How to Think about War: An Ancient Guide to Foreign Policy by Thucydides

How to Think about War: An Ancient Guide to Foreign Policy by Thucydides
Speeches from The History of the Peloponnesian War
Selected, translated, and introduced by Johanna Hanink
Princeton University Press, 2019
Hardcover, 336 pages
Ancient Wisdom for Modern Readers Series

I had not read any of the releases in Princeton University Press' Ancient Wisdom "How to" series but I wanted to find out what was in this volume. The title and subtitle are a little misleading since the six speeches from Thucydides' The History of the Peloponnesian War address more than simply war and foreign policy. The speeches, just like the work as a whole, look at human nature, imperialism, justice, human behavior, power, and so much more. Regardless, the speeches provide a good introduction to Thucydides for anyone that hasn't read the History, which as Hanink notes in the Introduction, can be "long, dense, and difficult." That might be a little overstated since someone like me can stumble my way through it, but I definitely remember being turned around at times when I read it. That being said, the work is intensely rewarding for the effort put into reading it. Think of this volume as a "highlights" reel, not capturing everything but giving you some of the high points.

Hanink has chosen six of the most famous passages from the History that

are especially rich in abstract reflections on war, human behavior, and what today we call political theory. It is also undoubtedly "in the speeches that much of the most explicit analysis of the nature of Athenian imperialism appears." ... This volume seeks to make the speeches more accessible by presenting them together, in a new translation that is faithful to the Greek but which also aims to be fresh and approachable. (xviii)

I like the focus on speeches since these were set pieces in Thucydides' History. He admits that they aren't precisely what was spoken at the time but they retain the spirit of what was said. Obviously this allows him latitude in constructing the speech to make the point(s) he wants the reader to take away from the passage. Hanink quotes C. W. MacLeod, who sums up that when Thucydides characters speak, "they are doing so with something to say, something to hide, something to achieve at a particular time and place." (liv) All of the speeches are by Athenians (and who provide one side of the Melian Dialogue). This focus by Hanink on the Athenian perspective opens "a window onto one particular community's influential and fascinating, but also extraordinarily tendentious and slanted, vision of the world and of itself." (xlvi) Speeches also lay out the reasoning in the speaker's attempt at persuasion toward or explanation for their goal.

Hanink's introduction provides an overview to Thucydides and the History and her notes for each speech help place the excerpts in context and summarize the points the speaker makes. She notes a common theme within the excerpts: "Each of the speeches in this volume contains remarks upon the origin, validity, and character of the Athenian empire." (xx) On the surface, the speeches are full of praise for Athens, laying out the reasons why it is superior to the rest of the Greek world. Thucydides undermines these messages by showing Athenian actions after the speeches that could be antithetical to what was just said. Those actions can be unsettling, although they aren't shown here, so the reader of just the speeches will miss Thucydides' implied criticism of Athens (although Hanink does provide some summaries). Even so, there is enough included in the speeches to realize not everything is as claimed. Pericles' first war speech anticipates future criticism he knows he will hear when the war turns difficult, and while inciting the Athenians to war he also cautions not to make it a war to expand their empire. You hear echoes of these exhortations in his last speech where he defends his strategy. The lofty rhetoric and praise in the funeral oration sets up an ideal of Athens that is impossible to live up to, and the plague that follows will demonstrate how short the Athenians fall in measuring against those principles. The Sicilian Debate essentially turns into farce from the speakers' political maneuverings for personal gain and glory, but the pending slaughter and devastation of the Athenian army on the island looms ominously for the modern reader who already knows the outcome.

It is the Mytilenean Debate and the Melian Dialogue, though, that are the most unnerving of the speeches. In explaining the harsh reaction of Athens to cities that rebel, Athenian representatives demonstrate a political realism that makes the reader realize Athens doesn't care about justice or other lofty ideals when it comes to other cities. Their only concern is Athens' own interests, regardless of the brutality involved. Even when there is a just outcome, such as sparing the Mytilenians from complete destruction, the reasons behind it (allowing them to live so Athens can collect their tributes) have nothing to do with justice or any other lofty ideal. I've listed the speeches included below this post and linked them to my amateurish attempt to summarize and comment during my first reading of the History.

The Ancient Wisdom series reminds me of classical handbooks (for lack of a better term) that used to provide writings from a particular classical writer or extracts around a particular topic from various ancient authors. Their stated goal is to present "the timeless and timely ideas of classical thinkers in lively new translations," ... making "the practical wisdom of the ancient world accessible for modern life." Regarding translation, Donald Kagan noted that Thucydides' "style is often very compressed and difficult to understand, so that any translation is necessarily an interpretation,” and Hanink herself said "Thucydides’ Greek is so difficult that even ancient native Greek speakers struggled with it." As Mary Beard has pointed out, this has implications in balancing the quality of the translation (making it easy to read) against capturing the character and flavor of Thucydides' text. I will say Hanink's translation is more direct and modern than the "older" translations I've read (Hobbes, Crawley). I'm not sure why the Greek text of the speeches are included, maybe to pad out the book or more likely to give it the "classical handbook" feel.

I like the idea of making these classical texts "accessible," even if that means excerpts instead of the complete works. I'd like to encourage reading all of Thucydides' History since it is a master class in strategic thinking, foreign policy, imperialism, and human nature, as well as covering the complexities of the Peloponnesian War. I understand if you're not ready for that level of commitment, though, and I highly recommend How to Think About War as a suitable précis for sections of the History. Hopefully it will move you to explore more!

The Speeches
(with book and chapter numbers from The History of the Peloponnesian War; links are to my posts on that section)
On Justifying a War: Pericles' First War Speech (1:140-144)
On Dying for Your Country: Pericles' Funeral Oration (2:34-46)
On Holding the Course: Pericles' Last Speech (2:60-64)
On Realpolitik: The Mytilenean Debate (3:37-49)
On Ruthlessness: The Melian Dialogue (5:85-113)
On Launching a Foreign Invasion: The Sicilian Debate (6:8.4-24)

Links:
Johanna Hanink's website

Excerpts from the book:
     Introduction
     Chapter 1
     The Greek text presented is from the Loeb editions, which can be found online in editions 108, 109, 110, and 169), although the Oxford Classical Text edition was used for translation.

Podcasts with Hanink about the book:
     The History of Ancient Greece Podcast, which can also be found here
     Carnegie Council (audio and transcript)

Hanink's article at Eidolon: The Twists and Turns of Translation

The "inevitable" Peloponnesian War

S. N. Jaffe has an article at the War on the Rocks site titled "The Risks and Rewards of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War" that should be helpful to anyone attempting to read or write about the war. Jaffe is the author of Thucydides on the Outbreak of War: Character and Contest, a study of the first book of the History. From the "Description" tab on the book at Oxford University Press:

The cause of great power war is a perennial issue for the student of politics. Some 2,400 years ago, in his monumental History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides wrote that it was the growth of Athenian power and the fear that this power inspired in Sparta which rendered the Peloponnesian War somehow necessary, inevitable, or compulsory.

In this new political psychological study of Thucydides' first book, S.N. Jaffe shows how the History's account of the outbreak of the war ultimately points toward the opposing characters of the Athenian and Spartan regimes, disclosing a Thucydidean preoccupation with the interplay between nature and convention. Jaffe explores how the character of the contest between Athens and Sparta, or how the outbreak of a particular war, can reveal Thucydides' account of the recurring human causes of war and peace. The political thought of Thucydides proves bound up with his distinctive understanding of the interrelationship of particular events and more universal themes.

The article at War on the Rocks provides an overview of the History and provides a nice summary of why it's wrong to accept Thucydides at face value when he states “the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm (or fear) which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable … or necessary or compulsory.” The whole article is worth a read and I sincerely hope to read Jaffe's book for more on his interpretation. For now, here's part of the article's summary on that inevitability:

I maintain that Thucydides does not mean inevitability as efficient causation, or in any sense that suggests that the forces involved are fully external to the actors. Instead, I argue that the objective inevitability of a Peloponnesian War is in fact the product the subjective views of the actors themselves, rooted in the deeply opposing characters of Athens and Sparta, or in the ways that the cities differently privilege security, honor, and profit. To abridge a complicated story, what Thucydides means by necessity is perhaps best understood as the imperatives of the national interest, as the actor in question understands those interests, while these interests are themselves conditioned by overarching world views or disparate cultural outlooks.

To draw these threads together, a Peloponnesian war became “necessary” when the actors themselves came to see no alternative to it. This does not mean that they were correct to arrive at that decision, or that there were no alternatives to war. Instead, Thucydides illuminates the interactive chain of events by which the protagonists themselves became locked into path dependencies, firmly convinced of the reasonableness of their actions or policies, which, in fatal combination with one another, led to a mutually destructive war.

As Jaffe points out, there is "vigorous disagreement" on the study of Thucydides...what the author meant and how to apply his lessons. Whether or not you agree with Jaffe's remarks on Thucydides, his framing information should be of use to anyone wanting to read the History.

Nemesis: Alcibiades and the Fall of Ancient Athens by David Stuttard

Nemesis: Alcibiades and the Fall of Ancient Athens by David Stuttard
Harvard University Press: April 2018
Hardcover, 400 pages From the inside book flap:

Alcibiades was one of the most dazzling figures of the Golden Age of Athens. A ward of Pericles and a friend of Socrates, he was spectacularly rich, bewitchingly handsome and charismatic, a skilled general, and a ruthless politician. He was also a serial traitor, infamous for his dizzying changes of loyalty in the Peloponnesian War. Nemesis tells the story of this extraordinary life and the turbulent world that Alcibiades set out to conquer.

Introduction (page 7):

[T]his book is written not for the specialist but for general readership with an interest in the many areas of human experience with which Alcibiades’ biography intersects: politics and society, religion and philosophy, ambition and betrayal, and the drama of a life lived to the fullest by a subject who often seems to have been making up the rules as he went along. There can be no denying the drama of Alcibiades’ life, either in general or in specifically Greek terms. Its arc is that of the quintessential tragic hero who, from a position of great power, engineers his own destruction thanks to bad choices or flawed character.
[Note: it's possible that the antepenultimate word should be "and."]

Definition from the Merriam-Webster dictionary phone app:

Nemesis: the Greek goddess of retributive justice. Usually follows hubris, or exaggerated pride or self-confidence.

When I first read Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War I have to admit that I found the last third of the book a challenge to follow. One thing clear in this section was the character Alcibiades (~452 – 404 BC), a charismatic chameleon constantly changing allegiances, especially when it was necessary to save his neck. He went from being an Athenian general to a Spartan policy-maker hanging out with Persian rulers, then welcomed back in Athenian leadership roles. He was from the infamous Alcmaeonid family on his mother’s side, notorious for polluting sacred grounds in killing suppliants and saddled with rumors of collusion with the Persians during their invasion of Greece. In youth, Alcibiades was renown for looks and athletic skill. He mingled with the finest minds of his day, such as Protagoras, Anaxagoras, Damon, Pheidias, and was a student/follower of Socrates. His father died when he was young and he became the ward of Pericles, Athens' most important political figure of that time. Anecdotes present Alcibiades as headstrong, outrageous, and privileged. He was also a master at public relations and “spin,” presenting himself in a way to keep people talking about him and staying in the public eye.

The Peloponnesian War began in 431 BC just as Alcibiades was coming of age. He fought at several levels, starting as a helot and working his way up to a cavalry post. Along the way he possibly saved Socrates' life and Socrates returned the favor in a separate battle. It was just before the Peace of Nicias, a break in the war about a decade after it had started, when Alcibiades took center stage in Athenian political life. There were problems with the treaty, terms were not always followed, and Alcibiades led political and military actions that helped stir up a hornet's nest of tensions and resentments in the area. A few years later, the Athenian assembly voted for what would be the disastrous Sicilian campaign, an action Alcibiades championed. It was before the Athenian ships sailed to Sicily that the mutilation of the Herms occurred, damage of religious significance that took on political importance when the vandals were not found. Alcibiades' opponents took advantage of the political turmoil and charged him with profaning the Mysteries of Eleusis, recalling him from the Sicilian expedition just as it was beginning. Not placed under arrest, Alcibiades slipped away and escaped to Sparta, where he masterfully spoke to the city's Ecclesia and laid out a blueprint for Sparta to win the war with Athens. Please indulge an extended quote here since it shows that Alcibiades wasn't an empty blowhard but a talented strategist that would strike not just at Athens but personally impact his political enemies there, too:

It was to prove one of the most brilliant moves of the entire war. Everything that Alcibiades predicted came to pass. With a year-round Spartan presence just a few menacing hours from their city walls, the Athenians found their freedoms severely restricted. No one knew where the next Spartan raid might hit. Nor was it like the annual incursions into Attica, which the Peloponnesians had made at the start of the first phase of the war back in the late 430s and early 420s. Then the countryfolk knew that, when the raids were over (and none lasted more than forty days), they could return to their homes and farmsteads, even if these might have sustained damage. Now they must either abandon their rural livelihoods completely, crowd into Athens, and endure the cramped conditions, which in the past had proved such fertile breeding-ground for plague, or brave it out at home, never knowing from one day to the next, when their houses might be torched or when they themselves might face the sharp edge of a Spartan sword.(176-7)

And the slaves at Laurium [silver mines] did indeed desert in droves. From the time that Agis first put out the word that they would receive asylum until the ending of the war, more than twenty thousand managed to escape their labour camps and steal through the mountain glens to safety. For the Athenian economy, it was a massive blow. For slave owners such as Callias, it was catastrophic. Already a spendthrift, with ever slave who made it out to Decclea, he saw his once-enviable wealth dwindle and disappear. And it drained Nicias’ coffers, too.

It was while he was helping Sparta that he also helped himself to the wife of one of the Spartan kings, probably fathering a son by her. I won't rehash all that follows in his work with Sparta, dealings with the Persians, successful return to Athens, warlord status in Thrace, and his escape to Anatolia before assassins caught up with him other than to say it is a fascinating and engaging ride. Everything Alcibiades did was calculated and oversized...and usually successful. One of the strengths of the book is the attempt to analyze possible agendas of the major players in order to see where interests line up and where they diverge. Again, it's guesswork (and presented as such), but helpful in scrutinizing not just what happened but also possibly why it happened. Permit me one last excerpt, an insightful comment on why Alcibiades' personality, so strong and persuasive in person, might have been a hinderance once he wasn't present:

As at Athens, so, too, in Sparta: when Alcibiades was on hand to charm, dazzle, seduce with the sheer force of his magnetic personality, he could convince even many of his harshest critics of his indispensability. Once he was gone, however, his magic evaporated with him. It was like remembering excesses from a riotous symposium in the stark light of the next day’s dawn. Not just sober reconsiderations and hardheaded reappraisals. But a desire to distance oneself as far as possible from the withering evidence of decadence and dissolution. (193-4)

It is that personality of Alcibiades that shines through in Stuttard's writing, an oversized ego feeding a strong drive to achieve and win. His monumental audacity is something to behold, especially when it usually paid off handsomely for him. In reconstructing Alcibiades’ life a modern reader faces problems with the ancient sources. Thucydides probably interviewed Alcibiades as one of his sources for his history, but Alcibiades would have been self-aggrandizing as well as selective in what he relayed, while Thucydides would have been discriminating in what he included in order to fit his agenda. As Stuttard mentions, many details of Alcibiades’ life were later fabrications, spun to reinforce the viewpoint of that author. Despite the challenges, David Stuttard’s lively biography and history covers not just Alcibiades’ life but the events of the Peloponnesian War (especially the second half) so the reader can understand the context of his many dubious actions.

Stuttard’s background in theater and his style seem to be tailor-made for such a dazzling subject and theatrical story. Flourishes abound, metaphors laden, and images drawn out. Stuttard adroitly weaves the many facets of Alcibiades’ life, public and personal, into the seemingly unending Greek conflict of his lifetime. Ancient sources are examined against each other and circumstantial reports so readers can follow up and make up their own mind as to what to believe. It's a lively read, covering one of the major characters during this chaotic span of ancient Greece's history. What emerges is a portrait of a complex figure, as enigmatic today as he probably during his own time. A prior knowledge of this period is helpful, but not required given Stuttard's excellent overview. The provided maps, time line, and family tree are extremely helpful. Very highly recommended.

Update: Mr. Stuttard was nice enough to reply to my tweet and add, "Next up for @Harvard_Press will be Phoenix: Cimon and the Rise of Athens, a very different character, but what an exciting story!" I'm definitely looking forward to it.

Links:
David Stuuttard's Website, with more links, including one to this book and also to his old blog.

Alcibiades in the Shadow of Achilles, a condensed version of his recent British Museum presentation on this book at the Harvard University Press blog. Also highly recommended. His talk closes with, " I’ve spent several years of my own life tracking his, and I’ve enjoyed every minute of it. I hope that, if you read the book, you will enjoy it equally." Indeed I did.

My posts to date that mention Alcibiades:

• The Peloponnesian War: Amphipolis II, a peaceless peace, Mantinea
• The Peloponnesian War: The Sicilian debate, sacrilege, false hope
• The Peloponnesian War: Syracuse and chances lost
• The Peloponnesian War: when all Athens has is fear
• The Peloponnesian War: No, this is how democracy ends
• The Peloponnesian War: the end of (the) history
• Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lectures 12 - 14
• Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lectures 15 - 17

My notes on the book, with additional sources to check out.

Studying Thucydides in Zimbabwe

I received a nice note from a teacher in Zimbabwe ("somewhat isolated from the academic world," as they put it) commenting that my posts on Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War has helped them and it has paid off for their students. That note, along with other nice comments from students reading the book and finding help from my posts, cheer me every time I see them. While the stats are unimpressive to commercial sites or bloggers, I find it astounding that there have been over 300K visits my posts directly about Thucydides' work. I hope those posts continue to help others working to make sense of a seminal work of literature and one of my favorite books. I'm sure I'll revisit it and add some more updates since I feel my notes have only scratched the surface of what makes it so original.

I'll be back after a couple of days, after recovering from exploring Yosemite with my family and then going back to pick up my boys once their three-day class there has finished. Meanwhile, I want to express my gratitude for everyone who has let me know how much those posts have assisted their reading and understanding of Thucydides.

I leave you with how the sky above Half Dome looked yesterday...

Simulation Games in the Classroom

A few years ago, Dr. James Lacey, professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College, contacted me about my series of posts on Thucydides. It was and remains one of the high points in blogging for me. So I wanted to share a recent article of his that looks at the difficulty in teaching Thucydides. While his focus is specifically on the war colleges, I think it's an important lesson for both teaching and history in general. The article is "Wargaming in the Classroom: An Odyssey" at warontherocks.com.

Dr. Lacey recounts his early experience attempting to teach Thucydides and how the standard teaching approach didn't prepare students to answer questions like “Was the attack on Syracuse poor strategy, or good strategy marred by poor execution?” His recent approach freed up classroom time in order to play a wargame that included economic and diplomatic elements. Out of the five Athenian teams playing the game, four of them attacked Syracuse despite the real-life disaster 2,500 years ago. In explaining their rationale for choosing to invade, the students pointed out legitimate strategic reasons for doing so, something Dr. Lacey notes that the standard approach didn't adequately impart to students. He also shares some of the other games and simulations he chose for other conflicts. Despite students chuckling over the stupidity of European leaders getting drawn into World War I, every time he has run the simulation the armies have arched.

He mentions a few revelations the students had realized after playing these games and simulations, but I'll just share this one paragraph:

At the end of each wargame, students walked away with a new appreciation of the historical circumstances of the period and the events they had read about and discussed in class. And even though all wargames are an abstract of actual events, I am sure that no student exposed to historical gaming will ever again read about the Peloponnesian War without thinking about Sicily’s wheat, the crucial importance of holding the Isthmus of Corinth, or what could have been done with a bit more Persian silver in the coffers of one side or the other’s treasury. Similarly, the next time one of this year’s students reads about Lee and Grant in 1864, they will also be thinking about how the truly decisive actions took place out west. For, as it was during the actual conflict, in every game the students played, Grant’s role was to pin down the Army of Northern Virginia, while the western armies ripped out the economic heart of the Confederacy.

I recommend reading the whole article even though I doubt any of my readers will attend a war college. The lessons learned that Dr. Lacey presents can be used for any history course. For history this year my kids participated in a co-op class that several homeschool parents pulled together. One parent, a former teacher, had the children do an ancient civilization game that the kids loved. In trying to insure their civilization lasted, they had to deal with resource and money constraints and I think they realized the trade-offs rulers/governments have to face when making such decisions. I definitely plan on including such games in our future courses.

If you have experience with any of these types of games or simulations (as a teacher or student), I would love to hear from you in the comments!


Sidenote: Evidently Dr. Lacey stirred up a hornet's nest at other war colleges with some of the statements in his article. If you have time, you may want to check out an article by Professors James Holmes and John Maurer as well as Dr. Lacey's reply in the Comments.

Next week: Thucydides on BBC 4 Radio

Starting Monday on BBC 4 Radio's "Book at Bedtime" series, the book will be Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, read by David Horovitch and abridged by Tom Holland. And what an abridgment, since the total air time will be an hour and fifteen minutes. I have no idea what it will be like, but I'm looking forward to finding out!

Schedule:

• Monday, 27 April 2015: War Begins
• Tuesday, 28 April 2015: From Funerals to Plague
• Wednesday, 29 April 2015: Spartan Surrender at Pylos
• Thursday, 30 April 2015: An Athenian Atrocity
• Friday, 1 May 2015: The Beginning of the End

BBC Radio 4 In Our Time: Thucydides

Last week BBC Radio 4's program "In Our Time" featured a great discussion of Thucydides, his writing, and his role as historian. I don't know how long this link will remain active so I recommend listening to it soon (although many of their previous episodes are available in their archives). If you're interested in reading Thucydides this program will be a great introduction, providing a solid framework for understanding his work. As someone who has already read the book, I found the discussion made me want to revisit it again soon. You've been warned.

Here is the program summary and a list of the participants:

Melvyn Bragg and his guests discuss the ancient Greek historian Thucydides. In the fifth century BC Thucydides wrote The History of the Peloponnesian War, an account of a conflict in which he had himself taken part. This work is now seen as one of the first great masterpieces of history writing, a book which influenced writers for centuries afterwards. Thucydides was arguably the first historian to make a conscious attempt to be objective, bringing a rational and impartial approach to his scholarship. Today his work is still widely studied at military colleges and in the field of international relations for the insight it brings to bear on complex political situations.

With:

Paul Cartledge
Emeritus Professor of Greek Culture and AG Leventis Senior Research Fellow at Clare College, Cambridge

Katherine Harloe
Associate Professor in Classics and Intellectual History at the University of Reading

Neville Morley
Professor of Ancient History at the University of Bristol

Producer: Thomas Morris.

It's a lively discussion, hitting many of the points that make the history so interesting. My notes on the show are available here.

I liked the reading list provided on the program page:

Emily Greenwood, Thucydides and the Shaping of History (Bristol Classical Press, 2005)

Victor Davis Hanson, A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War (Random House, 2006)

Katherine Harloe & Neville Morley (eds.), Thucydides and the Modern World: Reception, Reinterpretation and Influence from the Renaissance to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2012)

Geoffrey Hawthorn, Thucydides on Politics: Back to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2014)

Neville Morley, Thucydides and the Idea of History (IB Tauris, 2014)

Robin Osborne (ed.), Classical Greece: 500-323 BC (Oxford University Press, 2000)

Christopher Pelling and Maria Wyke, Twelve Voices from Greece and Rome: Ancient Ideas for Modern Times (Oxford University Press, 2014)

Plutarch (trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert), The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives (Penguin, 1973)

Philip de Souza, The Peloponnesian War 431-404 BC (Osprey Publishing, 2002)

Robert B. Strassler (ed.), The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (Simon & Schuster, 1998)

Thucydides (trans. Martin Hammond), The Peloponnesian War (Oxford University Press, 2009)

Thucydides (trans. Jeremy Mynott), Thucydides: The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians (Cambridge University Press, 2013)

Thucydides (trans. Rex Warner), History of the Peloponnesian War (Penguin, 2000)

After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars by Paul Cartledge

After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars by Paul Cartledge
Emblems of Antiquity series
Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN: 9780199747320 Paul Cartledge’s name has been mentioned on this blog several times—he is the A. G. Leventis Professor of Greek Culture in the Faculty of Classics at the University of Cambridge. This book is part of Oxford University Press’ Emblems of Antiquity series. The emblem, in this case, is the Oath of Plataea, inscribed on a marble stele found in the early 1930s in the Athenian countryside. The monument itself is considered genuine but the authenticity of the Oath of Plataea is debated—Cartledge believes it to be inauthentic.

So why choose something of dubious validity for the center of a study? Cartledge uses the oath, inscribed between 350 and 325 B.C. describing an event taking place in 479 B.C., as a starting point to look at events, culture, and religion of both time periods while delving into the broader context of the fight for historical memory. The authenticity of the inscribed oath is almost beside the point:

[T]he main point of this book, which is to try to identify and to explain the function(s) the Oath of Plataea was designed to serve in its immediate monumental context. Those functional needs, I suggest, are to be located firmly within a retrospectively triumphalist narrative—or rather story, in the sense of a fabrication—that the Athenians had begun insistently to tell themselves and anyone else who would listen to them from the mid-380s BCE onwards. A story which acquired a new salience and urgency in the desperate times immediately following the Athenians’ calamitous defeat at Chaeronea in 338 [BC]. Those, I further suggest, are respectively the true overall context and the true specific context within which the monument as a whole is to be properly and fully understood. (30)

All of which forms an extended whole in conjunction with my recent post on Professor Jeremy McInerney's lecture. This ideologically motivated commemoration was done by shaping history in many forms and relying on politics, religion, and other contexts to change how the battle was remembered. In recounting the battle, Herodotus gave the highest credit to the Spartans, which would be a major factor in how the event would resonate through history:

Plataea, indeed, could almost be called the great unknown battle in one of the great wars of history. One reason for Plataea’s relative lack of celebrity, as already noted, is that it was essentially a Spartan (and Peloponnesian), not Athenian, victory, and the Athenians have been far more vocal, far more influential over the surviving tradition of the Wars, than the Spartans… . Another is that Plataea was a small state… . Yet a third reason for the battle’s lack of its due meed of celebrity is more technical, and due to the nature of the surviving evidence for it. Herodotus’ account is not just the best that we have, but really the only usable one—in the sense that the others are more or less derivative from it rather than independently grounded and valuable. 88-9)

Despite declaring the unknown qualities of the battle and even with dedicating a long chapter to it, the battle itself is not the major focus of the book and Cartledge emphasizes the paucity of detail. I’ve included a few links on the battle at the end of the post to help provide essential perspective for much of what happened during the long standoff and battle.

So what are some of the other contexts? Cartledge emphasizes the religious contexts, something he feels hasn’t been adequately examined to date. The monument was found near the ancient city of Acharnae, location of the only temple to Ares in Attica (and one of the few in the Greek world). The temple was also linked with Athena, at least the militarized version of her. While oaths were important throughout Greece, Cartledge goes into detail on the importance of oaths to Athenians, especially oaths that “fostered amity and collective endeavor, and particularly in the stasis-ridden atmosphere of the fourth century BCE.” (58)

There are also political and historical contexts tied to the faux-oath. The monument was erected about the time Athenian males were required to take a couple of years of military training. The trainees had to take the Ephebic Oath, also on the monument. Borrowing (stealing?) the glory from the victory of Plataea would have powerful symbolism and gloss over the principle role of the Spartans. It would also help hide the fact that the glory days of Athenian military glory were past. The monument was erected about the same time as the debacle at Chaeronea (the loss to Philip II of Macedon and loss of Greek independence). If erected after the battle, the oath would provide some salve for the loss. If dedicated before the battle, the oath would supply much needed hope in recalling past successes. In either case there had been radical changes since the Graeco-Persian Wars at the beginning of the 5th century B.C., when Greece was fighting to remain free of Persian influence. Subsequent history would show several Greek cities calling on help from the Persians (and receiving it). As part of reshaping history, was the oath similar to the Athenian post-oligarchic amnesty of 403 B.C., in a sense changing memory by choosing what to remember and what to forget?

Ironically, the oath reminds people that many Greeks fought alongside the Persians during the wars as well as portraying the ultimate victors as gracious to those traitors (or at least they meant to be). Cartledge highlights the amazing part of these wars, which Herodotus likewise emphasizes—the near miracle of Greek cities cooperating together in sizeable numbers against the Persians. The cooperation between Greeks that did fight together quickly dissolved after the wars. Regarding the shaping of memory, Cartledge has this to say:

In their art of memory, as with so many other key cultural artifacts of theirs, the ancient Greeks were quintessentially agonistic, indeed antagonistic: competitive to the ultimate degree. Competition affected not just the matter of how great deeds were celebrated and commemorated but also the issue of which deeds, which battles, were to be celebrated, and by whom. … [T]hough the Plataea victory was actually a Panhellenic accomplishment, almost immediately its memory or rather memorialization became a focal point of contention among eternally rivalrous Greeks and their cities. (123-4)

Cartledge includes various means of competition for the way the Persian wars were to be remembered in several areas: monuments, commemorations, histories, myths, epigrams, and others. It’s a very entertaining book, geared toward the general reader. Cartledge foregoes footnotes but provides a “Further Reading” section highlighting sources and helpful details. While I think some knowledge of ancient Greek history is helpful, it isn’t necessary to enjoy the book. It’s a fun approach, using the oath as a means to explore what had changed in Athens and Greece during the 150 years between the Battle of Plataea and the date of the monument as well as unveiling some of the means the Greeks used to shape how history would be remembered.

---

Additional links and resources listed in the book:

• The University of Nottingham has a database of oaths. Go to the database page and click on “search the database.” The oath ID is 338.
• Cartledge reviews the Wikipedia entry on the Battle of Plataea and finds it “rather good” although he does go over some issues and problems in it.
• He is also complimentary on Nicholas Snow’s description of the battle in the historical novel The Shield.
• Cartledge includes a link to a review of the History Channel’s show on the Battle of Plataea. I would also like to add all posts at that site on the Battle of Plataea. There are plenty of videos posted on YouTube—just type in "Plataea" to search. I will add a link to the page about the battle posted at MilitaryHistoryOnline.com.
• The Onassis Cultural Center NY is hosting a lecture panel and discussion titled After Thermopylae: How Wars are Concluded and Commemorated on June 4, 2013 at the Morgan Library & Museum. In addition to Paul Cartledge the discussion is scheduled to include Bruce Cole, Eugenia Kiesling, and James Romm.
• Cartledge has provided a nice summary post of the book at the Heffers’ Classics blog. He will be a participant in their 2013 Festival. From his post:

Now, so far as the Oath of the Ephebes goes, that’s all fine and dandy – the reference of that oath is contemporary, and it was in 335 or thereabouts that the whole system of ephebic training at Athens was reorganised for the 18- and 19-year-olds performing a sort of national service at a time of grave crisis for Athens (following the Athenians’ heavy defeat by the Macedonians of Philip and Alexander at Chaeronea in 338). But the supposed Oath of Plataea, if genuine, would have been sworn almost 150 years earlier – so why inscribe it now, round about 335 perhaps?
If, that is, it was genuine?

If you have any other pages you think are helpful on either the Battle of Plataea or the Oath of Plataea, let me know and I’ll be happy to add them.

Update: I meant to add another resource I have read on the Battle of Plataea. Victor Davis Hanson's The Wars of the Ancient Greeks has a good description and a great map about the battle.

Thucydides on Strategy by Athanassios G. Platias and Konstantinos Koliopoulos (excerpt—first chapter)

I recently discovered the Chief of U.K. Defence Staff's Recommended Reading site and have been browsing through it. One book stood out since it addresses one of my favorites: Thucydides on Strategy by Athanassios G. Platias and Konstantinos Koliopoulos.

This slim volume shows that the theory of grand strategy can be traced back to Thucydides’ famous History of the Peloponnesian War. In a readable 20-page first chapter, the authors set out a useful typology of grand strategies applicable across history. This summary of what classical strategy has to offer reminds us that modern governments often fail to apply the wisdom of the ancient thinkers.

Click on the link and you'll find the extract is the first chapter they mention , "Grand Strategy: A Framework For Analysis."

The main argument of this study is that Thucydides' text is a classic masterpiece of strategy that contains significant strategic insights and a wealth of strategic concepts (see Appendix). Seen in this light, Thucydides' History has at least equal right with Clausewitz' On War to be considered 'the strategist's toolkit'. Needless to say, Thucydides did not use contemporary strategic jargon. One has to delve in the text in order to uncover these insights and concepts. This is where our own contribution lies: to bring to the surface and translate into modern strategic parlance the aforementioned concepts and insights.

Be sure to click on the Archive page for the core of expected reads for developing strategic thinking.

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73)

“How shall we call such a thinking man as Thucydides? The word ‘historian’ is somehow not satisfactory.”
Leo Strauss, Lecture 17

"Neither historians nor political scientists can deal with the complexity of true strategy and statecraft. Thucydides does so because his narrative is literature, and literature does not restrict itself. It can say anything that needs to be said."
Grand Strategy: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order by Charles Hill (Yale University Press, 2010), page 34

What started as a lark…listening to Leo Strauss’ lecture series on Thucydides available at the Leo Strauss Center during my commute…ended up as a series of posts since I found the course so engaging. As I disclaim on the lecture posts, I don’t cover everything in the lecture and, while I do my best, the quotes are not always exact. I also refer to my posts on Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War in many of the posts.

The lectures can be discomforting at times knowing Strauss died a few months after the end of this course. In the lectures, Strauss provides recaps of the events and places them in both the immediate context and overall framework of the history. He constantly questions what Thucydides meant by presenting facts and speeches the way he did—why certain things are included, why others items are excluded, how presentations are framed, etc. Strauss' translation of the original Greek text helps clarify some items and provides nuance that Thucydides must have intended. Strauss highlights certain items he seems to be struggling to understand in a greater context, such as why the gods are mentioned at certain times or what it means when Thucydides provides paraphrases and quotes a speech. At all times going through the book, Strauss challenges the reader to look beyond the events of the history and see why Thucydides believed his work to be “an everlasting possession.”

List of lecture posts

Lectures 1 – 4

Lectures 5 – 8

Lectures 9 – 10

Lecture 11

Lectures 12 – 14

Lectures 15 – 17

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lectures 15 - 17

The lectures/recordings on this course can be found at the center's site.

What follows are some of my notes on topics I found of interest in these recordings. I don’t pretend to cover everything he discusses in the lectures and my quotes are close but may not be exact. His class uses the Rex Warner translation while I mention and quote from the Thomas Hobbes translation, which can found here. On a final note I'll refer to my summary page for my posts on The Peloponnesian War.

Lecture 15
Before moving on to Book VII, Strauss takes some time to look at descriptions of Nicias in Book VI since he ends up with sole command on Sicily. In Chapter 46, the Athenian generals (except for Nicias) are disappointed in native lack of support and money: “Nicias had the better judgment of the situation in Sicily than the others.” In Chapter 63, though, his extreme caution (as demonstrated byhis lack of aggression against the Syracusians) shows the “defective character of Nicias’ generalship, that he doesn’t go straight to the goal against Syracuse… .” Nicias’ preference for “rest” instead of “motion” ties back to an opening claim in the history. “What is Thucydides’ judgment about this after all? Thucydides is known because of his reticence. Hobbes said of him he was the most politic historiographer that ever was, by which he meant that he was very reticent in his judgment and let his reader to discern what the virtues and vices of the various characters are.”

Book VII
Book VII begins with the Spartan general Gylippus traveling to Syracuse, allowing Thucydides to compare and contrast him with Nicias. In response to a question about the Athenians and a possible lack of nerve, Strauss addresses one reason Nicias had been appointed general: “He had an unblemished record. He had always been lucky. And according to the way of thinking of the Athenians you choose rather a general who never lost a battle than any other general who may be much brighter but who was not so lucky. It is, you can say, an irrational consideration given the irrational character of chance and intelligence.”

In response to another question on the generalships: “That is the point. The Athenians were, on the one hand, enamored of Alcibiades’ brilliance and daring, and on the other hand they were god-fearing, and the two things were in conflict. And in Alcibiades’ absence the enemies of Alcibiades strengthened the side of what might be called by nasty people 'fundamentalism' in Athens and therefore they called him back—they didn’t know that they would harm themselves much more [by the recall].”

Strauss delves into the decision-making process in Athens, focusing on the difference of influences from the ruling circles and the general population. Thucydides highlights the different characteristics of a city and its rule—unity (real or apparent) and composite (which may disintegrate at any time). One of my favorite quotes from the course occurs at this point during a wide-ranging discussion. Strauss raises the point that Nietzsche called the state “the cold monster,” “an expression which was taken up by De Gaulle. But I believe with this difference. Whereas Nietzsche truly shuddered, De Gaulle stroked it.”

Chapter 18: “This is the difference between Sparta and Athens—the Spartans trace their misfortune in the first war, and which terminated in the Pylus/Pylos affair as a misfortune…as lack of luck…which was deserved because they had broken the treaty. And here their piety, of course, is behind them. You can’t break oaths without paying for it—the gods will interfere then. But this is the Spartan belief. Whether Thucydides believes this is an entirely different question.”

Chapters 47-49 covers he Athenian generals’ council after the defeat at night and Nicias’ hesitancy to withdraw for fear of potential claims: “The nature of the Athenians are a major factor. And you must never forget that when you read that statement in Book II, Chapter 65 of Thucydides’ overall judgment on the overall Peloponnesian War at the end of his eulogy of Pericles. The war could have been won, and he speaks there of some derivative things—the rivalries between the people who would like to take the place of Pericles, but there was a deeper underlying reason and this was the natures of the Athenians which gave these particular rivalries their characters and made it possible, for example, it made possible the expulsion of Alcibiades and his recall. But Nicias is still hesitant because he has hopes that an agreement could be reached with Syracuse and the fear of what the Athenian demos might do to him if he were to leave Sicily.”

Chapter 50, the eclipse, and the Athenians waiting twenty-seven days before doing anything: ”So here this other factor which is crucial, and it is connected with Nicias’ character as a whole, is being given exaggeratedly to divination and frenzy…(one could also say superstition) and has the opposite of a helpful effect on the situation of the Athenians. “

End of Chapter 67 (Hobbes’ translation):

Overwhelmed with calamities, and forced by the difficulties which they [the Athenians] are in at this present, they are grown desperate; not trusting to their forces, but willing to put themselves upon the decision of fortune, as well as they may; that so they may either go out by force, or else make their retreat afterward by land, as men whose estates cannot change into the worse.

Strauss: “So the Athenians minded by the sober, cautious Nicias are brought into a situation in which they can only trust chance and not any human foresight or deliberation. So much has the situation deteriorated.” Nicias’ reply to this turn of events involves an appeal to anything that might help, including the ancestral gods—the more critical the situation, the more the gods are mentioned and called on.

Chapter 71, during a naval battle between the Athenians and Syracusians (from Hobbes’ translation):

For the Athenians, who had their whole fortune at stake in their galleys, were in such a fear of the event as they had never been in the like: and were thereby of necessity to behold the fight upon the water with very different passions . For the sight being near, and not looking all of them upon one and the same part, he that saw their own side prevail took heart, and fell to calling upon the gods, that they would not deprive them of their safety”.

Strauss: ”And they call on the gods only if there is hope, they might win. Not in the other case. Despair and piety—they are understood by Thucydides as incompatible.” As I mentioned in this post, Nicias’ speech before the battle was already dependent on hope. Here is another indicator that hope was all the Athenians had at this point. Or as highlighted by Thucydides, Nicias’ hope is greater than his fear.

Nicias’ speech in Chapter 77 stresses his hope and places faith in the gods. Strauss: “Now here we have, in this short passage, what one could call Nicias’ theology, in contra-distinction to the theology of the Athenian ambassadors on Melos. You remember what they say: ‘the stronger rules the weaker.’ And the gods are the stronger and they do what they want. And Nicias injects an ingredient of justice into the gods. But the question is his alternatives do not exhaust the possibilities but they are at extreme opposites which Thucydides faces.”

Thucydides’ short eulogy to Nicias in Chapter 86 uses Nicias’ theology while at the same time refuting its conclusion—Nicias least deserved this fate, yet that’s exactly what happened. The theology of the Athenian ambassadors at Melos is confirmed, even if Thucydides remains silent on this point.

Lecture 16

Book VIII
Book 8 opens with Thucydides remark that the Athenian population, upon finding out about the Sicilian debacle, blames everyone but themselves. Or rather they blame the public speakers and soothsayers who “encouraged them.” Strauss notes at the end of the first chapter a miracle occurs, but not the kind that would have been foreseen by soothsayers—the Athenians return to moderation and frugality along with additional oversight in the city (of elder men, not younger impressionable men). This resilience demonstrated by the Athenians, despite their earlier folly, extends the war.

Chapter 3 provides foreshadowing of Sparta’s behavior once the war is over as they levy money, demand hostages, and order ships to be built by their so-called allies. Evidently these other cities did not think Sparta would become like Athens if they won the war. While allies of Athens begin to revolt, a schism between Spartan kings in addition to conflicts within the Persian royal family occurs—no one is presenting a unitary front. Note Alcibiades’ surreptitious presence early in the book.

Strauss has touched on the inclusion of treaties in the history several times: “There are a few of these treaties in Book Eight, more than elsewhere. They are the Book Eight substitute for Thucydidean speeches. … A Thucydidean speech is a speech made by an individual or a group of ambassadors from a particular point of view, say Athenian/Spartan/Persian. Here these treaties are also from a particular point of view, say here Persian-Spartan versus Athens [Chapter 18], but not from one particular city, says Athens or Sparta or Persia, but of a number or two of them. So they approach the impartiality, as I called it, of Thucydides own logos.”

From Chapter 24, an important sentence comparing the Chians to the Spartans for joining “advisedness to prosperity; and the more their city increased, had carried the more respect in the administration thereof to assure it.” (Hobbes’ translation) Strauss: “So the Spartans are the top, from this point of view. They’re sober in good fortune. That’s quite an achievement. … An error of judgment does not bespeak hubris, overconfidence. It was a sober judgment at the time. It was a safe risk, but it was a risk nonetheless [by the Chians], as the facts show.”

Chapter 39 through 44 highlights some of the infighting in Sparta and friction between Sparta and Persia, which benefits the neutrals as well as Alcibiades. The Persians benefit by continued conflict in Greece. The treason by Phrynichus of Athens (deemed a wise man in Chapter 27) in Chapter 50 shows the moral order of the day—“Personal safety comes first.”

Thucydides’ comments on the rule of the Five Thousand (after the removal of the Four Hundred)—Chapter 97 (Hobbes’ translation):

“And now first (at least in my time) the Athenians seem to have ordered their state aright: which consisted now of a moderate temper, both of the few and of the many. And this was the first thing, that after so many misfortunes past made the city again to raise her head.”

Strauss: “That is an amazing statement for this book. Not Athens under Pericles but Athens under the Five Thousand, as reorganized, was the best regime. That it didn’t last very long, that is not an argument against it according to Thucydides because the principle underlying the whole thing was much more sensible. In Pericles’ case, the stability depended entirely on the survival of a single man—Pericles. Here there was a large group, of five thousand, the people who counted in the city who were in control.”

More topics discussed: Does the placement of this judgment near the end of the work mean the work is complete? How should we view the regard for the stability in Sparta versus the outstanding men of Athens? Accuracy of treaties: “Thucydides was not a model scientific historian—he was after bigger game.”

Lecture 17

I'm not going to quote from this lecture. What started off as an “are there any questions” quickly moves to points Strauss wants to reiterate from the course, although it is helpful here in the context of the overall history. A wide-ranging lecture and Q&A session in addition to a good recap of several of the major topics. Most of the notes I made have been raised elsewhere in the course, although it's helpful to hear them here so they can be put in context.

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lectures 12 - 14

The lectures/recordings on this course can be found at the center's site.

What follows are some of my notes on topics I found of interest in these recordings. I don’t pretend to cover everything he discusses in the lectures and my quotes are close but may not be exact. His class uses the Rex Warner translation while I mention and quote from the Thomas Hobbes translation, which can found here. On a final note I'll refer to my summary page for my posts on The Peloponnesian War.

Lecture 12

Continuing Book VI
In this lecture the Athenian debate about the invasion of Sicily continues, starting with Alcibiades’ speech. Strauss looks at Alcibiades’ attitude, noting he “doesn’t hesitate to question a certain simplistic democratic notion. In a democracy people are not equal. Some are rich, some are poor. Some gifted, some ungifted. And so on.” Strauss summarizes the effect of Alcibiades’ speech on the Athenians: “The main point is that precisely the alleged effect of Alcibiades and the admitted virtue of Nicias, together, will produce a winning combination. And therefore Nicias’ argument is defeated.” The oaths the Athenians swore to help allies on Sicily are noted again. “You see the oaths play a very great role before the Athenian demos, who are more pious than the upper strata. And that leads to interesting developments later on.” After Alcibiades’ speech: “So it is said Nicias thinks he has lost the argument and he cannot fall back on what he has said in his [???opening???] speech. So he [Nicias] must persuade the Athenians in an entirely different way—that the gamble is too great.”

In Chapter 20 Nicias raises the expectation that certain groups of people on Sicily will join them because of their racial connection. “Keep this issue of racial connection in mind. It plays a considerable role—not too strong an emphasis, but it is always there. That is the great hope of the Athenians, that the racial diversity of the Sicilians might be helpful to the Athenians.” Why do the Athenians go along with Nicias’ exaggerated requirements for the Sicilian invasion? “Because Nicias shows them a way of how to overcome that obstacle. He shows Sicily is a tough proposition but [paraphrasing Nicias] ‘I see a way to overcome that if we make the proper preparations’. And therefore he proves … that the combination of Nicias’ long experience and Alcibiades’ tempestuous temper is wonderful for that purpose.” The exaggerated requirements backfire since they show Nicias as a good planner and leader.

Strauss, continued: “Nicias is a very fine gentleman but he doesn’t belong to the top drawer. Thucydides never says that. Thucydides is such a decent man he would never compromise a noble character like Nicias. But for those among us who are willing to learn something, he indicates it clearly enough—that in a tough situation [??????] Nicias is not good enough. … That is the point: Nicias’ judgment is not the best.”

After the mutilation of the statues of Hermes, decrees were passed granting immunity to anyone providing information on this or any other sacrilegious act. “That is a key point: wholly unexpected impious acts, which of course would endanger the military enterprise in the opinion of the people.” When Alcibiades’ name is mentioned in connection with mock celebrations of the mysteries of Eleusis, Strauss interrupts: “May I mention here in passing a suspicion of mine which I believe is not entirely groundless. Most of you will have read Plato’s Banquet [Symposium] and there at the end a drunken Alcibiades comes in. … In the banquet, Socrates divulges mysteries, and the dramatic date of the Symposium is a year before the Sicilian expedition, 416 [BC]. In brief, what I think what Plato jocularly does in the Banquet is to tell the true story of what happened prior to the Sicilian expedition. They [the terrified Athenians persecuting Alcibiades] are all wet, that is what Plato is saying. The truth is Alcibiades didn’t divulge anything. … But some secret, some mystery was divulged, maybe by Socrates.”

Before I leave these speeches, I wanted to mention that Strauss mentions Thucydides’ comment on Pericles (Book II, Chapter 65) and the alignment of his concern for public and private good. The obvious comparison is Alcibiades since he presses for the expedition for private gain, at least according to Thucydides. Not discussed here, but I think something that would be an interesting topic for a paper, is Nicias’ alignment. How does his emphasis on what’s best for Athens line up or impede his own personal good in the first speech and the third speech? Untangling the multiple layers of meaning is a lot of fun.

The lecture continues with quick summaries about the Athenians setting sail for Sicily, the Athenian generals’ plans, speeches in Syracuse about appropriate actions to take, the failure to obtain alliances on Sicily, and Alcibiades’ recall to Athens. From this section I’ll focus on Strauss’ comments on Athenagoras. I noted in my initial post on this section that Athenagoras sounds like Nicias at times. Regarding chapters 38 through 40 and their ringing defense of democracy, Strauss opined “This is the democratic argument in Thucydides, not in the funeral speech—but this one. … It is usually not considered, when people consider the point of democracy in Thucydides, [instead] they think of Pericles’ speech. Thucydides says that the regime [in Athens] was called in name a democracy but in fact it was the rule of the first man [during Pericles’ rule].” Later in the lecture Strauss, in answering a question on why Athenagoras was so wrong on his predictions about Athens’ invasion of Sicily: “He [Athenagoras ] was blinded by his notion of democracy. He thought that all democrats [democracies] must be such nice people as the Syracusian model.”

Lecture 13

The Athenian expedition in Sicily (Book VI continued)
Crucial items such as the lack of Athenian cavalry, leaving the troops exposed to Syracusian cavalry and the failure to take advantage of racial antagonism on Sicily (to line up allies) happen shortly after landing on the island. Chapter 53—Alcibiades is recalled to Athens for alleged sacrileges regarding profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermes statues. Thucydides notes that the Athens were concerned for acts that might lead to a return to tyranny, leading to the digression on the banishment of tyranny in Athens. Strauss: “One can say the story which Thucydides tells [VI, starting with Ch. 54] concerns the democratic myth about the tyranny in Athens. And he has his version.”

Returning to the Sicilian expedition, Strauss doesn’t completely articulate his hypotheses on what Thucydides is doing with mentions of the gods but I think this comes close to summing things up: “Later on, when the going gets rough, or tough, and the Athenians approach defeat, then Nicias comes to the fore with his piety, and there with constant reference to the gods. And therefore the silence about gods here, as it were, was a foil to Nicias’ speaking about the gods.” As Strauss mentioned in Lecture 11 when Archidamus finally appeals to the gods, most of the characters in the history are silent about the gods until after they experience some profound change—something beyond their control or understanding—which causes them to call on or rely on the gods.

(The following occurred during the discussion of Hermocrates’ speech at Camarina, starting in Ch. 76) Strauss: “That is a great theme, the racial antagonism within Sicily. And the Athenians come to the help of their kinsmen, the Chalcideans. But the very same kinsmen in Euboea, i.e. men near Athens, are subjugated by the Athenians.”

The reply to Hermocrates at Camarina is given to Euphemus, an ambassador from Athens. Strauss analyzes his speech closely and I found the comparison of Euphemus’ speech to that of the Athenians in Sparta (in reply to the Corinthians, Book I Chapter 75) particularly interesting. In the earlier speech the Athenian ambassadors linked Athenian’s actions in expanding its empire to fear, honor, and profit (Hobbes’ wording). Euphemus, in his speech, starts with ‘security’ as the reason for Athens’ actions but then links security directly to fear. This speech, in conjunction with Pericles’ funeral oration and the Melian dialogue, cements Athens’ reputation as a “tyrant city” in the history. Strauss: “Athens is a tyrant city, as Pericles had said [??????] before, and Cleon also, and even Euphemus in his euphemistic speech cannot deny it. And everything else is implied, so that the Melian dialogue is only an extreme formulation of what was simmering beneath the surface… .”

Strauss, commenting on the tyrant expanding power through fear: “And we learn from a later man, who presents a somewhat different picture, and in many ways the same: The foundation of justice is fear: Hobbes. And [the fact] that Hobbes translated Thucydides, it was his first work that he did, is no accident. He was very much attracted to that. And only Hobbes saw that this would lead not only to justice (of course, that’s also what Thucydides says in his way) but to much greater justice than from any other principle.”

Strauss takes a break and looks into a question he has raised several times: why does Thucydides quote some speeches and why does he sometimes only report (paraphrase) a speech? Strauss doesn’t go into great detail, but notes “In Sparta, old-fashioned Sparta, the punishment, human or divine, plays a much greater role than in Athens.” … “What seemed to him, to Thucydides, enters into the speeches but not into the narrative of actions. In the narrative of action he lays down what he has found out as actually having been done. But in the case of speeches, what seemed to him the right thing to say for this man in this circumstance.”


Lecture 14

After a brief recap of where we are in the history, the lecture starts with the Syracusians asking for aid against the Athenians from the Corinthians and Spartans (Book VI, Chapter 88). Alcibiades, having fled during his recall, makes an eloquent speech to the Spartans. Strauss has all of Alcibiades’ speech read to the class, commenting as it unfolds. Reading and hearing Alcibiades’ speech again, I have additional respect for him. I’m sure that was the intent.

Beginning of Chapter 92 (Hobbes’ translation): “Now I must crave this: that I be neither the worse esteemed, for that having once been thought a lover of my country, I go now amongst the greatest enemies of the same against it; nor yet mistrusted, as one that speaketh with the zeal of a fugitive.” The Warner translation (and others) uses “exile” here. Strauss ties this argument in with another student of Thucydides: “This is no feeling of an exile who wants to return home and take revenge on his enemies. There is a beautiful chapter on this subject in Machiavelli’s Discourses…that exiles are very unreliable…, because their longing for their homeland deceives them.” Strauss then points out, consistent with many sections in Machiavelli, there are multiple levels of possible meaning in such a claim.

Strauss spends plenty of time on Alcibiades and his mention in other works (including the difficulty of finding an equal in other historical figures), as well as discussion of loyalty versus treachery (with emphasis on Plato’s Crito). Strauss then discusses the split-personality nature of Athens and the problem of Alcibiades: “It was the tragedy of Athens. Athens could have won on Sicily if it had a military leader like Alcibiades, or, more precisely, Alcibiades had been the military leader. But on the other hand they couldn’t trust Alcibiades because of the [??????] of their forefathers. They knew Alcibiades wasn’t [?????sound ??????]. What should they do? And therefore when these rumors came, these ugly rumors of the slanders, they believed the slanders. And so they called him back and ruined the [expedition].” The reader witness the struggle in the Athenians between piety and justice, on one hand, and what is necessary to protect the state. Thucydides' everlasting possession has proved to be exactly that for all these years.

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lecture 11

The lectures/recordings on this course can be found at the center's site.

What follows are some of my notes on topics I found of interest in these recordings. I don’t pretend to cover everything he discusses in the lectures and my quotes are close but may not be exact. His class uses the Rex Warner translation while I mention and quote from the Thomas Hobbes translation, which can found here. On a final note I'll refer to my summary page for my posts on The Peloponnesian War.

Lecture 11

Strauss begins the lecture with a final comment on the Melian dialogue. He had stated that during the dialogue the Melians do not bring up the subject of the gods, they only mention them in reply to an Athenian statement. He modifies that claim here after reading Book V, Chapter 103: “The question is did the Athenians bring it [the subject of the gods] up? And there is a slight difference of opinion. I would now put it this way. They [the Athenians] mention it only in passing. … Someone can say it was not brought up by anybody, which would be somewhat closer to the truth. … That is my proposal.” He further clarifies this stance by saying no one directly speaks of the gods but the divine (something much vaguer) is mentioned. What does Thucydides precisely say about the gods? Thucydides evades answering that question, but Strauss says he has started looking at the mention of the gods and will share some of his study later in the lecture.

He steps back in the text to the battle of Mantinea. If the Sicilian expedition is the Athenian tragedy, Strauss calls Mantinea the Spartan comedy, winning through unorthodox means. ”This fantastic story of the battle of Mantinea, it restored the prestige of Sparta. It was achieved in a wholly unorthodox way by a Spartan king who was not completely above suspicion of treachery. And all kinds of changes were made, we have seen, against the ancient law. And this is a kind of premonition the changes Sparta might be willing to undergo if necessary.”

Strauss returns to his earlier comments and says he thinks studying the inclusion and exclusion of the gods during the speeches may give some clarity on Thucydides view of the gods, especially their role in the war. This is long but I think worth including in detail here. (Strauss had only finished this through the early part of Book II. Also, I have not checked his claims with the text.)

I. Opening—claims
  a. The “bigness” of the Peloponnesian War
    i. The weakness of the ancients versus the strength of the present—nothing is said about the gods.
    ii. The greatness of the sufferings—the Greeks inflicted more suffering on each other than they received from the Persians or from the Trojans (I, 23). The sufferings are tacitly divided into two groups:
      1. Those that human beings inflict on one another—no mention of the gods
      2. Those inflicted by something else (earthquakes, famines, etc.)—sufferings from “demonic” origin, “demonic” being ambiguous. May be the gods, may mean anything outside the human (approaching the meaning of what we call natural). The term gods or demons is not used.

II. Speeches in Book One (direct or paraphrased)
  a. Corinthians and Athenians (Corcyra)—the gods are not mentioned
  b. The four speeches in Sparta (I, 68-86)
    i. Corinthians—appeal more emphatically to the gods who watch over the performance of oaths than the Athenians or Sthenelaidas
    ii. Athenians—mention the gods
    iii. Spartan king Archidamus—completely silent on the gods. Keep in mind Thucydides introduced him as having only the reputation of wisdom and temperance (the only one of the four that Thucydides dignifies by giving an epithet or praise, although obviously qualified).
    iv. Spartan ephor Sthenelaidas—mention the gods
  c. Speeches in Sparta (only the Corinthian speech is presented by Thucydides)—they refer to the oracle of the god
  d. Mutual recriminations between Spartans and Athenians on religious pollutions (I, 126). Thucydides refrains from judging on the merits of the cases. The Spartans note that their pollution was responsible for a big earthquake that hit Sparta. Note this is the Spartan opinion, not necessarily Thucydides’ opinion.
  e. Fate of final leaders of the Persian Wars (Spartan Pausanias and Athenian Themistocles—128) contains quotations from the generals' correspondence to the king of Persia (something approaching speeches by Thucydidean characters )—no references to gods. The god in Delphi (Apollo) had a weighty word to say about the Spartan king after he was stabbed to death for his treachery.

III. Speeches by Pericles—completely silent on the gods as Archidamus, with one exception
  a. End of Book One—no mention
  b. Funeral speech—refers in passing to sacrifices (part of the festivities of the things Athens performs).
  c. Final speech (II, 64)—no mention (see below)

IV. Speeches and narration in Book Two
  a. Speech by Archidamus to supreme commanders of Spartans just before invasion of Attica (II, 11)—no reference to gods
  b. Periclean speech to Athenian popular assembly that Thucydides paraphrases—Pericles mentions “the goddess”. Here he is referring to the most valuable statue Athens has with an eye toward its monetary value. (II, 13)
  c. Thucydides has quite a few things to say about the gods in his narrative of the plague
  d. Speech between the Spartans and the Plataeans—the exchange is based on relevant oaths. The Spartan king Archidamus begins his final reply to the Plataeans by calling on the gods and heroes who possess Plataean land to be witnesses to the justice of the Peloponnesian cause (II, 19)—a cause of somewhat dubious claim. Archidamus, who has been silent on the gods, suddenly appeals to the gods. In this context, it must mean that the whole moral political situation has undergone a profound change. Merely human means and motives are not sufficient anymore.

Book VI—The Athenian vote to invade Sicily

Strauss recommends Plutarch’s biography on Nicias. In Nicias' first speech (starting in chapter 9), attempting to discourage the Athenians from pursuing the Sicilian expedition, Strauss emphasizes (stronger than I did) that Nicias tries to discredit the peace (the peace that Nicias had helped negotiate) by pointing out its weaknesses. Another important point that Strauss raises that I didn’t discuss:

”These people [the majority that had voted to attack Sicily] are prepared to put into jeopardy what is available—what they have—for the sake of invisible things (the grandeur of [??????]). It’s very remarkable because later on Nicias himself will be compelled to put all his faith in invisible things when things go wrong in Sicily. But for the time-being, he is just a sober, practical, matter-of-fact man who says ‘We don’t need further conquests. We don’t need to endanger all we possess for a dubious prospect.’”

All of Nicias’ first speech against the expedition is read in class and looked at, setting up Alcibiades’ reply (in the next lecture). Strauss has noted several times that if there are three items, such as the three speeches here, the place of “honor” or emphasis is the middle item. What could Thucydides hope to stress or emphasize by placing Alcibiades’ speech in the middle?

Posting in this series will resume Tuesday—I’m accompanying a kindergarten class to the aquarium on Monday.

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lectures 9 - 10

The lectures/recordings on this course can be found at the center's site.

What follows are some of my notes on topics I found of interest in these recordings. I don’t pretend to cover everything he discusses in the lectures and my quotes are close but may not be exact. His class uses the Rex Warner translation while I mention and quote from the Thomas Hobbes translation, which can found here. On a final note I'll refer to my summary page for my posts on The Peloponnesian War.

Lecture 9

I don’t always discuss Strauss’ initial discussions in his lectures—usually he raises a question or topic and talks about it before turning to the text. Sometimes it’s difficult for me to see the connection between the discussion and the text, other times they fit together in an obvious manner. In the opening discussion for this lecture, Strauss looks at Thucydides from the standpoint of history versus philosophy (taking into account religion).

Some quotes and comments from all of the lecture:

• “To state this as harshly as possible [about the history], there is no shred of evidence for gods, but there is a lot of evidence, according to Thucydides, for the need for gods. But there is no confusion, no darkness in Thucydides’ mind caused by the possibility of gods. After all, Thucydides could be called an agnostic."

• This lecture continues in Book 4, reaching Thucydides’ introduction to the Spartan general Brasidas. At the same time we meet him, however, Thucydides relays the following incident to color the reader’s attitude toward Sparta (Book IV, Ch. 80, Hobbes’ translation):

For they did also this further, fearing the youth and multitude of their Helotes: for the Lacedæmonians had ever many ordinances concerning how to look to themselves against the Helotes. They caused proclamation to be made, that as many of them as claimed the estimation to have done the Lacedæmonians best service in their wars, should be made free; feeling them in this manner, and conceiving that, as they should every one out of pride deem himself worthy to be first made free, so they would soonest also rebel against them. And when they had thus preferred about two thousand, which also with crowns on their heads went in procession about the temples as to receive their liberty, they not long after made them away: and no man knew how they perished.

Strauss, as an aside, compares this to the Katyń massacre of the Polish officers by the Russians during World War II. “The tragedy is absolutely shocking, but it was part of the secret of Spartan power.” … “This is the other Sparta—the non-Brasidean Sparta. And Brasidas is of course simply an organ, an instrument of that Sparta. So that all admiration for Brasidas’ nobility of character must be qualified.”

• The lecture turns to the topics of Delium and Amphipolis. About Delium and Socrates’ participation in the battle: “Further, as [historian George] Grote observes…Socrates was exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Aristophanes was exposing him to derision in the comedy of The Clouds as a dreamer, [????] morally worthless and physically incapable.” (Strauss notes some people don’t believe Socrates was present at the battle.)

• The speeches before the (first) battle of Amphipolis are compared—Pagondas (Theban general, ch. 92) and Hippocrates (Athenian, ch. 95). “What is most [?????] difference between the Boeotian and the Athenian speech? The complete absence of any reference to the gods in the Athenian speech. And what happens? The Athenians are terribly defeated. So even assuming that Pagondas was [???an unbeliever???], his hypocrisy helped him.”

• Strauss lightly covers the(first) battle of Amphipolis, noting Thucydides’ generalship (and subsequent exile) is mentioned. Strauss highlights the fact that Brasidas (Spartan) is given a speech by Thucydides while Cleon (Athenian) isn’t. With Thucydides you always have to ask why one side is given airtime but the other isn’t (and look beyond the obvious answer that inclusion doesn’t suit his purpose)—what was Thucydides trying to show or shape in his presentation? Arguments can be supported by including some data and excluding other facts. Add the framework of dramatizing the history and you have several dynamics at work within his history beyond simply what happened.

One thing Strauss pointed out I completely missed in my initial reading last year. In Book Four, Chapter 132, the Spartans

took with them from Sparta, contrary to the law, such men as were but in the beginning of their youth, to make them governors of cities, rather than commit the cities to the care of such as were there before. (Hobbes’ translation)

Compare this action to Brasidas’ speech to the men of Acanthus, particularly the start of Chapter 86—“ I come not hither to hurt, but to set free the Grecians: and I have the Lacedæmonian magistrates bound unto me by great oaths”. Now that Sparta sets up puppet governments where they claimed to fight for freedom we see what their word is worth.

Strauss turns to Book Five and quickly covers the second battle of Amphipolis. Once again he raises the conflict between public and private good (see Lecture 8) as highlighted by Thucydides in Book Five, Chapter 16:

But when also this other overthrow happened to the Athenians at Amphipolis, and that both Cleon and Brasidas were slain: the which on either side were most opposite to the peace; the one, for that he had good success and honour in the war; the other, because in quiet times his evil actions would more appear and his calumniations be the less believed : those two that in the two states aspired most to be chief, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, and Nicias the son of Niceratus, who in military charges had been the most fortunate of his time, did most of all other desire to have the peace go forward. Nicias, because he was desirous, having hitherto never been overthrown, to carry his good fortune through, and to give both himself and the city rest from their troubles for the present; and for the future to leave a name, that in all his time he had never made the commonwealth miscarry; which he thought might be done by standing out of danger, and by putting himself as little as he might into the hands of fortune; and to stand out of danger is the benefit of peace. (Hobbes' translation)

Strauss calls the Melian dialogue the most theoretical part of Thucydides’ work. It’s difficult to say what Thucydides thinks about this dialogue. On one hand, the Sicilian expedition comes soon after this dialogue (compare to the plague in Athens following Pericles’ speech). Yet the Sicilian expedition, as disastrous as it was, did not cause Athens to fall. “As Thucydides says, the Athenians had an amazing resiliency. And if I read him correctly, what brought the Athenians down was folly. The leading Athenians of that time, in disregarding Alcibiades’ advice regarding a naval battle [??? … ???], they are defeated and that led to the ruin of Athens.”

Lecture 10

Strauss revisits (at the beginning and the end of the lecture) the comparison between the Peloponnesian War and Thucydides’ combining two distinct fighting periods with the so-called ‘peace of Nicias’ between them to World War I and World War II—what was intended as a peace treaty proved to be only a temporary armistice. Thucydides addresses this issue in his second preface of the history in Book V (chapters in the mid-20s). Strauss jumps ahead to Book VII when he looks at the Spartan feelings of guilt for breaking the peace, which they believe leads to their defeats in the first section of the war. Since it is much clearer that the Athenians broke the peace of Nicias and started the second section of the war, the Spartans believe this helps lead to their ultimate victory.

Strauss takes plenty of time to go through the Melian dialogue, reading the dialogue and pausing to recap and discuss parts of it. Since the dialogue is pretty straightforward, I’ll only provide one quote from Strauss that puts the dialogue in company with other literary discussions:

“So this situation in which the conversation takes place is in the absence of the common people. … Melos being a Spartan colony means it is not a democracy, and they don’t want the common people to have any say in the matter. And that is of some interest because the three most famous documents of what is now called Machiavellianism, or maybe extreme Machiavellianism, we have from antiquity—the Melian dialogue, Thrasymachus’ speech in the first book of The Republic, and Callicles’ speech in Plato’s Gorgias—are all behind closed doors (are not public speeches).”

The dialogue raises many questions. Some topics mentioned by Strauss includes the truth of the Athenian declaration—is justice only possible between two equals? Did the Melians make the right decision not to submit? Another question, mentioned at the end of the last lecture, involves how to interpret Thucydides’ attitude toward the dialogue. Similar to Pericles’ funeral oration, a terrible setback immediately follows a speech or dialogue. Even though Thucydides makes it clear the Sicilian expedition was not the immediate cause of Athens’ fall, it did play a role and set the tone in leading to the city’s ultimate demise.

The next post will look at lecture 11.

Leo Strauss lectures on Thucydides (1972-73): Lectures 5 - 8

The lectures/recordings on this course can be found at the center's site.

What follows are some of my notes on topics I found of interest in these recordings. I don’t pretend to cover everything he discusses in the lectures and my quotes are close but may not be exact. His class uses the Rex Warner translation while I mention and quote from the Thomas Hobbes translation, which can found here. On a final note I'll refer to my summary page for my posts on The Peloponnesian War.

Lecture 5

The lecture begins with a side-note on claims and comparisons:

• The greatest war (demeans previous wars). But Thucydides was not just an observer of this war but a participant. How does that impact his claim and history?

• Instead of speaking about Greek “culture”, Thucydides talks about the emergence of “Greekness.”

• When Thucydides compares the Peloponnesian war to the Trojan War he also engages in a battle with Homer (“never forget that”). Thucydides also stresses the importance of the “demonic” (divine) in the Trojan War. Keep an eye on the differences between human and demonic things.

• The distinction Thucydides presents between rest and motion: what items are at rest? What items are in motion? Why is rest a higher level of being than motion? Can we have rest without motion? How does mastering unrest fit into this distinction?

• How to size up Athens and Sparta: “These two cities are distinguished from one another not only by their political and military arrangements but also by their state of mind, their spirit. Therefore, they must be understood not merely in terms of the cleverness and the stupidity of their policies but must also consider their form, their character, their ideals.”

Strauss finishes going through Pericles’ funeral oration. Strauss makes an interesting claim, saying Pericles only uses the word death at the very end of the speech. Reading back through the speech, there are many references to death and the word is used a few times, although I am reading in translation. Even if the translation is correct, it is striking how little death is referenced in a funeral speech.

Strauss doesn’t mention it directly but a topic he raised in an earlier lecture can be applied here, showing the intent of this speech is to describe the ideal Athens. How does Athens measure up to this ideal as the history progresses? We don’t have long to wait since the plague follows the speech and undermines many parts of Pericles’ speech.

Lecture 6

“All Thucydides’ statements, we can say, are deliberately incomplete. … Yet, Thucydides never continues his incomplete statements.” Strauss is pointing out that Thucydides will have two statements that are related but in different parts of the history but they are not explicitly tied together. The second statement may append the first reference. Or the second statement will have a slight alteration or stress something different.

“One cannot avoid wondering whether there is a connection between Thucydides’ way of writing and his subject. His subject matter is, at least partly, the demonic (daemonic) things (whatever that may be) and of course the city. The relation between those two items is presupposed, not explained. Now this answer to explain Thucydides’ way of writing by his subject matter is manifestly insufficient. Yet how many great writers have dealt with these subject matters and yet without any hidden thoughts. The most obvious example which occurs to me is Thucydides’ alleged continuator, Xenophon, who also deals with demonic things and he also deals with a war.”

Strauss then looks at the difference between Thucydides (“severity and gravity”) and Xenophon (light-hearted, yet shows fear of the demonic). “By thinking of this simple difference between Thucydides and Xenophon one comes somewhat closer to the understanding of why Thucydides writes in the manner of which he writes.”

During his discussion of the Plataeans’ defense before the Spartans and the Thebans argument against Plataea, Strauss raises the issue of how to define a city. What happens when the leaders do not reflect the wishes of the people?

“We hear all the time of the laws of cities. … But what does that mean, the city? Was Thebes, for example, at the time of the Persian invasion, a city? Was the government of Thebes at that time…was this Thebes? Or was it not simply usurpers of power? … So we must make a distinction in each case between the polis, the common, and a part which claims to be or to speak for the common.” … “You see the complication of the political issue that you do not have merely cities, but cities consisting of antagonistic parts. So that does not really help us know what precisely is a city.”

A theme Strauss comes back to several times in this lecture looks at progress vs. non-progress—where do all the uprisings in Book Three fit in such a framework? How to account for the terror and the atrocities committed in this section? In viewing these occurrences, does man…does the history…reflect progress?

Lecture 7

This lecture covers the end of Book Three and begins looking at Book Four and the following items: Sicily and Demonsthenes, Pylos and Sphacteria. During the sections read Strauss highlights the natural phenomena and how much of a role chance plays during the war (important to keep in mind since luck/fortune will be stressed often in arguments for or against something).

Demosthenes is scared to return to Athens after his initial losses in Aetolia. How much does the fear of the Athenian council punishing generals impact decisions in the field? Strauss mentions Machiavelli’s Discourses, Book One, Chapter 28, from which I’ll quote:

The very contrary happened in Athens, for her liberty having been taken away by Pisistratus in her most florid time and under the deception of goodness, so soon then as she became free, remembering the injuries received and her past servitude, she became a harsh avenger not only of the errors of her citizens, but even the shadow of them. From which resulted the exile and death of so many excellent men: From this came the practice of ostracism and every other violence which that City at various times took up against her Nobility.

The stress that Thucydides lays on the Athenian victory at Sphacteria goes beyond a simple battle. At the end of the battle Athens' supremacy seemed a certainty as Sparta begged for peace. This victory provides some foreground to the later Sicilian debacle. Why were the Athenians victorious at Sphacteria? How do the principle characters (Cleon and Demosthenes) compare to principles in the Sicilian expedition? Cleon, encouraged by a mob mentality, makes reckless claims, yet he proves to be successful. How does such reckless behavior stack up against the impetuous nature of the later expedition? (The next lecture explores this topic some more.)

Lecture 8

The first 55 minutes were spent talking about Thucydides as historian—I failed to make any notes on this section of the lecture.

Some excerpts from later in the lecture:

• “There is a post-Periclean conflict between the private good and the common good—in Pericles there was perfect harmony between the two. What Pericles wanted for himself was good for Athens. And that was no longer the case as far as his successors were concerned. That we know. Now we enter on the story of Demosthenes and his concern with the private good. This disruption by the concern for the private good was due not merely to base ambition but to sensible fear of mad men—the demos. And you remember that Demosthenes returned to Athens only after his [???victory???] the following spring, not without fear that he might be impeached, but with less fear, because he had made somewhat of a restitution. One can say that Demosthenes here foreshadows Nicias’ conduct in Sicily. Nicias and Demosthenes were colleagues in Sicily and Nicias was very much afraid of what they would do to him if her were to come back to Athens without having [???defeated???] the Sicilians.”

• “But the success [at Sphacteria] was decisively due, we are [??sorry???] to say, to Cleon…to his madness. Nicias and the other sane men [are] the opposite of madness… they said ‘That’s wonderful, let him go out and he’ll either defeat the Spartans—fine—or he’s defeated and killed—still better.’ But these clever moderate views are themselves defeated, because when he [Cleon] comes back his reputation is higher than it ever was. He makes good his mad promises. They force Nicias, a sober man, to abandon his command to madman Cleon. This also has a parallel later with Sicily where Alcibiades, who one can hardly call a madman…but also one cannot call a moderate man…Alcibiades forces the sober Nicias to share his command with him. And this leads to entirely different results.”

• “It seems that moderation is superior to madness, but when you look at the result…madness proves to be superior to moderation.” Strauss goes into detail how this has parallels to parts of Plato’s Phaedrus.

• After the loss at Sphacteria, the Spartans act hesitant, not willing to commit to conflicts because of fortune’s turn against them. This change in confidence, in a way, returns them to the Spartan caution which the Corinthian delegation complained about in Book One.

The next post will look at lectures 9 and 10.