Arrian: Book One—additional thoughts during the conference call

A few stray thoughts during the conference call covering Book One of The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch this evening, some have been bubbling beneath the surface while others were spurred by other comments.

One of the first points discussed was Arrian’s assessment as a historian. For ancient historians, Herodotus and Thucydides would be an obvious comparison. And to some extent Arrian invites such a comparison in his two prefaces. Arrian sprinkles a few social comments in Book One along the lines of Herodotus, such as the origin and language of the Sidetans. Commentary such as this example feels natural in Herodotus’ many digressions but they stand out in Arrian’s history since he has fewer examples.

One feature that stands out in the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides are the speeches that provide context and advance the narrative. These speeches convey several topics or events in one neat quote. Arrian’s history uses few speeches in Book One, limited mostly to interaction between Alexander and his general Parmenion. There are two conversations between them in Book One, Alexander rejecting Parmenion’s advice in both situations. There will be at least two more examples of interaction between the general and his king similar to these examples, Alexander rejecting Parmenion’s advice and the Macedonians carrying the day. After the two examples in Book One I get the feeling this is a literary device similar to Herodotus’ or Thucydides’ use of speeches. (For those that don't know Parmenion’s fate at this point, let's just say it’s not good, adding to the feeling of embellishing how good Alexander looks at his general’s expense.)

The question was raised during the call if Alexander is presented as a romantic character in Arrian’s history. Alexander fits the mold of a romantic character on many counts, but… is it possible to be a romantic character in a Greek tragedy? Alexander demonstrates a maturity and ingenuity at the start of his reign that seems to deteriorate over the history. His flaws, self-induced in many ways, may have helped lead to his early demise. Or maybe not. Something to keep in mind as the history unfolds…

Arrian: Book One—Granicus: “Except for the Spartans”

A few additional thoughts I wanted to add to my previous post on the battle at the Granicus River…

To camp or not to camp

1. When Alexander learned of the concentration of the Persian forces, he advanced rapidly and encamped opposite the enemy, so that the Granicus flowed between the encampments. 2. The Persians, resting on high ground, made no move, intending to fall upon the foes as he crossed the river, for they supposed they could easily carry the day when the Macedonian phalanx was divided. 3. But Alexander at dawn boldly brought his army across the river and deployed in good order before they could stop him. In return, they posted their mass of horsemen all along the front of the Macedonians since they had decided to press the battle with these.

Diodorus Siculus, The Library of History, translation by C. Bradford Welles, Book XVII, 19.1-3

I think Diodorus’ narrative makes much more sense, where Alexander camps at the Granicus River the evening before the battle, although it's much less dramatic than Arrian’s version.

The new Achilles

A thousand years, said the histroians, divided the victory at the Granicus from the fall of Troy, which Callisthenes had calculated to occur in the same month as Alexander’s invasion; a thousand years, therefore, between one Achilles and the coming of his rival to the plains of Nemesis, goddess of revenge, as Callisthenes described the site of the battlefield. It was indeed the start of a new age, though none of those who turned away from the site could ever have realized how; not in a new philosophy or science, but in the geographical width of conquest and the incidental spread of a people’s way of life.

from Alexander the Great, Robin Lane Fox

Except for the Spartans

In addition to his biographers, Alexander also knew how to frame things to his advantage. After the battle at the Granicus River, Alexander “sent three hundred sets of Persian armor to Athens as a dedicatory offering to Athena on the acropolis, and even ordered the following words to be inscribed: “Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks, except for the Spartans, dedicated these spoils from the barbarians dwelling in Asia.” (1.16.7, The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch) The invasion of Asia had been cast as a Panhellinic crusade against the “barbarians,” former invaders of Greece (and more). The thousands of Greek mercenaries in Persian employ that Alexander slaughtered at the end of this battle didn't quite fit the narrative.

But my favorite part of the dedication was highlighting the Spartans opting out of the League of Corinth, even after Alexander's appeal to them. The Spartans had replied that they were the ones worthy to lead and would not be led. How much would “except for the Spartans” bother them? My guess is not that much. Apparently I’m not the only one that feels that way.

“Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks except the Lacedaimonians...”

We can very well imagine
how completely indifferent the Spartans would have been
to this inscription. “Except the Lacedaimonians”—
naturally. The Spartans
weren’t to be led and ordered around
like precious servants. Besides,
a pan-Hellenic expedition without
a Spartan king in command
was not to be taken very seriously.
Of course, then, “except the Lacedaimonians.”

That’s certainly one point of view. Quite understandable.

So, “except the Lacedaimonians” at Granikos,
then at Issus, then in the decisive battle
where the terrible army
the Persians mustered at Arbela was wiped out:
it set out for victory from Arbela, and was wiped out.

And from this marvelous pan-Hellenic expedition,
triumphant, brilliant in every way,
celebrated on all sides, glorified
as no other has ever been glorified,
incomparable, we emerged:
the great new Hellenic world.

We the Alexandrians, the Antiochians,
the Selefkians, and the countless
other Greeks of Egypt and Syria,
and those in Media, and Persia, and all the rest:
with our far-flung supremacy,
our flexible policy of judicious integration,
and our Common Greek Language
which we carried as far as Bactria, as far as the Indians.

Talk about Lacedaimonians after that!

“In the Year 200 B.C.” by C. P. Cavafy
C.P. Cavafy, Collected Poems. Translated by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard. Edited by George Savidis. Revised Edition. Princeton University Press, 1992.

Arrian: Book One—Granicus: “Thou art invincible”

Then he went to Delphi, to consult Apollo concerning the success of the war he had undertaken, and happening to come on one of the forbidden days, when it was esteemed improper to give any answers from the oracle, he sent messengers to desire the priestess to do her office; and when she refused, on the plea of a law to the contrary, he went up himself, and began to draw her by force into the temple, until tired and overcome with his importunity, "My son," said she, "thou art invincible." Alexander taking hold of what she spoke, declared he had received such an answer as he wished for, and that it was needless to consult the god any further. Among other prodigies that attended the departure of his army, the image of Orpheus at Libethra, made of cypress-wood, was seen to sweat in great abundance, to the discouragement of many. But Aristander told him, that far from presaging any ill to him, it signified he should perform acts so important and glorious as would make the poets and musicians of future ages labor and sweat to describe and celebrate them.

- From Alexander, Plutarch’s Lives, the Dryden translation edited by Arthur Hugh Clough

For tonight’s conference call on Book One of The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander (see the sidebar for more information) I was asked to begin the discussion on the battle at the Granicus River, Alexander’s first conflict with the Persians. I wanted to post my thoughts here in order to organize them for tonight’s call—the following doesn’t necessarily address all of the discussion questions about the battle. I may raise more questions than I answer as well as engage in a lot of surmising, presuming, and guessing to fill in the blanks of Arrian’s narrative.

The Persians
The Persians did not attempt to stop Alexander when he crossed the Hellespont. Were they content with their army and cavalry strength as compared to the Macedonians and Greeks? By letting Alexander cross freely at the Hellespont it seems like they are daring Alexander to face them on their turf. For the Persians, Memnon of Rhodes had faced the advance Macedonian force led by Parmenion the previous year and had driven them back to wait for Alexander. He was most familiar with their capabilities (some of this comes from sources other than Arrian…I’ll try and limit outside sources from now on except for the opening quote):

Memnon of Rhodes advised them not to take a chance against the Macedonians, whose infantry, he said, was far superior to their own; furthermore, he said, the Macedonians had Alexander present, while on their side Darius was absent. He advised them to march ahead, destroy the grazing land by trampling it with the cavalry, and burn the standing harvest, not even sparing the cities themselves; Alexander would not remain in the country, he said, if provisions were scarce. (from 1.12.9, The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch)

Memnon’s suggestion of a scorched-earth policy, in hindsight, proved to be the perfect tactic to deprive Alexander of the ability to live off the land. If the Persians had followed this advice, Alexander could have supplied his troops to some extent as long as he stayed close to the coast and used his fleet to supply the troops. But for how long? As it was, Alexander disbanded the fleet at Miletus due to monetary constraints. But politics never change—the other Persian commanders questioned Memnon’s motives for avoiding a direct fight with Alexander instead of evaluating the proposal on its own merits.

Alexander
Since Parmenion had already faced the Persians his counsel should have carried more weight than Alexander allowed. Parmenion seems destined to be used as Alexander’s foil or Arrian’s literary device. Even allowing for literary license, Alexander’s behavior demonstrates a mix of recklessness, confidence, and desperation. In Book One, Alexander establishes he can choose or avoid battles to his advantage. Does Alexander’s mad rush into battle, both in general for the entire army and specifically with his behavior, show us how important he viewed this battle? Did he trust the priestess in her claim that he was invincible?

The “early renown in the war” was important to Alexander but that phrase comes from Miletus where he already had achieved several victories (including Granicus). I can’t shake the feeling that the battle at the Granics River for Alexander boiled down to two choices—success or death. If he failed here, his invasion against Persian forces would effectively be over. He uses a similar rationale at Miletus in choosing not to engage in a direct naval battle because of the perceived superior Persian fleet. But at the Granicus River the Persians held a markedly better position, which offset any superiority Alexander thought his troops held, numerical or situational. Did Alexander’s decision at the Granicus River boil down to a choice between marked success and veiled suicide? If Alexander failed in this battle it seems that his intended invasion of Persia would be over, the Greek cities would renege on the League of Corinth, and his reign in Macedonia would be challenged.


There are many other points that could be investigated surrounding this battle. The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander has many appendices pertaining to various aspects of Alexander’s reign and campaigns. I’m happy to say that one aspect that I think gets overlooked or marginalized is addressed in Appendix F: “Money and Finance in the Campaigns of Alexander”. An army cannot march very far beyond where it can afford to go or where it can be supplied, however boring such topics may be to cover.

Arrian: Book One—loyalty and betrayal

There are many aspects of Alexander that could be discussed from Book One such as the ingenuity demonstrated in avoiding the Thracian carts or in crossing the Danube with hay-filled tents. There is a lot to look at in his mature military tactics demonstrated at the Granicus River or his ability to improvise during the siege of Halicarnassus. Not that those aspects aren't important, but I thought it worthwhile to observe Alexander’s demonstrations of loyalty and the loyalty he expected to receive in Book One to provide a baseline for comparison during the rest of his campaigns. All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

After his father’s death, Alexander insures the Greek cities were still supportive of the League of Corinth with Alexander at its head (Sparta excepted). Hearing rumors of revolt in Thrace, Alexander moves to quell dissension in those dependent territories before beginning his march toward Persia. Alexander makes it clear that he considered having a unified home base a high priority when he returns to Thebes after its revolt. Thebes’ destruction and the death and enslavement of its citizens must have been intended to send a message to any other Greek city contemplating revolt. It certainly worked for Athens, who sent embassies to Alexander to assure him of their support.

Early in his campaign, Alexander’s wrath fell on many Greeks that faced him on the battlefield or tried to subvert him. After defeating the Persian forces at the Granicus River Alexander had the Greek mercenaries fighting for the Persians slaughtered. Mercenaries that survived were sold into slavery in Macedonia. Even with entreaties from Athenian emissaries, Alexander refused to release these slaves. Although Arrian does not explain why, Alexander must have felt the slaves provided insurance for continued Athenian support during his campaigns. (Alexander may have had in mind the Spartan hostages taken in the Battle of Sphacteria during the Peloponnesian War, providing Athens with assurance that Sparta would stop invading Attica.) Alexander equated fighting by Greek soldiers in foreign armies against him as breaking the terms of the League of Corinth—while not technically Greek, Arrian makes it clear Alexander thought he was, whether directly or as leader of the League’s forces.

After Alexander’s victory at the Granicus River, many of the Greek cities in Asia Minor opened their gates to Alexander and were usually rewarded...or at least not punished. Alexander must have realized the implications of his slaughter of Greek mercenaries after the Granicus River battle because he saw determined Greek soldiers at Miletus who appeared ready to fight to the death. Seeing their “nobility and steadfastness”, Alexander offered the Greek mercenaries at Miletus clemency if they fought for him.

Arrian mentions several actions by Alexander calculated to insure or increase his troops’ loyalty to him. Macedonian soldiers that fell at the Granicus River were provided heroic funerals and he provided for their families in Macedonia. Alexander mingled with soldiers wounded in that battle, allowing them to chat and brag about their exploits. Later in the campaign Alexander earned praise and honor from his troops by allowing the soldiers that had been recently married before leaving home to return to their homes for the winter. Alexander administered the cities he took in Asia Minor in such a way that would have earned loyalty from many of them. Tribute rates remained the same or were reduced while many oligarchies were replaced with democratic governments. If a city reneged on its agreement with Alexander, though, they could expect retribution. Aspendos delayed fulfilling their terms of capitulation to Alexander which brought about the doubling of their required payments.

Cities trying to hold out against Alexander, causing him to spend an extended amount of time and effort in conducting siege operations, seem to earn his greatest wrath in Book One. Halicarnassus provides the main example of Alexander’s vengeance when it eventually fell to him. Alexander had the city razed except for a couple of citadels he deemed easier to continue to blockade. It’s as if Alexander takes it as a personal affront if has to lay siege to a city. Is it the extra effort? Impersonal fighting during the siege? Wasted time? It's impossible to say, but I want to see if this trait continues.

The example of Alexander son of Aeropus provides an instructive example of Alexander’s early display of loyalty and those that betray it. This “other Alexander” was brother of the two men who killed his father Philip (as Arrian attributes the plot—that the conspiracy of Philip’s murder had other options or had other possibile murderers is not addressed by Arrian). Since the "other Alexander" immediately supported Alexander’s ascension to the throne he was allowed into the royal inner circle and became captain of the Thessalian cavalry. But... Alexander son of Aeropus was soon rumored to be part of a conspiracy with the Persians to murder Alexander. Instead of acting rashly, Alexander convenes a council with close friends who provide frank assessments, leading to the other Alexander’s arrest. (His ultimate fate is not described here.) As I said earlier, this provides a baseline for any future plots, real or perceived, and how Alexander will handle them.

Arrian: Book One—I am the greatest, at least by association

Arrian takes pride in his work, most notably in the two prologues in Book One. In these passages he directly addresses the reader, stressing the greatness of his subject and, by association as his chronicler, of himself. I think it’s worth taking a minute to look at Arrian’s claims in these prefaces or prologues. The second prologue deserves additional scrutiny because of its placement, comparisons, and claims. All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

In the first prologue (often labeled the Preface), Arrian defends his use of Ptolemy and Aristoboulos as his main sources because they both served under Alexander (they were there), both wrote after Alexander died (nothing to gain or lose by telling the truth), and Ptolemy would, as king, would “have been more disgraceful to speak falsely”. The last point makes Arrian appear somewhat credulous, to say the least, but I’m sure it scored some nice points with the emperor in the obvious bow to authority. Arrian has included additional material when they seemed “worth relating and not wholly implausible”. When Ptolemy and Aristoboulos disagree on their accounts, Arrian again goes with the more plausible account.

The first preface ends with Arrian’s charge to any reader surprised at his writing this history of Alexander: “Any readers who are surprised that it would have occurred to me to write this history, after so many others have written theirs, should read the other accounts and then mine—and then let them say they’re surprised.” The first prologue sets the initial tone of the work, but it pales in comparison to the claims of the second prologue at 1.12.2-5. At this point in the narrative Alexander has just crossed the Hellespont, visited the remains of Troy, and laid a wreath on the tomb of Achilles. The symbolism piles up as Arrian reintroduces his work. Arrian claims Alexander had one unfortunate trait—the lack of a worthy history. Achilles had Homer. Is Arrian implying that he’s the equivalent of Homer? I wouldn’t be surprised given his attitude in the rest of this passage. Alexander’s “exploits were not published to mankind in a worthy manner either in prose or in verse. Nor were his praises sung in lyric poetry… .” And Arrian thinks he is just the guy to do it—as he implies, a great figure deserves a great writer.

Arrian takes several shots at Xenophon, providing pointed contrasts between Alexander’s and Xenophon’s accomplishments. While Arrian revered Xenophon since he added the historian's name to his own, apparently the appreciation resided mostly in Xenophon’s writing ability and not his military achievements. Or maybe just when compared to Alexander. There may be (a no longer false) modesty from Arrian in this history regarding a) his distance from the subject (compared to Xenophon who wrote his own history in the Anabasis), and b) his willingness to go unnamed in the work. Arrian claims “these chronicles are my country and my family and my offices, and have been from my youth.” Since Alexander held the “foremost place among warriors”, then Arrian should hold “a foremost place among Greek writers”. Many comments spring to mind from these prefaces, but I’ll limit myself to one point.

Arrian makes it clear in the first preface there were many histories of Alexander’s exploits to choose from when compiling a history. The second preface, though, complains of the void in adequately relaying his deeds in a “worthy manner either in prose or in verse.” I think it worth looking at these two claims. Several options can explain the void despite numerous histories but I keep coming back to two reasons. If Arrian meant there were not many great writers from Alexander’s time down to the second century CE that addressed Alexander's life then Arrian engages in self-promotion consistent with his claims in the prefaces, especially in the second one. Alexander's accomplishments cannot be denied, as Arrian declares, but there may be a tacit admission regarding conflicting views of Alexander. I’m not referring to the conflicting histories Arrian mentions—paring down to just the basic facts provides a somewhat consistent narrative. Where the historian places the emphasis in those facts can make all the difference. I’m looking forward to see how Arrian handles the many facets of Alexander.

Arrian: Book One—a study in contrasts, part two

Alexander’s shrewdness when choosing the appropriate action to advance short- and long-term goals lies in his ability to take differing positions when necessary. This post looks at a few of his different approaches to battles in Book One of The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch (source for all quotes).

Alexander could be headstrong when he felt a battle was called for. Upon arriving at the Granicus River soon after crossing into Asia, the Macedonians see the Persian army prepared to meet them on the other side of the river. Parmenion suggests to Alexander that the Macedonians should camp on their own side of the river and cross early in the morning since the river had deep spots, the troops would be bunched up while trying to cross, and the banks on the opposite side were steep. “Thus our first stumble would harm our present standing and might even spoil the outcome of the larger war” noted Parmenion. 1.13.5)

Alexander’s answer and his action in the battle at the Granicus River would provide a foundation for any perception that he spoiled for a fight, something he notes in his reply:

But Alexander replied, “I know all that Parmenion, But I would be ashamed, after having easily crossed the Hellespont, if this little stream:--such was the phrase he used to disparage the Granicus—“keeps us from crossing as we are. I would consider it unworthy of the Macedonians’ renown and of my quickness to accept risks. And I think the Persians would take courage and think themselves a match for the Macedonians in battle, seeing that up to now their fears have not been confirmed by what they have experienced.”
(1.13.6-7)

Alexander’s reckless behavior in battle, constantly putting himself in the forefront and exposing himself to danger, would be enough to cement his reputation of accepting risks. But that wasn’t always the case in the army’s march. Alexander, at least in Book One, picks and chooses his battles where he feels necessary. At Thebes and Halicarnassus he pauses during the attack to give the cities a chance to respond to overtures for negotiation. Reminiscent of Alcibiades in Thucydides, Alexander welcomes any opportunity to take a city by sedition. Alexander demonstrated an outlook that preserved his troops several times, avoiding battles where a fight was not necessary (such as the Triballoi and Thracians who escaped to the island in the Danube). Any city that reneged on its surrender or agreement of cooperation, like Aspendos, would find a harsh fate with Alexander.

The role of aggressive commander and hesitant assistant changes at Miletus, where Parmenion councils immediate attack while Alexander looks for other ways to succeed.

Nevertheless, Parmenion advised Alexander to fight at sea. Expecting for a variety of reasons that the Greeks would prevail with their fleet, he had been particularly impressed by an omen: an eagle had been seen on the shore near the sterns of Alexander’s ships. It was Parmenion’s view that if they were victorious, it would be of great advantage to their enterprise as a whole, whereas a defeat would not much matter, since the Persians already had the upper hand at sea. He asserted that he himself was ready to embark with the fleet and run the risk. But Alexander declared that Parmenion was mistaken in his judgment and that his interpretation of the omen was improbable. It would not make sense, he said, with so few ships, to fight at sea against a much larger fleet, and to engage the well-trained navies of the Cyprians and Phoenicians when their own was untrained. Furthermore, he had no wish to surrender to the barbarians the fate of his experienced and daring Macedonians on an element so uncertain. A naval defeat would considerably harm their early renown in the war, particularly because the Greeks, elated by the news of a naval defeat, would revolt. Taking these points into account, Alexander argued that this was not the proper time to engage the enemy at sea. Besides, he said, he interpreted the omen differently: the eagle was indeed a favorable omen, but because it was seen on the ground, he rather thought it meant that he would prevail over the Persian fleet from the land.
(1.18.6-9)

Note the importance of “renown in the war”. This has already played an important role in keeping the Greeks in line at home. But before Arrian's history is taken at face value (yes, I know, a little late at this point), let's take a look at Arrian's direct comments to the reader...

Arrian: Book One—a study in contrasts, part one

Part of Alexander’s greatness or shrewdness derived from his ability to choose an action that advanced his short- and long-term goals. The next couple of posts will look at Book I of Arrian’s history and highlight a few of these choices and how they furthered his objectives even though his actions can appear inconstant and vary greatly in practical application. All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

The first quote looks at Alexander countering the revolt in Thebes:

For a short time the Thebans posted at the Ampheion held their ground, but when they were pressed hard on all sides by the Macedonians and by Alexander, who seemed to pop up everywhere, the Theban horsemen dashed through the city and rushed out into the plain, while the foot soldiers tried to save themselves as best they could. After that, it was not the Macedonians so much as the Phocians, the Plataeans, and other Boeotians who, in a rage, slaughtered the Thebans helter-skelter even when they made no move to defend themselves, falling upon some in their houses, upon others who forcibly resisted, and even upon those who tried to approach the temples as suppliants, sparing neither women nor children.
(1.8.7-8)

Any valid history of Alexander has to deal with the body count left in his wake, even in cases like this where his Macedonian troops are not the ones committing the atrocities. Alexander had control over what happened in the city as the next example will make clear, even when blood feuds were being settled. His decision to allow the slaughter of the Thebans must have been meant to send a message to any other “Greek” cities that he would not allow revolt, whether he was nearby or in India. To punish Thebes he stopped his invasion of Asia, setting those plans back several months in order to drive home that point. I’m sure any other city, even if they heard rumors of Alexander’s death (like Thebes had received), would think twice after learning of Thebes’ punishment. How bad was the slaughter? The summary for the section after the above quote describes how it was seen a few centuries later by the author: “Arrian pauses to compare the suffering of Thebes with other great disasters inflicted by one Greek city on another. He finds that all previous cataclysms pale in comparison to the fate of Thebes.”

Alexander could be merciful at times when it benefited him. After his troops take Ephesus, his behavior stands in marked contrast after the recent sack of Thebes:

Reaching Ephesus on the fourth day, Alexander restored all the exiles who on his account had been banished from the city; dissolving the oligarchy, he established a democracy in its place. He then ordered that all the tribute that had formerly been paid to the barbarians [Persians] now be paid to Artemis. When the common people’s fear of the oligarchs had been dispelled, they became eager to kill those who were in favor of calling in Memnon, as well as those who had despoiled the temple of Artemis and those who had thrown down the statue of Philip in the temple and dug up the tomb of Heropythos, the city’s liberator, in the marketplace. Syrphax, his son Pelagon, and the sons of Syrphax’s brothers were led away from the shrine and stoned to death. But Alexander prevented the Ephesians from seeking out and taking vengeance on others, as he realized that if he granted them permission they would unjustly kill the innocent along with the guilty, either to settle private scores or to seize the property of the victims. Never was Alexander’s conduct held in higher esteem than on that occasion, because of what he did in Ephesus.
(1.17.10-12)

That last sentence has an echo later on in Book I when Alexander allows his recently-married soldiers to go home for the winter (instead of staying in Asia).

Some of the Macedonians serving with Alexander had married shortly before the expedition, and he recognized that he should not neglect them. Accordingly, he sent them home form Caria to spend the winter with their wives in Macedonia, having placed them under the command of Ptolemy, son of Selukos, one of the royal bodyguards, and two of the generals—Koinos son of Polemokrates and Meleagros son of Neoptolemos—as these men, too, had recently married. He directed them to enlist as many horsemen and infantrymen from the country as they could before returning and bringing back their cohort. And for this deed, more than for any other, Alexander was held in esteem by the Macedonians. He also sent Kleandros son of Polemokrates to levy troops in the Peloponnese.
(1.24.1-2)

Alexander’s rashness will emerge over his decade-plus adventure in Asia but at the beginning of his reign and campaign we see a shrewdness calculated for maximum effect and calibrated for the situation.

The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander online resources

Picture source

One great thing about the Landmark editions is the support provided within each book: maps, indexes, annotations, appendices help make reading the work more rewarding and enjoyable. Providing an online resource post for a book from the series seems unnecessary but I like to do it anyway.

A database with links to major and minor ancient sources on Alexander’s history. The Arrian work is the translation by E.J. Chinnock (1893).

The Internet Ancient History Sourcebook links related to Alexander

pothos.org, billed as Alexander the Great's home on the web

Excerpts from Penguin Books’ The Campaigns of Alexander, translated by Aubrey de Sélincourt. The introduction by J. R. Hamilton appears to be complete.

The article “The Loneliness of Alexander the Great” by Conrad Clough, focusing on the same topic of Ernst Badian’s Alexander the Great and the Loneliness of Power. Also note the “related article” section in the sidebar.

Alexander's Last Days: Malaria and Mind Games? - an article by John Atkinson, Elsie Truter, and Etienne Truter. Originally published in Acta Classica.

Alexander the Great on the Web: links, links and more links

You can find any post regarding Arrian on my site here, including all the posts at Forbes’ “Booked” blog with historians James Romm and Paul A. Cartledge

The Reading Odyssey should have podcasts, book by book, available on their site after each conference call this year. More information on the schedule can be found in this post.

A review of The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander by Victor Davis Hanson


Some resources from university or class sites:

The University of Warwick’s module for Alexander. Not everything in the sidebar is currently available.

Prof. Nicholas K. Rauh’s site for Purdue’s Spring 2010 class on Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic World. I have only checked out a few pages in the section of lecture notes but they look helpful.

The syllabus, with a few links, of Barbara Saylor Rodgers’ Fall 2006 course on Alexander the Great at the University of Vermont

A Lego version of Alexander (from the FC Historical Figure contest)

Update (10 Oct 2011): Mary Beard has an article titled "Alexander: How Great?" at the New York Review of Books which covers several books on Alexander (and one on Philip)

Update (16 Jan 2012): Scott McCulloch at Ancient Life has a discussion on 5 Recommended Books On Alexander The Great. Be sure to check out the comments for additional recommendations.

Alexander and the Triballoi

Envoys now visited Alexander from all the other autonomous tribes settled near the Danube and from Syrmos, the king of the the Triballoi. Envoys also arrived from the Celts who dwelt on the Ionian Gulf. Men of enormous stature, the Celts had a high opinion of themselves. All the envoys had come desiring Alexander’s friendship, and he exchanged pledges with one and all. He asked the Celts what in the human realm they feared the most, expecting that, since his great name had reached the Celts and gone even farther, they would say they feared him above all. But the Celts’ reply disappointed him. For as they dwelt far from Alexander and inhabited a place that was hard to reach, and as they saw that Alexander’s efforts were directed elsewhere, they said they feared only that the sky might fall on them; and though they admired Alexander, neither fear nor any concern for their advantage had moved them to send these envoys. Alexander declared these men his friends and made an alliance with them before sending them off, though he remarked under his breath, “Big talkers, these Celts!”
(The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, 1.4.6-8, translation by Pamela Mensch)

Estimated location of Triballoi and other tribes
Picture source, although some liberties may have been taken

Apology: additional thoughts

So what to think of Socrates’ defense and Plato’s presentation of it? There are a few points I want to get down on paper (I wrote this at a Easter family get-together) while the dialogue still rattles around in my thoughts.

Having read Thucydides a few months ago, Socrates’ dialogue with the city of Athens raised comparisons with the city of a few years earlier. Pericles’ funeral oration provides a good starting point, where a liberal, open Athens is celebrated. A few quotes from my post covering this speech seemed relevant: “Many characteristics are used to describe Athens and what makes it superior: trust, duty, courage, action, and involvement. “'Power of the city', a phrase which is repeated several time, is designed to make itself felt through citizen action and institutions.” “Pericles stresses Athenian subjection to laws, not just in making Athens great but also twice explaining he gives this oration in following what the law requires—he’s subject to the same laws as every citizen.” “Pericles notes that we all die but what matters is what we do while alive.” Even though Pericles’ speech will be undermined by future events (not to mention by one of his speeches) there lies a basis for his praise for the city. The characteristics Pericles mentions in this speech show up in one form or another in the Apology.

The ideals expressed in the funeral oration are tested during the war and Athens does not always live up to the sentiments expressed. Pericles’ speech after grumbling started as the citizens watched Sparta ravage the surrounding countryside and the plague spread reduces the funeral oration's ideals to their reality. As I said in this post about one of the important messages in Pericles’ speech that carries over to the Apology, “During his speech, Pericles stresses the importance of the state over the individual—if the state survives, the individual can be made whole.” Plato directly challenges this sentiment, stressing the importance of the individual and his development to make the state great. One more example from Thucydides that has some bearing on the dialogue: the reaction of Athens’ citizens to the mutilation of the statues of Hermes before the expedition to Sicily demonstrated how political the court system could be and how cases could be ‘gamed’. The practical side of Athens presented a few decades earlier than Socrates’ case shows how the actual didn’t always live up to the ideal, which is normal. It’s in the cases where there is an extraordinary gap between the two that prove instructive and Plato makes the most of Socrates' example.

But…was Socrates guilty? Many discussions seem not to address this basic question. It is difficult to tell since Socrates blurs the line between fact and fiction in his defense, eventually arriving at something that sounds like it might be the truth. The story about the oracle sounds completely false by the end, for example, as he arrives at what sounds like his real reasons for pestering individuals in Athens. I’ve quoted Allan Bloom in a previous post with his great line that there is “an odor around Socrates of impiety.” It is difficult to point to any large infraction but many small items accrue against him. I’ll plead uncertainty on the question, tending to believe him innocent while he maintained enough of an air of guilt to those unable to look beyond their predisposition. Not helping matters are the enemies Socrates had built up over the years and the ones he created during his defense. His arrogance, especially during the ‘middle’ sentencing speech probably helped increase the votes for his death.

Socrates' actions follow from his beliefs, which are rationally examined. The idealized life, including challenging one’s beliefs, striving for improvement, and recognizing our ignorance, lies behind Socrates’ performance in the Apology. His final challenge, to his accusers no less, to reproach his sons if they stray from virtue or think more of themselves than appropriate extends through Plato to us. In order to comply, self-knowledge and self-control of the type Socrates practiced must be necessary. While not necessarily heretical, since he says the god put him on his mission, Socrates ultimately claims the ability to reason wrong from right. This is his challenge to the jury—to reason through his charges with available facts in order to decide his fate. Their failure still resonates over 2,400 years later. The defense of Plato’s Socrates lies not in his argument against his charges but in his justification for the life worth living.