—that is an important thing and the most mysterious one. Why, in order to offer something, you must destroy it. These are the themes of the last part of L’ardore.
…

INTERVIEWER

I think it [sacrifice] is also central for you. Why is sacrifice so important?

CALASSO
Maybe it’s simply because sacrifice brings us into dealings with the unknown. In the act of sacrifice, you establish a relation with something that you recognize as enigmatic and powerful. Our collective psyche seems to have lost touch with it, although science is providing countless motives for being overwhelmed by the unknown. The unknown itself is in our own mind as well—our mind is in its largest part totally unknown to us. Therefore, it is not only a relation to the exterior world, it is a relation to ourselves. We establish a connection with the unknown through the act of giving something and, paradoxically, the act of destroying something. That is what is behind sacrifice. What you offer and what you destroy, it is that surplus which is life itself. …

INTERVIEWER
After The Marriage, with Ka, you moved from Western myth to Indian thought. How did this come about?

CALASSO
To me, very early on, the Vedic texts seemed to go beyond whatever else one may read on certain points. If you want to have an inkling about two essential words like consciousness and mind, you must look into these texts. You never find anything as enlightening anywhere else. … Everything hinges on consciousness. They brought consciousness to the center way before our scientists thirty years ago hailed it as a great new scientific theme.

During the lecture Calasso delved into several topics (sources, trends, implications, and blindness resulting) centered on his argument that society has become its own, last superstition…replacing the role of the gods with a belief in 'society.' This could have been a depressing talk, but Calasso’s approach provided a light touch on weighty subjects. He didn’t let sacred societies off the hook, either, noting they have been most dangerous when they attempt to be organic. It was here that he quoted Jacob Burckhardt’s analysis on Spartan power:

"Power can have a great mission on earth; for perhaps it is only on power, on a world protected by power, that superior civilizations can develop. But the power of Sparta seems to have come into being almost entirely for itself and for its own self-assertion, and its constant pathos was the enslavement of subject peoples and the extension of its own dominion as an end unto itself."

So does the sacred society believe in something beside itself? Unasked, but not necessary given the rest of his talk, was the question if the non-sacred (or experimental, as Calasso termed it) society believes in something beside itself.

So what were some of the takeaways from the lecture that stick with me? Being an awful note-taker, I'll say there were more interesting topics than I can mention here, but I’ll take a stab at some of the more important and amusing points.

• I *have* to read Calasso’s books. Many topics he raised felt like he was only scratching the surface of subjects he has gone into greater depth elsewhere.
• Calasso has a great sense of humor. His responses to many of the questions showed a light touch, even when sharper retorts would have been excused.
• Calasso framed his belief in the power of literature and ancient roots in this manner: “What describes consciousness better? The Upanishads? Or science?”
• (I wish I had his quote on this topic, but a paraphrase will have to do.) There is a balance between information and memory. Increasing information means less memory.
• ”Nietzsche is the axis around what [how] we think.” Calasso took great pains to point out that meant multiple lines of thought.
• Calasso puts great faith in the roots of belief, asking (rhetorically) about the roots for functioning in a sacred-based society vs. the roots for functioning in an experimental society.
• The literary references were fun to track in his lecture. While not a comprehensive list, I provide it as an indication on how fun it was to follow the tracks of the discussions: Homer, Sophocles, Nietzsche, Robert Musil, Simone Weil, Simone de Beauvoir, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Burckhardt, Franz Kafka, James George Frazer, and Émile Durkheim. Talk about a rollercoaster of thoughts…

Well, I look back on this and it’s not a great summary of what was discussed, but I hope it conveys the breadth and depth of Roberto Calasso’s lecture. You’ll be hearing more about him here as I work through his books.

Lecture by Paul Cartledge on After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars

Paul Cartledge spoke at the SPHS Autumn Lecture, Tuesday November 12th 2013 held at The Hellenic Centre in London. Thanks to David Meadows at rogueclassicism for posting a link to this lecture.

My post on the book can be found here.

“The story I have woven...is one of commemoration, of rivalry, classically ancient Greek rivalry for commemoration priority.” In other words, who would get the greatest honor or credit for the defeat of the Persians? In my post I described the oath as part of a fight for historical memory. Cartledge’s description is more exact. I’m going to provide a few notes from the lecture--they aren’t meant to sum up the talk but provide some additional information that supplements my post on his book.

• Cartledge had a minor consulting role for the movie 300. From his anecdote it sounds like his focus was on pronunciation of names (and they didn't always take his advice).


• Herodotus has the most complete description of the Battle of Plataea. As a supposedly objective recorder of the battle, Herodotus described Plataea as “the fairest victory of all those we know.” Cartledge describes this as a drop in the ocean of anti-Spartan sentiment.


• Cartledge mentions William Shepherd’s recent book on the battle: Plataea 479 BC: Greece’s Greatest Victory (Osprey). He also recommends looking at Tom Holand’s recent translation of Herodotus (in which Cartledge wrote the Introduction and Notes). See Amazon UK for a preview, which includes the Translator’s Preface and Cartledge’s Introduction.


• After going into detail about the monument with the Oath of Plataea, Cartledge discusses the argument over the existence of the temple to Ares at Acharnae and the reasons he believes it existed.


• Cartledge spends plenty of time describing and interpreting the monument on which the Oath appears, showing how it was intended to steal Spartan glory on the victory at Plataea. He also looks at other monuments commemorating battle victories so the listener can compare and contrast them.


• He also spends time going over additional items that were part of the fight for commemorative memory, including epigrams, elegies, and even household items.


• There are additional videos posted by the Hellenic Society that look interesting. Expect another post or two on a few of these.

Great Battles Lecture: A Tale of Two City States: Quiriguá's Victory over Copán in 738 CE

Honduran archaeologist Ricardo Agurcia Fasquelle, Executive Director of the Copán Association, presents this inaugural lecture in the Great Battles Series. Until recently scholars depicted the ancient Maya as a peaceful civilization devoid of warfare. This somewhat romantic notion has been overturned by evidence of a starker reality: during the Classic period (ca. 250—900 CE) an array of Maya kingdoms were engaged in a series of major wars that ravaged the heart of the Maya homeland. For much of this era the major kingdom of Copán appears to have escaped these conflicts. Everything changed in 738 CE, however, when Copán was dramatically defeated by its far smaller vassal, Quiriguá.

I decided to watch another lecture on the Great Battles Lecture from the Penn Museum. This was the first lecture in the series, delivered October 3, 2012. I recommend the lecture with two important caveats:

1. This battle hardly seems to qualify as a “great battle,” even if the series uses a very loose definition for both words. Fasquelle admits as much in answer to the first question (“How did this battle change history?”), saying that the study of Mayan history is in its infancy. While much has been uncovered in the past 20 years there is still quite a ways to go in understanding the culture and impact of events. It is important as an example of the warfare that increased toward the end of the Classic period. Even though Copán continued to exist after the battle (although with lesser status), Mayan leaders were seen as deities so the capture and sacrifice of their king probably would have been traumatic. In the end, though, the full impact of this battle is still being studied.
2. Robert Sharer was scheduled to deliver the lecture but he passed away a few weeks before the lecture. Ricardo Agurcia Fasquelle did a very good job filling in at the last moment. I mention this fact because at the time of the lecture there was an exhibit at the Penn Museum based on the work of both men and other teams. Because more information was available to lecture attendees only a limited part of the talk was given to historical context. While a lot of information was given about these two city/states was provided, more context of how they fit in with regard to the Mayan civilization, the area (especially with non-Mayan neighbors), the time, and other areas would have been helpful to non-museum attendees.

With those two qualifications out of the way, here are my notes on the talk, including some of the wording from presentation slides.

How we view the ancient Mayans has changed over time. In the 1940s the Mayans were seen as a theocratic society, occasionally sacrificing a virgin, while gazing at the stars and working on their calendars. Since then their glyphs have been deciphered and much more is understood, including the increase in war. The focus of the last point culminates in 2006’s movie Apocolypto showing mostly bloodthirsty savages. The truth lies somewhere between the two extremes. That Mayans engaged in war is clear though depictions in art, frequency of fortifications, and development of weapons (spears, knives, machetes, and atlatls). During the Classic period Maya warfare was mostly about raids and skirmishes instead of big, pitched battles, short in range and duration. The small scale is a function of the limited ability to travel far while carrying weapons and supplies.

Copán was an open (non-walled) city on the banks of the Copán River with a population growing to around 20,000. The acropolis was the only protected area of the city. Quiriguá was also an open city, on the banks of the Montagua River and growing to a population of 3,000. Neither city was built with an eye toward defense. Both city-states are in a region with shared resources (the most valuable being jade), a distance of a 3-day walk between the two. Copán is the largest and oldest of the two cities, the “big” brother in the relationship, although both have shared history and royal families. Both cities were founded by the same person: K’inich Yax K’uk Mo’, a great Tlaloc warrior. The relationship could be described as a ruler (Copán) / client (Quiriguá) arrangement.

In 725 Copán’s 13th king (Waxaklajun Ub’ah K’awil) oversaw accession of his new Quiriguá subordinate, a stele commemorating the appointment. During the Mayan Classic period there were two major powers—Tikal and Calakmul. Copán had been historically allied with Tikal, as was Quiriguá. In 736, though, the leader of Quiriguá (the one mentioned above appointed by the Copán king) struck an alliance with Calakmul, putting it on a collision course with Copán. On April 27, 738 Waxaklajun Ub’ah K’awil was captured by a war party, marched to Quiriguá, and beheaded. His wife may have been part of the betrayal. The leader of Quiriguá begins to call himself the “black Copán lord.”

Quiriguá flourishes in the aftermath, gaining political and economic autonomy. There is new construction, expanding the city while they control the resources (such as the lucrative jade trade) in the Motagua River valley. Quiriguá is now an independent city/state. Copán stumbles but does not fall. The 14th ruler doesn’t do much since he was on the throne for a short period of time. The 15th ruler of Copán finishes construction on the famous hieroglyphic stairway and other projects. Copán’s dynasty continues through the 16th king. On the Quiriguá Acropolis an inscription tells of a cordial visit by Copán’s 16th (and last) ruler Yax Pasaj on June 28, 810—the cities have reconciled. By 830 both rulers were finished and so were the cities, their people meting away into the tropical forest.

Fasquelle talks about the archeological finds that the teams have made. One of the amusing parts of the lecture is that it is clear that the rivalry between the two city-states has carried down to the different archeological teams and how they view the other city. I mentioned the first question in the Q&A session in the first caveat. The second question addressed why the people abandoned their cities. Fasquelle notes a dramatic population collapse around 900, noting that at Copán it is easier to find remains from 200 BC than from 900 AD. While ultimately we don’t know the reason(s) for the collapse there are several factors we do know that could have played a part. Warfare increased during the late Classic period for whatever reason, possibly an increase in population fighting for limited resources. Remains from the late Classic period show malnutrition. Because of the delicate balance with nature any major change—hurricane, drought, etc.—would have a major impact. Making things more complicated is the abandonment of the Mayan cities in the area took place over a great period of time, at least 100 years instead of all at once. This is another area where investigations are focused.

Again, even though it probably doesn't fit in the loose definition of a great battle it's an interesting lecture. Recommended.

Picture source at Wikipedia

Great Battles Lecture: Hannibal’s Secret Weapon in the Second Punic War

Dr. Patrick Hunt, Stanford University, speaks. Hannibal, a Carthaginian commander who lived ca. 200 BCE, is considered one of the greatest military commanders in history. His use of the environment in his warfare against Rome in the Second Punic War—often called the Hannibalic War—set precedents in military history, utilizing nature and weather conditions as weapons to complement his generally smaller forces. This strategic marshaling of nature could be described as a "second, secret army," as demonstrated in his battles at Trebbia, Trasimene, and Cannae. (Lecture given on June 5, 2013)

I enjoyed the last Great Battles Lecture from the Penn Museum so much I thought I would continue to post on them as new ones are available. Dr. Hunt’s lecture is on Hannibal’s “secret weapon” in the Second Punic War (218 to 201 BC…all subsequent use of dates will be BC unless otherwise noted). Dr. Hunt gave some background on the growing conflict between Carthage and Rome that led to the Punic wars, explored Hannibal’s background, looked at possible routes over the Alps into Italy, and focused on his strategy and tactics. “Secret weapon” may be reaching a bit, but it is clear (as noted in the above description of the lecture) that Hannibal included the use of weather and nature to his advantage. Instead of a summary like I provided for the previous lecture here are my notes and the content of a few slides from the lecture:

Polybius believed a good historian had to visit the locations he was writing about in order to adequately write about them—this gave him “topographical credibility.”

Hannibal’s strategies have been studied for centuries:

1. Know and control the terrain
2. Know your enemy
3. Exploit your enemy’s weakness (including dual consuls)
4. Give your army the best tools (including psychology: encourage your men but be brutal)
5. Ambush whenever possible (deception)
6. Surprise (do the unexpected)

On #4 and psychology: Andreas Kluth’s Hannibal and Me says that Hannibal’s situation, where the army had to “do or die,” is what drove a lot of Hannibal’s men—as invaders, constantly surrounded by superior numbers, they had to either win or die. Hannibal shared the hardships with his men, building camaraderie, but also wanted to be feared. Machiavelli’s maxim that it is better to be feared than loved captures Hannibal’s approach.

Hannibal’s “secret weapon”: Use Nature to your advantage. It was the equivalent of expanding his arsenal with a secret army). His tactics included the following:

• Cross mountains (Alps in winter)
• Use winter cold and time (Trebia)
• Cross swamps in spring (Arno River)
• Use summer fog (Trasimene)
• Fight at night (Ager Falernus-Volturnus)
• Use dust-blowing wind (Cannae)

Dr. Hunt steps back at this point to look at Carthage in general, then focuses on the 3rd century. First Punic War—Sicily was the battle ground (264-241) as Rome expanded and came into conflict with Carthage’s trading superiority. The Treaty of Lutatius is onerous on Carthage. After the First Punic War, Rome called the Mediterranean Mare Nostrum (“our sea”).

In his 1935 work (title not mentioned—I’m guessing Roman Alpine Routes) Walter Woodburn Hyde says that early Romans are show a fear of mountains in their writings.

Dr. Hunt reviews the debated point of Carthage’s child sacrifice and the tophet. Also covers Hannibal’s mention of his experience having a proxy animal sacrificed in his place. His father, Hamilcar, had a grudge with the way he was treated by Carthage. He went to Spain to build up autonomous resources.

Hannibal received aide in crossing the Alps, after researching it. A maritime crossing into Italy was not feasible—heavily guarded. Valleys within the Alps was the route. From Livy’s History (XXI.32): “The dreadful vision was now before their eyes: the towering peaks, the snowclad pinnacles soaring to the sky, the people with their Wild and ragged hair.” (Livy, unlike Polybius, didn’t visit the locations he wrote about). Dr. Hunt has been exploring possible routes over the Alps, following the valleys and passes and narrowing down the possible routes based on the historian’s descriptions. He provides some of Polybius’ descriptions and shows slides from some of his own trips along the route (around 37:30 is an anecdote about taking Stanford football players on a trip).

Hannibal makes an example of the Taurinian clans (Celts). Polybius (Book 3, 52-53): when Hannibal descends out of the Alps his men are more like beasts than humans—they have suffered so much. Hannibal augments his troops with Celts. Up to 25% of troops at this time are Celts. Up to 10 languages spoken by Hannibal’s troops, a true international force.

Dr. Hunt showed some of the artwork by Angus McBride, drawings of various allies Hannibal absorbed into his army and their unique weaponry. He also displayed pictures from Serge Lancel’s Hannibal to highlight the weapons used by varying groups in his multicultural army, such as the falcate (cleaver). The takeaway from these pictures was that Hannibal had different tools and weapons because of the many backgrounds in his army.

Battle of Trebia: on the winter solstice—shortest day of the year. Hannibal sent his Numidian cavalry across the Trebia River early in the day. Sempronius was in charge of the Roman army because Scipio had been wounded. Hannibal knew the strengths and weaknesses of each general he faced and took advantage of Sempronius being in charge. The forces of Sempronius were lured, unprepared, into the freezing Trebia River while the Numidians had prepared for it. Hypothermia set in before the Romans had crossed the river—Hannibal used the weather as an ally. Romans treated Trebia as an accident, not realizing the tactics Hannibal used to his advantage.

Then Hannibal crossed the Arno—the crossing of a swamp, which was not a happy time for his army, but had the element of surprise. Trasimene saw another hothead, Flaminius, in charge of the Romans. Hannibal took advantage of the fog from the lake that occurred this time of year—Hannibal’s army was hidden in the fog while Flaminius charged into a killing zone. At least 30K Romans and allies killed in this battle.

Fabius Maximus, now commander of the Roman army, declined to engage Hannibal directly. Fabius was nicknamed “the delayer,” which wasn’t intended as a compliment. At Ager Falernus, Hannibal had been bottled up in the valley while Fabius had blocked river crossings and mountain passes. Hannibal escaped and avoided a major battle by using his cattle, alighting bundles of flammable material on their heads and sending them into the hills. Fabius knew it was a trick but his guards chased the cattle, leaving a pass open. Yet another disaster for the Roman army.

At Cannae, wind from off the coast carried dust this time of year, creating a screen for Hannibal. Rome was using many raw recruits, due to previous losses, as well as new leaders that were politically motivated. The terrain has been chosen by Hannibal to make the Roman attempt to fight like a Greek phalanx ineffective. Hannibal has less men but the Roman army was constrained…they could not sweep out, or envelop the Carthaginian army. Combine this with the dust and wind, and once the experienced Roman leaders were killed Carthage was insured the victory. Hannibal’s troops feint and encourage the Romans to rush to their deaths.

Effect of Roman defeat at Battle of Cannae: depending upon the source, it is estimated that 55,000 (Livy) – 70,000 (Polybius) Romans were killed or captured at Cannae. Among the dead were the Roman consul Lucius Aernilius Paullus, as well two counsuls for the preceding year, two quaestors, twenty-nine out of the forty-eight military tribunes, and an additional eighty senators (at a time when the Roman Senate was comprised of no more than 300 men, this constituted 25%-30% of the governing body). Virtually 1 in 5 of very Roman male between 18-40 was killed. Not a single Roman family was unaffected. Hannibal collected 200 gold rings of Eques knights. All this happened in six hours.

At this point Rome lay open to Hannibal but he decided not to lay siege to the city, the hinge-point of the war. From Livy’s History XXII.61: “How much more serious was the defeat of Cannae, than those which preceded it can be seen by the behavior of Rome’s allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they despaired of Roman Power.” Hannibal spent (wasted) a decade in Italy, then Scipio Africanus takes the battle directly to the Cartheginians. Roman military strategy and tactics changed after Hannibal.


Update: More detail on Carthage can be found in my post on Richard Miles’ book Carthage Must Be Destroyed

Great Battles Lecture: Thermopylae: The Battle for Europe?

(From the YouTube description) Dr. Jeremy McInerny [sic], Professor of Classical Studies, examines the tactics and strategy of the Battle of Thermopylae (in present-day Greece) in 480 BCE. Why was the battle fought at this location and was it, as it is often portrayed, a turning point in the confrontation of East and West? This lecture puts the Battle of Thermopylae into the context of the Persian Wars, and examines the battle's significance for the Greeks as well as for Europeans in later periods, in art and poetry.

Professor Jeremy McInerney of the University of Pennsylvania may be familiar to some of you since he has done a few series for The Great Courses. His lecture on Thermopylae is perfect timing for me since it’s a good precursor for Paul Cartledge’s new book After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars (which I hope to post on next week). Since I seem to highly recommend videos that aren't exactly popular (I was viewer 148), this post will combine a semi-summary of his lecture with some occasional fleshing out of the topics he raises.

His talk attempts to put the Battle of Thermopylae in context for what it meant to the Greeks as well as what it meant going forward for the West. He jokingly starts the lecture showing the who, what, when, and where of the battle. He mentions there is a need to “unpack” the battle since so many people have the view that “Western civilization as we know it would not have come about had the Greeks not been victorious at Thermopylae.” He obviously includes much tongue-in-cheek when claiming a Greek victory at Thermopylae. Because of the resonance to the imagination that the battle engenders, though, I don’t think he’s far wrong in turning what was a disaster into a propaganda-like victory. One of the important topics is the “battle of images” that arose after the fact.

Something that stood out in his lecture I don’t think I’ve mentioned in previous posts is that the Greeks try to have it different ways in their characterization of the wars with Persia, depending on what point of comparison is emphasized. The Greeks, though outnumbered by some inflated factor, are often portrayed as an equal to Persia. In looking at the battle of ideas or ideals, Greece is portrayed as far superior. While it’s an obvious point, McInerney shows a map of Persian territory as compared to the combination of Greek city-states around 490 B.C. Greece is the equivalent of a rounding error when compared to the Persian empire. So which is it? Superior, underdog, or equal? Maybe a mix of each?

McInerney raises a point about the Persian empire’s expansion that could apply to other empires of the ancient world:

“We are so conditioned in modern history to look for complex causes, for imperial expansion, economic motives, religious motives and so forth, that we often ignore the brutally simple fact that in the ancient world empires expanded because they could. They simply took more territory when it was available to them.”

The same could be said for many of the Greek cities in the years and conflicts following the Persian wars. McInerney provides a quick overview of the clashes between Persia and Greece, but also notes the cooperation and intermingling between the two, providing detail to support his comment that “The contact between Greeks and Persians culturally goes much deeper than we would often like to admit.” After providing some background on Persia during the time of Darius, McInerney looks at several points of conflict between Athens and Persia, focusing on the Ionian Revolt and the help the Athenians provided. He also goes into detail on the different modes and techniques of warfare between the Greeks and the Persians.

McInerney presents a useful graphic of the Battle of Marathon, highlighting the keys of Greek success. The importance of the victory was great, while the fallout and effects could be seen as out of proportion. “To have defeated that army [of the vast Persian empire] was an accomplishment of superhuman proportions. And it triggered in Athenian culture an astonishing degree of confidence in what they were able to do.”

A decade later when the Greeks learned of the invasion of Xerxes’ army (at least two years in advance), the strategic chokepoint of Thermopylae was the obvious place to slow the Persian advance. Mcinerney looks at Herodotus 7.206 for the purpose of Leonidas and the Spartans (in conjunction with naval engagements). He then reads Herodotus’ account of the third day of battle, after Ephialtes of Trachis betrays the Greeks. Thermopylae was a military disaster while Salamis and Plataea were the victories that stopped the Persian invasion. Why does Thermopylae capture the ancient and modern imagination so much? Calling to mind the celebration of ANZAC day (and he could have mentioned many other examples), he notes “a national identity can be built around a defeat.” What arose, as shown in Herodotus’ account, was a framework pitting East against West, freedom versus slavery. The mythological aspects of the battle began almost immediately.

McInerney presents a slide capturing some of the changes flowing from the battle beyond the celebration of the heroes. Eleutheria [freedom] enters the political discourse where previously it was used only to differentiate between a free man and a slave, Barbarian becomes a term of abuse instead of commenting on how someone spoke or their being non-Greek. Greek confidence leads to a cultural flowering. And while the loss led to a feeling of triumph, it also produced a less-than-attractive triumphalism.

As an example of the last point—whose Xerxes do we talk about? The noble ruler? Or an “eight-foot tall Brazilian metrosexual with more body piercings than you’ll see on South Street on a Saturday night?” In the 2006 movie version of Thermopylae the subtext is so forward that it becomes the text itself—there is a threat coming from the East, and that threat goes beyond the stated freedom versus slavery. The Eurymedon vase, from the 460s B.C. captures what the movie hints at—who buggers who? Herodotus’ noble, heroic account quickly becomes vulgarized and represented by the worst stereotypes.

McInerney looks at the triumphalism of Athens. While mentioning the good things flowing from the triumph, it’s important to keep in mind the people celebrating these heroics would turn allies into enemies. Their assemblies would vote to slaughter all the men of a city revolting against their tyranny. Empires are empires, with all their accompanying traits. Even though Athens helped defeat Persia it effectively becomes an empire, with many of the same traits they portray in their vanquished enemy. This is part of the complicated story of Thermopylae, where things aren’t always black and white.

The lecture ends with the reading of C. P. Cavafy’s poem “Thermopylae”, which chooses to highlight what Athens should have done and been after the battle, not what they did:

Honor to those who in the life they lead
define and guard a Thermopylae.
Never betraying what is right,
consistent and just in all they do
but showing pity also, and compassion;
generous when they are rich, and when they are poor,
still generous in small ways,
still helping as much as they can;
always speaking the truth,
yet without hating those who lie.

And even more honor is due to them
when they foresee (as many do foresee)
that in the end Ephialtis will make his appearance,
that the Medes will break through after all.

A quick note on playing the video: it initially cut off for me at the 46:53 point despite showing a length of 53:23. Upon reloading the page and advancing to the 46 minute mark I was able to see the final minutes. I’m not sure if that glitch was on my end or YouTube’s, but I did want to mention it in case it happens to others. Despite the mention of a Q&A session, it was not included in the video.

Another note: while there is much to look at regarding Thermopylae, I focused on the aspects of Homeric epic in my post from The Histories.