The Herodotus reading group at the Reading Odyssey

I know this is last minute but if you have ever been interested in reading (or re-reading) Herodotus' The Histories, consider signing up for the Reading Odyssey's reading group beginning on September 17, 2014, and running through March 2015. I have participated in several of their reading groups and have found them extremely helpful and fun.

Links:
     The Reading Odyssey's page
     The sign-up page
     My posts on Herodotus
     Some online resources on Herodotus

I plan on re-reading The Landmark Series edition alongside the recent Tom Holland and Pamela Mensch translations. I guess there goes my (theoretical) spare time. But I can't think of a better way to spend it. Join us!

Herodotus Salon recording

On May 14, 2014 Paul Cartledge and James Romm talked about Herodotus and the two new translations of his Histories. It's well worth the hour to listen to the salon sponsored by Reading Odyssey, which can be found here.

I asked about other recent books on Herodotus they have enjoyed and they provided some books that will be added to my to-be-read stack soon in addition to the two new translations by Pamela Mensch and Tom Holland. Don't forget Cartledge's After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars (and his lecture on the book) or Romm's Herodotus in the Hermes Book Series, both wonderful books as well.

Herodotus Salon - With Professors Paul Cartledge and James Romm

I'm happy to pass along the following information from Reading Odyssey, Inc:

Herodotus Salon - With Professors Paul Cartledge and James Romm 

Wednesday, May 14
7pm (New York time) via toll-free conference call. 

Reading Odyssey is proud to host a conversation with two top classicists discussing two new translations of the wonderful Herodotus.

We will be discussing these two new translations:


       
Translated by Tom Holland, with Introduction by Paul Cartledge
Penguin Classics, 2013

Translated by Pamela Mensch, Edited with Introduction and Notes by James Romm 

Hackett Publishing Company, Forthcoming in March 2014 

Join this call if you'd like to hear two of the great classicists talking about this wonderful historian.

Having participated in several events and programs with Reading Odyssey, Inc., I can highly recommends what they do. Information on signing up can be found here. The event is free, or you can donate $10 toward funding their programs. I hope to "see" you there!

Lecture by Paul Cartledge on After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars

Paul Cartledge spoke at the SPHS Autumn Lecture, Tuesday November 12th 2013 held at The Hellenic Centre in London. Thanks to David Meadows at rogueclassicism for posting a link to this lecture.

My post on the book can be found here.

“The story I have woven...is one of commemoration, of rivalry, classically ancient Greek rivalry for commemoration priority.” In other words, who would get the greatest honor or credit for the defeat of the Persians? In my post I described the oath as part of a fight for historical memory. Cartledge’s description is more exact. I’m going to provide a few notes from the lecture--they aren’t meant to sum up the talk but provide some additional information that supplements my post on his book.

• Cartledge had a minor consulting role for the movie 300. From his anecdote it sounds like his focus was on pronunciation of names (and they didn't always take his advice).


• Herodotus has the most complete description of the Battle of Plataea. As a supposedly objective recorder of the battle, Herodotus described Plataea as “the fairest victory of all those we know.” Cartledge describes this as a drop in the ocean of anti-Spartan sentiment.


• Cartledge mentions William Shepherd’s recent book on the battle: Plataea 479 BC: Greece’s Greatest Victory (Osprey). He also recommends looking at Tom Holand’s recent translation of Herodotus (in which Cartledge wrote the Introduction and Notes). See Amazon UK for a preview, which includes the Translator’s Preface and Cartledge’s Introduction.


• After going into detail about the monument with the Oath of Plataea, Cartledge discusses the argument over the existence of the temple to Ares at Acharnae and the reasons he believes it existed.


• Cartledge spends plenty of time describing and interpreting the monument on which the Oath appears, showing how it was intended to steal Spartan glory on the victory at Plataea. He also looks at other monuments commemorating battle victories so the listener can compare and contrast them.


• He also spends time going over additional items that were part of the fight for commemorative memory, including epigrams, elegies, and even household items.


• There are additional videos posted by the Hellenic Society that look interesting. Expect another post or two on a few of these.

After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars by Paul Cartledge

After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars by Paul Cartledge
Emblems of Antiquity series
Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN: 9780199747320 Paul Cartledge’s name has been mentioned on this blog several times—he is the A. G. Leventis Professor of Greek Culture in the Faculty of Classics at the University of Cambridge. This book is part of Oxford University Press’ Emblems of Antiquity series. The emblem, in this case, is the Oath of Plataea, inscribed on a marble stele found in the early 1930s in the Athenian countryside. The monument itself is considered genuine but the authenticity of the Oath of Plataea is debated—Cartledge believes it to be inauthentic.

So why choose something of dubious validity for the center of a study? Cartledge uses the oath, inscribed between 350 and 325 B.C. describing an event taking place in 479 B.C., as a starting point to look at events, culture, and religion of both time periods while delving into the broader context of the fight for historical memory. The authenticity of the inscribed oath is almost beside the point:

[T]he main point of this book, which is to try to identify and to explain the function(s) the Oath of Plataea was designed to serve in its immediate monumental context. Those functional needs, I suggest, are to be located firmly within a retrospectively triumphalist narrative—or rather story, in the sense of a fabrication—that the Athenians had begun insistently to tell themselves and anyone else who would listen to them from the mid-380s BCE onwards. A story which acquired a new salience and urgency in the desperate times immediately following the Athenians’ calamitous defeat at Chaeronea in 338 [BC]. Those, I further suggest, are respectively the true overall context and the true specific context within which the monument as a whole is to be properly and fully understood. (30)

All of which forms an extended whole in conjunction with my recent post on Professor Jeremy McInerney's lecture. This ideologically motivated commemoration was done by shaping history in many forms and relying on politics, religion, and other contexts to change how the battle was remembered. In recounting the battle, Herodotus gave the highest credit to the Spartans, which would be a major factor in how the event would resonate through history:

Plataea, indeed, could almost be called the great unknown battle in one of the great wars of history. One reason for Plataea’s relative lack of celebrity, as already noted, is that it was essentially a Spartan (and Peloponnesian), not Athenian, victory, and the Athenians have been far more vocal, far more influential over the surviving tradition of the Wars, than the Spartans… . Another is that Plataea was a small state… . Yet a third reason for the battle’s lack of its due meed of celebrity is more technical, and due to the nature of the surviving evidence for it. Herodotus’ account is not just the best that we have, but really the only usable one—in the sense that the others are more or less derivative from it rather than independently grounded and valuable. 88-9)

Despite declaring the unknown qualities of the battle and even with dedicating a long chapter to it, the battle itself is not the major focus of the book and Cartledge emphasizes the paucity of detail. I’ve included a few links on the battle at the end of the post to help provide essential perspective for much of what happened during the long standoff and battle.

So what are some of the other contexts? Cartledge emphasizes the religious contexts, something he feels hasn’t been adequately examined to date. The monument was found near the ancient city of Acharnae, location of the only temple to Ares in Attica (and one of the few in the Greek world). The temple was also linked with Athena, at least the militarized version of her. While oaths were important throughout Greece, Cartledge goes into detail on the importance of oaths to Athenians, especially oaths that “fostered amity and collective endeavor, and particularly in the stasis-ridden atmosphere of the fourth century BCE.” (58)

There are also political and historical contexts tied to the faux-oath. The monument was erected about the time Athenian males were required to take a couple of years of military training. The trainees had to take the Ephebic Oath, also on the monument. Borrowing (stealing?) the glory from the victory of Plataea would have powerful symbolism and gloss over the principle role of the Spartans. It would also help hide the fact that the glory days of Athenian military glory were past. The monument was erected about the same time as the debacle at Chaeronea (the loss to Philip II of Macedon and loss of Greek independence). If erected after the battle, the oath would provide some salve for the loss. If dedicated before the battle, the oath would supply much needed hope in recalling past successes. In either case there had been radical changes since the Graeco-Persian Wars at the beginning of the 5th century B.C., when Greece was fighting to remain free of Persian influence. Subsequent history would show several Greek cities calling on help from the Persians (and receiving it). As part of reshaping history, was the oath similar to the Athenian post-oligarchic amnesty of 403 B.C., in a sense changing memory by choosing what to remember and what to forget?

Ironically, the oath reminds people that many Greeks fought alongside the Persians during the wars as well as portraying the ultimate victors as gracious to those traitors (or at least they meant to be). Cartledge highlights the amazing part of these wars, which Herodotus likewise emphasizes—the near miracle of Greek cities cooperating together in sizeable numbers against the Persians. The cooperation between Greeks that did fight together quickly dissolved after the wars. Regarding the shaping of memory, Cartledge has this to say:

In their art of memory, as with so many other key cultural artifacts of theirs, the ancient Greeks were quintessentially agonistic, indeed antagonistic: competitive to the ultimate degree. Competition affected not just the matter of how great deeds were celebrated and commemorated but also the issue of which deeds, which battles, were to be celebrated, and by whom. … [T]hough the Plataea victory was actually a Panhellenic accomplishment, almost immediately its memory or rather memorialization became a focal point of contention among eternally rivalrous Greeks and their cities. (123-4)

Cartledge includes various means of competition for the way the Persian wars were to be remembered in several areas: monuments, commemorations, histories, myths, epigrams, and others. It’s a very entertaining book, geared toward the general reader. Cartledge foregoes footnotes but provides a “Further Reading” section highlighting sources and helpful details. While I think some knowledge of ancient Greek history is helpful, it isn’t necessary to enjoy the book. It’s a fun approach, using the oath as a means to explore what had changed in Athens and Greece during the 150 years between the Battle of Plataea and the date of the monument as well as unveiling some of the means the Greeks used to shape how history would be remembered.

---

Additional links and resources listed in the book:

• The University of Nottingham has a database of oaths. Go to the database page and click on “search the database.” The oath ID is 338.
• Cartledge reviews the Wikipedia entry on the Battle of Plataea and finds it “rather good” although he does go over some issues and problems in it.
• He is also complimentary on Nicholas Snow’s description of the battle in the historical novel The Shield.
• Cartledge includes a link to a review of the History Channel’s show on the Battle of Plataea. I would also like to add all posts at that site on the Battle of Plataea. There are plenty of videos posted on YouTube—just type in "Plataea" to search. I will add a link to the page about the battle posted at MilitaryHistoryOnline.com.
• The Onassis Cultural Center NY is hosting a lecture panel and discussion titled After Thermopylae: How Wars are Concluded and Commemorated on June 4, 2013 at the Morgan Library & Museum. In addition to Paul Cartledge the discussion is scheduled to include Bruce Cole, Eugenia Kiesling, and James Romm.
• Cartledge has provided a nice summary post of the book at the Heffers’ Classics blog. He will be a participant in their 2013 Festival. From his post:

Now, so far as the Oath of the Ephebes goes, that’s all fine and dandy – the reference of that oath is contemporary, and it was in 335 or thereabouts that the whole system of ephebic training at Athens was reorganised for the 18- and 19-year-olds performing a sort of national service at a time of grave crisis for Athens (following the Athenians’ heavy defeat by the Macedonians of Philip and Alexander at Chaeronea in 338). But the supposed Oath of Plataea, if genuine, would have been sworn almost 150 years earlier – so why inscribe it now, round about 335 perhaps?
If, that is, it was genuine?

If you have any other pages you think are helpful on either the Battle of Plataea or the Oath of Plataea, let me know and I’ll be happy to add them.

Update: I meant to add another resource I have read on the Battle of Plataea. Victor Davis Hanson's The Wars of the Ancient Greeks has a good description and a great map about the battle.

Great Battles Lecture: Thermopylae: The Battle for Europe?

(From the YouTube description) Dr. Jeremy McInerny [sic], Professor of Classical Studies, examines the tactics and strategy of the Battle of Thermopylae (in present-day Greece) in 480 BCE. Why was the battle fought at this location and was it, as it is often portrayed, a turning point in the confrontation of East and West? This lecture puts the Battle of Thermopylae into the context of the Persian Wars, and examines the battle's significance for the Greeks as well as for Europeans in later periods, in art and poetry.

Professor Jeremy McInerney of the University of Pennsylvania may be familiar to some of you since he has done a few series for The Great Courses. His lecture on Thermopylae is perfect timing for me since it’s a good precursor for Paul Cartledge’s new book After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars (which I hope to post on next week). Since I seem to highly recommend videos that aren't exactly popular (I was viewer 148), this post will combine a semi-summary of his lecture with some occasional fleshing out of the topics he raises.

His talk attempts to put the Battle of Thermopylae in context for what it meant to the Greeks as well as what it meant going forward for the West. He jokingly starts the lecture showing the who, what, when, and where of the battle. He mentions there is a need to “unpack” the battle since so many people have the view that “Western civilization as we know it would not have come about had the Greeks not been victorious at Thermopylae.” He obviously includes much tongue-in-cheek when claiming a Greek victory at Thermopylae. Because of the resonance to the imagination that the battle engenders, though, I don’t think he’s far wrong in turning what was a disaster into a propaganda-like victory. One of the important topics is the “battle of images” that arose after the fact.

Something that stood out in his lecture I don’t think I’ve mentioned in previous posts is that the Greeks try to have it different ways in their characterization of the wars with Persia, depending on what point of comparison is emphasized. The Greeks, though outnumbered by some inflated factor, are often portrayed as an equal to Persia. In looking at the battle of ideas or ideals, Greece is portrayed as far superior. While it’s an obvious point, McInerney shows a map of Persian territory as compared to the combination of Greek city-states around 490 B.C. Greece is the equivalent of a rounding error when compared to the Persian empire. So which is it? Superior, underdog, or equal? Maybe a mix of each?

McInerney raises a point about the Persian empire’s expansion that could apply to other empires of the ancient world:

“We are so conditioned in modern history to look for complex causes, for imperial expansion, economic motives, religious motives and so forth, that we often ignore the brutally simple fact that in the ancient world empires expanded because they could. They simply took more territory when it was available to them.”

The same could be said for many of the Greek cities in the years and conflicts following the Persian wars. McInerney provides a quick overview of the clashes between Persia and Greece, but also notes the cooperation and intermingling between the two, providing detail to support his comment that “The contact between Greeks and Persians culturally goes much deeper than we would often like to admit.” After providing some background on Persia during the time of Darius, McInerney looks at several points of conflict between Athens and Persia, focusing on the Ionian Revolt and the help the Athenians provided. He also goes into detail on the different modes and techniques of warfare between the Greeks and the Persians.

McInerney presents a useful graphic of the Battle of Marathon, highlighting the keys of Greek success. The importance of the victory was great, while the fallout and effects could be seen as out of proportion. “To have defeated that army [of the vast Persian empire] was an accomplishment of superhuman proportions. And it triggered in Athenian culture an astonishing degree of confidence in what they were able to do.”

A decade later when the Greeks learned of the invasion of Xerxes’ army (at least two years in advance), the strategic chokepoint of Thermopylae was the obvious place to slow the Persian advance. Mcinerney looks at Herodotus 7.206 for the purpose of Leonidas and the Spartans (in conjunction with naval engagements). He then reads Herodotus’ account of the third day of battle, after Ephialtes of Trachis betrays the Greeks. Thermopylae was a military disaster while Salamis and Plataea were the victories that stopped the Persian invasion. Why does Thermopylae capture the ancient and modern imagination so much? Calling to mind the celebration of ANZAC day (and he could have mentioned many other examples), he notes “a national identity can be built around a defeat.” What arose, as shown in Herodotus’ account, was a framework pitting East against West, freedom versus slavery. The mythological aspects of the battle began almost immediately.

McInerney presents a slide capturing some of the changes flowing from the battle beyond the celebration of the heroes. Eleutheria [freedom] enters the political discourse where previously it was used only to differentiate between a free man and a slave, Barbarian becomes a term of abuse instead of commenting on how someone spoke or their being non-Greek. Greek confidence leads to a cultural flowering. And while the loss led to a feeling of triumph, it also produced a less-than-attractive triumphalism.

As an example of the last point—whose Xerxes do we talk about? The noble ruler? Or an “eight-foot tall Brazilian metrosexual with more body piercings than you’ll see on South Street on a Saturday night?” In the 2006 movie version of Thermopylae the subtext is so forward that it becomes the text itself—there is a threat coming from the East, and that threat goes beyond the stated freedom versus slavery. The Eurymedon vase, from the 460s B.C. captures what the movie hints at—who buggers who? Herodotus’ noble, heroic account quickly becomes vulgarized and represented by the worst stereotypes.

McInerney looks at the triumphalism of Athens. While mentioning the good things flowing from the triumph, it’s important to keep in mind the people celebrating these heroics would turn allies into enemies. Their assemblies would vote to slaughter all the men of a city revolting against their tyranny. Empires are empires, with all their accompanying traits. Even though Athens helped defeat Persia it effectively becomes an empire, with many of the same traits they portray in their vanquished enemy. This is part of the complicated story of Thermopylae, where things aren’t always black and white.

The lecture ends with the reading of C. P. Cavafy’s poem “Thermopylae”, which chooses to highlight what Athens should have done and been after the battle, not what they did:

Honor to those who in the life they lead
define and guard a Thermopylae.
Never betraying what is right,
consistent and just in all they do
but showing pity also, and compassion;
generous when they are rich, and when they are poor,
still generous in small ways,
still helping as much as they can;
always speaking the truth,
yet without hating those who lie.

And even more honor is due to them
when they foresee (as many do foresee)
that in the end Ephialtis will make his appearance,
that the Medes will break through after all.

A quick note on playing the video: it initially cut off for me at the 46:53 point despite showing a length of 53:23. Upon reloading the page and advancing to the 46 minute mark I was able to see the final minutes. I’m not sure if that glitch was on my end or YouTube’s, but I did want to mention it in case it happens to others. Despite the mention of a Q&A session, it was not included in the video.

Another note: while there is much to look at regarding Thermopylae, I focused on the aspects of Homeric epic in my post from The Histories.

The Herodotus Project

I received an email from Shane Solow pointing me to the Herodotus Project, "an ongoing project documenting in photographs many of the places and artifacts mentioned by Herodotus (c 500 – c 425 BCE) in his Inquiries. This site is updated monthly with photographic tours that are hyperlinked with the text." The translation is by Shlomo Felberbaum. Also check out the main page, Lost Trails for more photos and links.

The Marathon Stone

Diana Gilliland Wright provides updated information and links on "The Marathon Stone,"

an amazing stone that appears to be the casualty list from the battle of Marathon. The inscription is written in boustrephon and diagonally (see comments for update), and was acquired by Herodes Atticus when he honored his home town of Marathon by constructing a great tumulus over the burial site of the Athenian dead.

This is to make a point. Herodes Atticus, who had more money than God, did a great deal of building across Greece which allowed him innumerable sources of art for the swollen collections at his various villas, including those at Marathon and Kefissia.

She brings this up because of recent publication data which includes updated translations. Follow her links for some interesting reading, including more history on the stone and alternative translations.

Thanks to David at rogueclassicism for linking this and providing additional links with more information.

The Histories summary

I may be obliged to tell what is said, but I am not at all obliged to believe it. And you may consider this statement to be valid for my entire work.
- from Book Seven, Paragraph 152

Wow. That’s about all I can manage at this point. What a long strange trip this has been. I didn’t intend to spend so much time on The Histories but I am glad I did. I hope I haven’t scared away anyone that is thinking about reading the book because of the length of time I took—it really doesn't take an entire season (and then some) to read it.

I wanted to spend a minute on the different editions I have read. My first exposure was with Penguin Classics, translation by Aubery de Selincourt. The only substantive complaint I had about that version was the maps. Whenever I come across a location in a text that I don’t know my first impulse is to look it up on a map. For the Penguin edition this meant flipping back to the front of the book and searching on the small maps provided. Even though the maps were adequate most of the time, finding a location was hit or miss. The Landmark Herodotus solves this by placing maps specific to the surrounding text throughout the book so I am rarely more than a page or two away from the appropriate map. But there is so much more to this version that I enjoyed. I’ll link Paul Rahe’s review again from the resources page which takes a critical look at this version, especially the defects he sees in the translation by Andrea L. Purvis. Even with the reservations he lists, I *love* this version for its layout and the additional information it provides. And something else that may seem minor but I think is important—I’ve been lugging this book around for about four months—throwing it in the backseat or trunk of my car, under my desk at work, and on various tables at home. Even with all the wear and tear it is still in great shape (note: this was the hardcover version). Very highly recommended. I’m looking forward to exploring the Landmark versions of Thucydides and Xenophon as well as picking up the volume of Arrian available later this year.

I thought about doing a post with final thoughts about The Histories but I don’t know how I could keep it to a single post. There are many areas I barely touched on or didn't mention that I'd like to include but I’m afraid I could make this a full year project. I’ll end with mentioning the complexity of Herodotus and his views, plus how much he disappears into his work while at the same time remaining front and center throughout. Many times when someone tries to pigeonhole Herodotus’ thoughts as pro-this or anti-that they usually demonstrate they don’t understand the work at all.

I don't intend the listed posts below to be all-inclusive on Herodotus but I hope they will encourage readers to explore some or all of his work.


The Histories

Online resources

Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven
Athens and Sparta
Oracles for the Athenians
Thermopylae as Homeric epic
Miscellaneous points
Himera

Book Eight
Who leads the fleet?
Artemesion
The Troizen decree
Salamis
The last chapters

Book Nine
The Battle of Plataea begins
Plataea
Mycale and the ending


A few of the characters and wonders in The Histories

The tunnel of Samos

The Behistun inscription

Two presentations on the story of Gyges

Aristeas of Proconnesus

Periandros (Periander)

Alkmeon

Of Arms and the Man


About The Histories

The opening of “Herodotus” by Lucian of Samosata

Ryszard Kapuściński's Travels with Herodotus

Kate Beaton’s lighthearted look at who is the father of history?

A quote from an Amazon review—Athenians, Albanians, what’s the difference?

E. Housman’s poem “The Oracles”

The Histories discussion: Book Nine: Mycale and Herodotus' ending

This post covers Book Nine from Paragraph 90 through the end of the work, covering the battle of Mycale, the siege of Sestos, and the final anecdotes.

The Greeks had sailed to Delos under the command of the Spartan Leotychidas. Messengers from Samos urge the Greeks to travel to their island to attack the Persians and ignite an Ionian revolt. The Greeks decide to sail to Samos but the Persians, learning that the Greeks were on the way, retreat to Mycale (just across a narrow neck of water to the mainland) to rely on their troops instead of their fleet. The Greeks follow and find the Persians have built a fortress. The Persians, because of the Samians’ recent behavior in releasing Greek prisoners of war, no longer trust the Ionians. Needless to say, the Persians’ treatment of the Ionians helps fulfill their traitorous potential. The Persians, while fighting valiantly, are undermined by the Ionians and overwhelmed by the Greeks.

One of the themes surrounding Mycale centers on the unified Greek forces and decision-making of the many poleis. The Athenians and other Greeks breach the Persian line and move into their camp while the late arrival of the Spartans (by design) finishes off the last of any resistance. In addition, the Ionians assist in attacking the Persians directly and indirectly. A few stray thoughts about this section on the battle of Mycale…

With both the Persians and Greeks relying on favorable signs before undertaking an attack, what does that tell a soldier when he sees the other side beginning a charge? Even worse, what if his omens are still unfavorable? This could help explain one component of rapid collapses in ancient battles I had not thought of until this section—the belief in something akin to divine abandonment. Tied in with omens is Herodotus’ theme of the gods’ vengeance for unjust penalties by recounting the story of the famous Greek diviner Euenios. While guarding the sacred flock of Helios at Apollonia, Euenios falls asleep and wolves kill about sixty of the flock. The Apollonian court haa Euenios blinded and immediately their sheep ceased to give birth. Several oracles are consulted and each tell how the gods are seeking vengeance for Euenios’ unjust punishment since it was they, the gods, who had set the wolves on the flock. Once the Apollonians tried to fix things Euenios possesses the power of divination. The current seer for the Greek fleet, Deiphonos, claims to be Euenios’ son, although Herodotus casts some doubt on his claim. (There’s something reassuring in seeing con men 2,500 years ago, although I’m not completely sure why--maybe it's knowing that human nature hasn't changed.)

By inciting the Ionians to revolt, Leotychidas brings the story full circle since the revolt in Ionia, supported by Athens, proved to be a major reason behind the Persian invasions of Greece. In his speech to Ionians, Leotychidas gives them the password “Hera” so they could identify themselves as loyal to the Greeks. I’m not sure if that was chosen for a particular reason (and some scholars believe the text says “Hebe”), but to me Hera is closely tied to revenge, an appropriate choice for any Ionian wanting to repay the Persians for crushing the earlier revolt.

Herodotus claims that the battle of Mycale happened on the same day as the battle of Plataea. Furthermore, he claims that

“there are indeed many clear proofs that the divine is present in what happens, and certainly one would be that on the day of the defeat at Plataea and on which the defeat at Mycale was about to occur, a rumor of the earlier victory reached the Hellenes at Mycale and greatly encouraged them, increasing their confidence and their willingness to undergo the dangers of battle with great zeal than before.

- from paragraph 100, all quotes and spellings are from The Landmark Herodotus with translation by Andrea L. Purvis.

Herodotus frames this as a rumor, leaving some plausible deniability on actual knowledge of the other battle. Yet this seems to be one of his strongest validations of “the divine”. He has not shied away from saying that the gods assist in victories or in other events, but here he decidedly portrays the gods as not just being present but interactive with humans. It’s a minor point but it stands out because his presentation of direct human/god direct interactions are rare.

The battle of Mycale and the subsequent battle of Sestos seem more like harbingers of the upcoming de facto Athenian empire through the Delian League than a conclusion to the Persian invasion. Athens insists on establishing alliances with the Ionians and nearby islanders as well as going on the offensive against Persian fortifications while the Spartans (and others from the Peloponnese) decide the original mission has been completed and sail home, a hint of things to come. The expansion of Athenian power will prove to be an important factor in the various wars with Sparta down to the time Herodotus was finishing The Histories.

Before telling about the siege of Sestos, Herodotus goes into detail about Xerxes’ romantic woes shortly after his return to Persian lands. Xerxes’ wife has the woman she thought was having an affair with Xerxes horribly mutilated. Why is this anecdote in here? If nothing else, the story proves to be a cautionary tale on several fronts. It presents Xerxes as a weak, feckless man. The story shows power wielded in an arbitrary manner, benefitting the rulers while damaging perceived enemies. The anecdote seems to say “look at what the Greeks would have had to put up with” had Xerxes triumphed. In addition, it fits in nicely with the “changing fortune” theme—one minute you’re on top of the world. The next minute your wife is mutilating potential lovers.

The last action of The Histories revolves around the siege of Sestos and leads into Herodotus’ final anecdote. I remember the first time I read the ending of The Histories. I thought “What in the …?” Herodotus does not end The Histories in any manner we are used to seeing a history account conclude, but there are many previous themes recalled here in addition to implied facts that Herodotus’ audience would understand and find relevant.

The last eight paragraphs are fairly straight-forward: The Greeks sail from Mycale to the Hellespont but find the bridge already destroyed by a storm. As mentioned earlier in the post, the Spartans and other allies from the Peloponnese sail home. The Athenians, under the leadership of Xanthippos, resolve to stay and attack nearby Persians in the city of Sestos. The Persian leader of this province was Artayktes, a man who had taken possession of and plundered the nearby tomb of Protesilaos. The siege takes many months but Xanthippos will not allow any of the disgruntled soldiers to return home until they take Sestos or Athens recalls them. The leading Persians attempt to flee Sestos but are caught and killed. Before being nailed to a plank and seeing his son stoned to death in front of him, Artayktes interprets a portent to mean that Protesilaos is revenging himself for Artayktes’ violation of his tomb. It turns out Artayktes had an ancestor that had proposed to Cyrus that the Persians should move to a better land since they were expanding their territory. Cyrus replied that soft places produce soft men for the “same land cannot yield both wonderful crops and men who are noble and courageous in war.” The Persians agree and “chose to dwell in a poor land rather than to be slaves to others and to cultivate the plains.” (from paragraph 121)

I will try to unpack some of what is going on in this ending because there is a lot in this brief section:

Tying the Trojan War to the Greco-Persian Wars
Protesilaos turns out to have been the first Greek ashore in addition to being the first killed in the Trojan War. From Ian Johnston’s translation:

Troops from Phylace, flowering Pyrasus,
shrine of Demeter, Iton, where flocks breed,
Antrum by the sea, and grassy Pteleum—
brave Protesilaus had led these men, while still alive.
Now the black earth held him. In Phylace,
he left behind a wife to tear her cheeks in grief,
home half complete. Some Dardanian killed him,
as he jumped on Trojan soil, the first on shore,
far ahead of all Achaeans.
(Book II, lines 696-704)

Artayktes tells Xerxes that Protesilaos was a “Greek man who waged war against your land and died, thus paying his just penalty. Give his house to me, so that all may learn not to wage war on your land.” (from paragraph 116) While being clever in his description, Artayktes compresses the timeline so that the land in Asia is Xerxes’ land and any transgression against it, regardless of when it happened, is a transgression against Xerxes. In doing so, he ties together the Trojan War with the Greco-Persian Wars, showing that the recent battles between Greece and Persia are a sort of culmination of East-West hostilities. Also, Artayktes’ description of what happened with Protesilaos echoes Herodotus’ opening descriptions of female abductions (Io, Europa, Medea, and Helen of Troy) narrated by the Persians where legends are transformed into an unrecognizable form. Herodotus has tied previous East-West conflicts, particularly the Trojan War, with the Greco-Persian wars in several places such as his catalogue of troops and ships in Book Seven. The location of Artayktes’ death, where Xerxes bridged the Hellespont, heightens the symbolism. So in just a few lines we have Herodotus mingling Homeric epic (with Protesilaos) and legendary characters (from a few generations back, like Cyrus) with Persian Wars heroes (Xanthippos). This compression of time includes characters in Herodotus’ day, which I'll mention later.

Retribution
While in custody, Artayktes sees guards roasting salted fish that spring to life and wriggle as if just caught. He interprets this portent to mean that Protesilaos, even though “dead and dry as a salted fish” has the “power from the gods to pay back the person who wrongs him.” (from paragraph 120) Vengeance or retribution has been a steady theme throughout The Histories, many of which take place here at the end of Herodotus’ work. But vengeance for divine sacrileges takes on additional meaning and penalties, such as Cambyses’ stabbing of the Apis cow and then fatally wounding himself in the same spot. The coda brings yet another example into the narrative. Herodotus had mentioned in Book Seven, paragraph 33, that Artayktes had been killed for committing “the unlawful deeds of bringing women into the sanctuary of Protesilaos at Elaious” (something not mentioned at this point). In addition, the theme of the crimes of the father being visited on later generations manifests itself many times in The Histories. Here Artayktes watches his son stoned to death in front of him while going to the very start of the book we see Crosesus’ downfall tied to his ancestor’s behavior. That poot judgment assists in their downfall seems to be an accompanying fact to something that has already been decided will happen. (Sidenote: was the “crime” of Artembares’ suggestion--see below--visited on the descendent Artayktes? Now I’m seeing relationships where they probably don’t exist.)

The tragic warner
Having Cyrus provide the final words of The Histories brings the work full circle. Artayktes’ ancestor Artembares is the one that suggested to Cyrus that the Persians should move to better lands since their holdings were expanding. Even though Cyrus won the argument here and the Persians decide to “dwell in a poor land”, Herodotus' audience knows that would not be the case for long as Persian opulence became a cliché. Recall paragraph 82, as quoted in the previous Book Nine post which displays how far the Persians strayed from Cyrus’ advice. Further irony comes in recalling the fact that Cyrus fails to heed his own advice and dies attempting to expand his empire. Herodotus has hinted at the differences between Greece and the East, going all the way back to the wonderful literary device of having Croesus and Solon meet. This anecdote seems to be a warning aimed at Greece in general and Athens in particular. The link between the past and Herodotus' day conmes from the appearance of Xanthippos, the Athenian general at Sestos. He is the father of Pericles, the Athenian leader during the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. While tying in these characters across the ages, Cyrus warns not just the Persians of his day but speaks across time to the Greeks (in general) and Athenians (in particular) about the risks involved in the expansion of power and the danger inherent in such growth.

The Histories discussion: Book Seven: Himera

So here I am within sight of the finish line of this project I semi-unwittingly tackled and I’m slamming on the brakes to post about a topic I glossed over in Book Seven. For this post I wanted to look at the battle of Himera in Sicily that was supposed to have occurred on the same day as the battle of Salamis. Himera takes up only three paragraphs/chapters in Herodotus (7.165-167), but in light of my recent post about Richard Miles’ book Carthage Must be Destroyed I wanted to tie the two sources together.

When envoys arrive on Sicily to request assistance in the common Greek cause (before the 480 BC invasion), Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, berates them for ignoring his earlier requests for aid. Gelon offers to supply troops and other resources if he is allowed to lead the Greek forces. Even after a counteroffer he is still rebuffed, so he informs the envoys that they will return home empty handed.

According to Herodotus, the Greek inhabitants of Sicily gave a different reason for not assisting the mainland Greeks:
Terillos, the tyrant of Himera, had been expelled from his city. He brought an army of 300,000 soldiers made up of Phoenicians, Libyans, Spaniards, Corsicans, and other areas around the Mediterranean, all led by Hamilcar, king of the Carthaginians. The battle turned into a major victory for Gelon. Herodotus looks at an explanation offered into Hamilcar’s disappearance after the battle which involved his immolation on the pyre he built for sacrifices and omens.

And that’s it for Himera in Herodotus. Yet this battle took on a life of its own (which could be said about all of the battles of this time). I’m going to summarize from Miles’ book going forward since he pulls from many sources. Terillos/Terillus, the Greek leader in Himera, makes a plea to his guest-friend Hamilcar of Carthage to help him reestablish his rule after he was run out of Himera by Gelon.

The expedition to help Terillos appears to have been privately funded instead of supported by the Carthaginian state. Even though Hamilcar attempted to advance to Himera under the radar, his letters laying out tactical plans were intercepted. Even worse, his troops had not been prepared sufficiently and the army was obliterated. There are several versions of Hamilcar’s death during the battle, but it seems clear he did not survive the attack.

Miles goes into detail on the impact of this colossal loss by the Carthaginians and the wealth that flowed Gelon’s way. But I’m more interested in the rehabilitation of history that is reflected in Herodotus, much like his description of the Greeks trying to include themselves in the battle of Plataea after the fact. This victory provided an opportunity for Gelon and the Syracusans to include themselves in the narrative surrounding the Persian invasion. As Miles puts it, Sicily’s enemies in Sicily were given “the opportunity to recast Himera in a grand narrative of how a barbarous invader had attacked and attempted to destroy the western Greeks, rather than the reality of a failed attempt by one of the Carthaginian political clans to come to the aid of a Greek ally” (Miles, page 117). So what better way to prove you deserve a seat at the head Greek table than to explain your absence in the ‘eastern’ invasion than by showing you were driving off a ‘western’ invasion. “Carthage could be linked to the Persians through the Phoenicians, who, as vassals of the Persian king, were obliged to provide a large number of levies and ships for the naval armada”(Miles, page 119).

The public relations campaign was moderately successful for a while since Herodotus (and others) presented the attack on Himera as a coordinated attack using the ‘same date’ device. Which, to some extent, was plausible. The attacks on Thermopylae and Artemesion probably had occurred on roughly the same days since the Persian army and fleet were supporting each other at that point. The circumstances surrounding Salamis, though, seem to be so arbitrary (instead of planned to occur there) that any coordination would probably be accidental rather than planned. Later Greeks, including Aristotle, dismissed the Persian connection for Himera.

__________________________________
Richard Miles, Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization, (London: Allen Lane, 2010), pp. 114–21.

The Histories discussion: Book Nine: Plataea

The Persians were not inferior in courage or strength, but they did not have hoplite arms, and besides, they were untrained and no match for their opponents in tactical skill. They were dashing out beyond the front lines individually or in groups of ten, joining together in larger or smaller bands, and charging right into the Spartan ranks, where they perished.

The place where the Lacedaemonians pressed their opponents the hardest was at the spot where Mardonios was fighting. He was mounted on a white horse and surrounded by 1,000 picked me, the best of the Persians, and for as long as he survived, the Persians maintained their resistance; and as they defended themselves, they struck down many of the Ladedaemonians. But when Mardonios was killed and the troops posted around him, who made up the most formidable division of the army, had also fallen, the other turned to flee and gave way to the Lacedaemonians. They were hurt the most by how they were equipped, namely by their lack of armor, for they were fighting as unarmed soldiers in a contest against well-equipped hoplites.

- from paragraphs 62 and 63, all quotes and spellings are from The Landmark Herodotus with translation by Andrea L. Purvis.

This post covers the battle of Plataea after the first day of fighting as well as the immediate aftermath. I’ll link to these two good summaries of the battle again which can be found at MilitaryHistoryOnline.com and Ancient Greek Battles. I am covering paragraphs 33 through 89 of Book Nine for this post.

The lead-in to the battle (after the first day) takes on an almost comic tone at times. After the argument between the Athenians and Tegeans on who should take the place of honor in the battle line, omens for both the Persians and the Greeks prove to be favorable only for self-defense. So while neither side initiates an attack, the Persians harass the Greeks in order to provoke them to begin a fight. Meanwhile, a Theban alerts Mardonios to the Greeks pouring through the pass at Mount Cithaeron, adding to their ranks every day. Mardonios cuts the supply lines to the Greeks by sending some of the cavalry to this pass. In addition, he has their water supply fouled. Alexandros of Macedon informs the Greeks that Mardonios will attack immediately, causing the Greeks to reorder their lines. Mardonios finds out about the change so he changes the order of his line. After several shake-ups, the Greeks decide to move their army to a more defensible position where water would be plentiful and their supply lines could be reestablished. If the stakes weren’t so high, all of the dancing around the conflict would be funny.

Due to miscommunication and arguments within the Greek camp, their lines become spread out and apparently vulnerable. Mardonios misinterprets the Greeks’ relocation as a retreat and his cavalry harasses the Greek lines even more, eventually charging and attacking the Spartan section of the line. The Spartans maintain a defensive posture until the omens turn favorable, at which point they charge and wreak havoc on the Persian forces. The Spartans prove to be the better equipped and trained force, killing Mardonios and his guards. At this point, the Persians and their allies flee in panic but are cut down unmercifully. The Athenians, held up by conflict with Persian allies, eventually arrive at the Persian walled camp. They help the Spartans breech the wall and slaughter those in the camp.

The victory at Plataea immediately achieves legendary status. Greek troops that were at Plataea but did not engage in the battle (as the Spartans or Athenians did) tried to affect how history would remember them. Empty burial mounds were constructed to provide the appearance of participation by the troops of these poleis. The populaces of Mantineia and Elis, whose troops arrived after the battle was over, banish their military leaders. The Spartans don’t allow those that arrived late the privilege of chasing the fleeing armies. Everyone wanted to participate in the afterglow of the victory whether they actually helped or not.

The vaunted Persian cavalry finally makes an appearance at Plataea. The plain of Boeotia had been chosen by Mardonios specifically for cavalry operations, just as Marathon had been targeted because of its plain eleven years earlier. The skirmish on the first day, mentioned in the previous post, shows the cavalry effectively attacking the Megarians and Athenians, yet this force proved to be rudderless once their leader Makistios falls. While the Greeks were in the foothills the cavalry harassed them as well as blocked their supply trains. Once full engagement began, though, the Plataea plain becomes a killing field in favor of the Greeks. The Persian and Boeotian cavalry’s most notable contribution turned out to be providing “vital assistance” to protect fleeing troops from the pursuing Greeks.

Also notable at Plataea was the presence of Greek armies on the Persian side. Up to this point the medizing poleis’ contribution (voluntary or not) to Persia has mostly been in the form of providing information to Persian leaders in addition to facilitating logistics for the army and fleet, both of which were necessary for Persian success. At Plataea, Hellene versus Hellene took a bloody, palpable form. This section ends with the Greeks besieging Thebes and executing their leaders. The history of Greece is filled with skirmishes and battles between the various poleis, but never on this scale and never with the assistance of such a powerful ally as Persia on one side. When Herodotus seems to pine for the Greek unity displayed against Persia, it’s helpful to remember that many Greeks willingly fought on the Persians’ side. Herodotus notes in paragraph 67 that “most of the Greek allies of the King were behaving like cowards” (with the notable exception of the Thebans), but I can’t tell if he’s damning them for cowardice or providing them cover by saying they fought badly on purpose (most interpretations favor the latter). In addition, the Athenians and Spartans became separated during the relocation of troops. The Spartans take this as a sign of Athenian abandonment and request assistance since they bear the full brunt of the Persian cavalry. The Athenians were unable to assist the Spartans because of attacks by the Greek allies of Persia. Maybe Herodotus’ nostalgia and rebukes center on the display of Athens and Sparta fighting on the same side since overall Greek unity is not always a key selling point at Plataea.

Sparta’s many hesitations during the Persian invasions continue in one form or another even after the battle at Plataea begins since they delay any attack until the omens are favorable. Fortunately for the Spartans and the Greek allies the omens turn favorable during a full charge from the enemy. It almost seems like Sparta, despite having their entire culture set up to study and perfect warfare, avoids conflict as much as possible. Once engaged, though, they become a fearsome and effective killing machine.

The Spartans receive the most focus during and after the battle and they also provide the starkest contrast with the Persians. Herodotus highlights the differences explicitly when a Greek suggests to Pausanias that he should take revenge for the Persian’s defilement of Leonidas’ body (at Thermopylae) by impaling the corpse of Mardonios. Pausanias’ rejection of this advice highlights ideals the Greeks find worthy, contrasting these with the Persians’ abuse:

”My friend from Aegina, I commend and appreciate that you mean well and are trying to look out for my future interests, but this idea of yours falls short of good judgment. After you have raised me up on high, together with exalting my homeland and my achievement, you cast me down to nothing by encouraging me to abuse a corpse, claiming that if I did so, I would have a better reputation. But this is a deed more appropriate to barbarians than to Hellenes, though we resent them for it all the same. In any case, because of this, I could hardly please the Aeginetans or anyone else who approves of such deeds as this. It is quite enough for me to please the Spartans by committing no sacrilege and by speaking with respect for what is lawful and sacred. As for Leonidas, whom you urge me to avenge, I tell you that he and the others who met their ends at Thermopylae have already achieved great vengeance by the countless souls of those who lie here dead. As for you, do not ever again approach me with such a suggestion or try to advise me, and be thankful to leave here without suffering harm.”

(from paragraph 79)

Xerxes’ speech to his uncle Artabanos before the invasion of 480 BC begins (7.50) provides another contrast with the Spartans during the battle of Plataea. Xerxes admonishes his uncle, saying that it is better to act and suffer half of what is dreaded than to always fear and suffer nothing…success will only come to those that act boldly. The Spartans prove that it isn’t enough to act boldly but to do so at the appropriate time. Amompharetos, a Spartan captain, highlights one of the Spartan tenets while providing yet another divergence from the Persians. Having missed the strategy meeting of the previous night, he mistakes the relocation of forces as retreat. Upholding the Spartan belief that it is better to die than retreat, he initially refuses to budge. Amompharetos' stubbornness in standing his ground stands in stark contrast to the Persians’ flight once Mardonios falls.

I’ll close this post with one more quote comparing the Persians and Greeks, this time focusing on the difference between the lavish Persian lifestyle and …well…Spartan fare:

It is also reported that Xerxes ad left his tent to Mardonios when he fled from Hellas, and that when Pausanias saw these quarters of Mardonios and how they were furnished with embroidered draperies, he ordered the bread bakers and the cooks to prepare a meal for him like those they had made for Mardonios. When they had carried out their orders and Pausanias saw the golden and silver couches with sumptuous covering and the tables, also of gold and silver, all set out with a magnificent feast, he was struck with wonder at the good things lying before him, and then, as a joke, ordered his servants to prepare a Laconian meal. When the banquet was ready, the difference between the two were great indeed, and Pausanias laughed, and then sent for the generals of the Hellenes. When they had all come to him, Pausanias, as he pointed to each of the meals that had been served, said, “Men of Hellas, I have brought you here together, because I wanted to show you what an idiot the leader of the Medes was. This was his lifestyle, but he came to us, who have the miserable way of life, in order to deprive us of it.” That is what Pausanias is reported to have said to the generals of the Hellenes.

(paragraph 82)

The Histories discussion: Book Nine: The battle of Plataea begins

This map covers earlier battles, but it also provides the topography of the area surrounding Plataea (located just below the “oe” in Boeotia)
Picture source

After dinner, as they lingered drinking, the Persian on the couch with Thersandros asked him in Greek what country he came from, to which he replied, “Orchomenus.” The Persian then said, “Since you have shared with me a meal and libations, I would like to leave you with this insight of mine to remember me by, so that being informed in advance, you will be able to make plans to secure a favorable outcome for yourself. Do you see these Persians dining here, and did you see the army we left camping by the river? Well, of all these men, you will see only a few surviving within a short time.” And as the Persian said this, he began to sob and weep profusely. In amazement at what he had said, Thesandros asked, “But should you not tell this to Mardonios and to the other Persians who rank just below him in esteem?” The Persian then replied, “My friend, what has been destined to happen by the god is impossible for a mortal to avert by any contrivance, for no one believes even what trustworthy people say. And though many Persians know that this is true, we are bound by necessity to follow our orders. The most painful anguish that mortals suffer is to understand a great deal but to have no power at all.”

- from paragraph 16, all quotes and spellings are from The Landmark Herodotus with translation by Andrea L. Purvis.

What is commonly called the battle of Plataea took place over two weeks. This section deals with the first day which saw fighting near Erythrai in the hills above Plataea. Two good summaries of the battle can be found at
MilitaryHistoryOnline.com and Ancient Greek Battles. I am covering through paragraph 32 of Book Nine for this post.

There are several troubling acts by various Hellenes in this section, starting with the opening paragraph. “[T]he leading men of Thessaly now provided even more encouragement for the Persians.” The Thebans provide probably the best advice given in The Histories to Mardonios on how to divide the Hellenes—bribe the most powerful men in each major city. Maybe leaders would accept the bribes or maybe citizens would believe the leaders did (even if they didn’t). Either action would create a crisis of confidence in the leadership.

This is at least the third time the Persians have been counseled to take an indirect approach in order to defeat the Greeks. Demaratos suggested sending part of the Persian fleet behind Sparta while Artemisia counseled indirect contact in sending troops to the Peloponnese. Fortunately for the Greeks, Mardonios ignored all advice, focusing on his desire to capture Athens instead. After he retakes an empty Athens, he sends the Athenians at Salamis the same offer extended earlier. When one of the Athenian council, Lykidas, proves to be receptive to the offer, he is dragged from the meeting and stoned to death. The Athenian women find out about what happened and go to Lykidas’ house where they stone his wife and children to death. I wonder about the reception of this story in Herodotus’ day. Athenian citizens should have had a trial and not be subject to mob rule. Would the listeners/readers believe that freedom trumps law? While they are fighting for their freedom, they are also fighting against such an arbitrary and lawless act as this. Lykidas' fate sounds like something Xerxes or Cambyses would have commanded. Is there a rebuke by Herodotus hidden in the story? Or possibly worse...is Herodotus commending the Athenian rough justice?

The actions of the Spartan leaders prove to be troubling as well. The Athenians beg the Spartans for help, outlining the offer from Mardonios they have rejected and contrast their behavior with the delay of the Spartans. The Spartans seem more interested in finishing their fortifications at the Isthmus of Corinth in order to protect the Peloponnese (and Sparta). Once one of their citizens makes the point that the wall will not protect them if the Athenians defect, the Spartans finally send men north to meet Mardonios’ troops. Why did the Spartans take so long? Their religious festivals were over and yet they stalled providing an answer to the Athenian envoys. Were they simply making sure the isthmus was fortified before joining the battle? Or is the answer more basic--they simply do things on their own timetable and in their own way?

Reactions to Spartan troops marching north proves to be good and bad for the Greeks. As other cities see Spartans joining the conflict their men flow into military camps to help defend Greece. When Mardonios hears the news, though, he demolishes what is left of Athens and heads to the plains of Boeotia (northwest of Athens) to provide more favorable terrain for his cavalry. The Greeks took their position in the foothills of Mount Cithaeron, initially refusing to engage in battle on the plain. Mardonios sends his cavalry under the command of Makistios to push and insult the Greeks in order to tease them out into open conflict. The Megarians were in the most vulnerable position that Makistios attacked and in reply to their call for assistance (the Megarians threaten to abandon their post if no help came...a common theme in these times) 300 Athenians respond. During the skirmish Makistios is thrown from his horse and killed, his Persian troops adrift without a leader (proving to be *major* foreshadowing).

Because of this victory, the Greeks move their camp to the plain near Plataea and debate over who should fight in the place of honor. The Athenians and Tegeans argue this point, each invoking their historic and recent fighting contributions. At the end of their speech the Athenians say they will fight in any position chosen for them, promising to be valiant regardless of the post. The entire Spartan camp agrees that the Athenians should occupy the left wing and Herodotus lays out the battle lines for both sides. For once, Mardonios does listen to the Thebans and puts “the most powerful part of his forces” to stand opposite the Spartans.


The mindset and attitude that Herodotus presents for the Greeks at Plataea are completely different than what was presented a year earlier at Salamis. At Plataea the Greeks are fighting over who gets the position of honor while at Salamis it was a battle to see who would sail away first. Greeks march into army camps every day to assist in the fight at Plataea while at Salamis almost everyone wanted to sail away. Maybe the knowledge that the Persians weren’t invincible, as shown at Salamis, provided most of the change. It wouldn’t have hurt that Xerxes fled to Persia after his loss at Salamis. In addition, Plataea provided soldiers that fought alongside Athenians at Marathon eleven years earlier, a convenient symbolic fact.

Stepping outside The Histories, but at a point where it adds an understanding of the mindset, comes the oath that anyone wanting to fight the Persians had to pledge. According to Diodorus, each soldier had to say this in order to join the fight:

The oath ran as follows: "I will not hold life dearer than liberty, nor will I desert the leaders, whether they be living or dead, but I will bury all the allies who have perished in the battle; and if I overcome the barbarians in the war, I will not destroy any one of the cities which have participated in the struggle; nor will I rebuild any one of the sanctuaries which have been burnt or demolished, but I will let them be and leave them as a reminder to coming generations of the impiety of the barbarians."

- The Library of History by Diodorus Siculus, from 11.29

The inscription on the Plataea victory tripod that Athens dedicated at Delphi made clear that they believed they were fighting to free “their states from loathsome slavery's bonds” (Diodorus, 11.33). This oath and inscription mesh with and support the reasons the Athenians repeatedly gave when declining Xerxes’ and Mardonios’ offers.

More fighting at Plataea to follow…

The Histories discussion: Book Eight: The last chapters

The Athenians first answered Alexandros as follows: “We ourselves are already well aware that the forces of the Mede are many times greater than our own, so there is no need to admonish us about that. Nevertheless, we shall defend ourselves however we can in our devotion to freedom. So do not attempt to seduce us into an agreement with the barbarian, since we shall not be persuaded. Report back to Mardonios that the Athenians say: ‘As long as the sun continues on the same course as it now travels, we shall never come to an agreement with Xerxes. Trusting in the gods and heroes as our allies (for whom he showed no respect when he burned their homes and images), we shall advance against him and defend ourselves.’ As for you, Alexandros, in the future, do not appear before the Athenians with speeches such as this one, nor pretend to be doing us a favor while encouraging us to commit deeds that violate all tradition. For we would not want you, our proxenos and friend, to suffer anything unpleasant at the hands of the Athenians.”

After giving this answer to Alexandros, they turned to address the messengers from Sparta: “It was quite natural for the Lacedaemonians to fear we would come to an agreement with the barbarian, but nevertheless, we think it disgraceful that you became so frightened, since you are well aware of the Athenians’ disposition, namely, that there is no amount of gold anywhere on earth so great, nor any country that surpasses others so much in beauty and fertility, that we would accept it as a reward for medizing and enslaving Hellas. Besides, even if we were willing to act that way, there are many serious considerations which would prevent us from doing so. First and foremost of these is that the images and buildings of the gods have been burned and demolished, so that we are bound by necessity to exact the greatest revenge on the man who performed these deeds, rather than to make agreements with him. And second, it would not be fitting for the Athenians to prove traitors to the Greek people, with whom we are united in sharing the same kinship and language, with whom we have established shrines and conduct sacrifices to the gods together, and with whom we also share the same way of life. So understand this now, if you have not learned it before: as long as even one Athenian still survives, we shall make no agreement with Xerxes. But we do commend your foresight and appreciate your consideration for us, especially in recognizing that we are in such a state of ruin that you have volunteered to support and maintain the members of our households. Your kindness has been more than sufficient. We, however, will persevere in whatever way we can, without troubling you. But now, since the situation is as it is, do send out an army as quickly as possible, for it is our conjecture that before long, indeed, as soon as soon as the barbarian hears that we have refused to do as he asked, he will be here invading our land again. And so now, before he reaches Attica, is the time for you to hasten to battle in Boeotia.” When they had received this answer from the Athenians, the messengers departed to return to Sparta.

- paragraphs 143 and 144, All quotes and spellings are from The Landmark Herodotus with translation by Andrea L. Purvis.

The remainder of Book Eight after the battle of Salamis covers the winter of 480/479 BC. Most of the Greek allies return to their homes, Mardonios keeps his chosen troops in Thessaly, and Xerxes travels home to Asia.

Xerxes’ trip back to Asia proves to be the opposite of his entry into Europe. Earlier in the year, he and his troops commanded nature: they bridged the Hellespont, drank rivers dry, and supported themselves from the land and prearranged stores of goods. On the return trip, the army ate grass and bark as they fought off starvation. They also had to deal with disease such as dysentery and some sort of plague. Crossing the Hellespont this time had to be done with ships—the pontoon bridges had been destroyed during a storm.

The Hellenic fleet retired to the Isthmus of Corinth in order to award “the prize of valor to the Hellene who had proved himself the most worthy throughout this war.” The commanders each cast two votes, one for first and one for second. A crack in the apparent Greek unity happens as each commander chooses himself with the first place vote--Herodotus describing this behavior as envy. Themistokles received every vote for second place (although if Themistokles voted, could he cast a vote for himself in both spots?). After the isthmus, Themistokles visited Sparta where he receives the same rewards as Eurybiades (the Spartan commander overseeing the entire Hellenic fleet). Upon his return to Athens, though, Themistokles is upbraided by Timodemos, who said that Themitokles receives these honors “because of Athens and not because of himself.” Themistokles, tiring of the constant attacks, replies “The fact is that if I were from Belbina, I would not have been honored this way by the Spartans, but neither would you, my friend, even though you are an Athenian.”

Artabazos escorted Xerxes to the Hellespont and took his time returning to the Persian winter camp in Thessaly, attacking and capturing cities that have rebelled against Xerxes. At least one instance attributed to divine retribution occurs during his march, where a flood tide kills many of his troops. Herodotus and the locals attribute this to the troops having profaned a nearby temple of Poseidon.

Over the winter the Greeks name new commanders: Xanthippos will be commander of the Athenians, while the Spartan Leotychidas will lead the Hellenic army and navy. Herodotus gives Leotychidas’ lineage and (if my count is correct) proves to be the third individual mentioned that is a descendent of Herakles. The first two were Kandaules (back at the very opening of The Histories) and Leonidas (Spartan leader at Thermopylae). If anyone runs across one I missed, please let me know. Herakles and a snake-goddess provided one possible origin of the Scythian race, but I’m interested to see if additional individuals are named.

Once again the Ionians prove to be the odd man out in the Greek world, at least for now. They send messengers to the Greeks to request assistance in achieving freedom but the Greeks provide lame and perplexing excuses on why they could not provide help. Was this payback for the Ionian revolt and Athens' help that some saw as triggering the Persian invasion?

Mardonios, in charge of the Persian troops in Greece after Xerxes left, sends Alexandros of Macedon as a messenger to Athens in an attempt to move Athens to his side. With Athens, Mardonios believes, he can control the seas. He assumes his troops will be victorious on land, an assumption only seriously tested at Thermopylae at this point. The opening quote of this post provides the Athenian answer to Alexandros’ appeal on behalf of the Persians. The terms are actually very generous, providing freedom as long as Athens joins Persia as a military ally. Before the opening quote, though, the Spartan’ entreaty to the Athenians includes a rebuke that echoes Herodotus’ feelings: “You are the ones that incited this war” that has spread to all of Greece. Sparta’s envoys also sound like Herodotus when they say that if Athens capitulates it will enslave the rest of Greece. The role of the gods and religious considerations are cited in the Athenian reasons for not accepting Xerxes’ offer—the first reason involves the need to revenge the destruction of their shrines while the second revolves around the shared religion with the other Greeks. The Athenians realize if they accept Xerxes’ offer, no matter how good the terms, it means the rest of Greece will be enslaved and, eventually, so will they.

The Histories discussion: Book Eight: Salamis

Sea Fight at Salamis, Wilhelm von Kaulbach, 1868
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As Themistokles was saying this, Adeimantos the Corinthian again attacked him, ordering him to be silent since he had no fatherland, and forbidding Eurybiades to allow any man who had no city to propose a motion for a vote. He told Themistokles that when he could demonstrate that he had a city, then he could contribute his opinions. This reproach against Themistokles referred to the enemies’ capture and current occupation of Athens. This time Themistokles replied at length, and with venom directed against Adeimantos and the Corinthians; he declared that in fact the Athenians’ city and land were greater than theirs, as long as they had 200 ships of their own, fully manned, for none of the Hellenes could repulse them if they were to launch an assault.

- paragraph 61. All quotes and spellings are from The Landmark Herodotus with translation by Andrea L. Purvis.


“O Salamis, how hateful is thy name!
And groans burst from me when I think of Athens.”
…
“The walls of Athens are impregnable,
Their firmest bulwarks her heroic sons.”

- from The Persians by Aeschylus, translation by Robert Potter

I wanted to cover topics surrounding the battle of Salamis (for which I’m limiting to paragraphs 55 through 112 in Book Eight). This site provides a good summary of the battle itself.

Themistokles
Despite his heroics, Themistokles manages to be displayed in a mixed light again. When chiding the other allies to fight instead of flee, he says the Athenians will move to Italy if the Persian fleet is not engaged at Salamis. While this may have been one of his many bluffs or ruses, he comes across like a petulant child threatening to take his ball and go home if the game is not played his way. It’s easy to overlook this threat since it occurs during a bracing and rousing speech, yet it is this threat that motivates Eurybiades (the Spartan commander of the entire fleet) to action. Themistokles' speech to Adeimantos in the quote at the top of this post provides a new concept, or possibly echoing Aeschylus’ thought—Athens exists in the hearts of its citizens, not in the physical buildings that had just been destroyed.

Though it's a mixed light shown on Themistokles, he appears brighter than his counterpart for the Persians, Xerxes. While I’m not sure I buy Herodotus’ rationale for the Persian king’s flight (general fear amplified by concern that the Greeks would destroy the Hellespont bridge, thus stranding his army), the appearance of Xerxes leaving Greece after the loss at Salamis seems demeaning for someone ruling much of the world. In addition, Herodotus seems to relish having Xerxes follow a woman’s advice to flee Greece, even if that woman was Artemisia (who I’ll talk about later in this post).

Through Themistokles, Herodotus echoes several of his themes in The Histories: “For it is not we who have achieved all this, but the gods and heroes; they were jealous that one man should become king of both Asia and Europe, particularly an ungodly man who is doomed by his own folly.” (from paragraph 109) This comes from the speech that Themistokles delivers to the Athenians in order to persuade them to return to Athens and allow the Persians safe conduct back to the Hellespont. While this is consistent with the wishes of the other Greek commanders, Herodotus paints this as a ploy on Themistokles’ part in order to curry favor with the Persians in case he needs their help at some later date. This charge seems to ‘backdate’ Themistokles’ defection to the Persians. Also unclear are the charges of Themistokles’ greed in extorting money, both for public and private gain, from nearby islands after the battle of Salamis. These accusations echo the bribery charges before the battle of Artemesion.

Hellenic unity
Unity among the Greek cities also appears in a mixed light. On one level, the cooperation Herodotus seems to pine for did happen. Athens put aside its pride and let Sparta lead the army and the fleet, even though Themistokles practically usurped the fleet commander’s role. Aegina set aside its long-standing feud with Athens and proved to be one of the stars during the battle at Salamis. Themistokles works with his political enemy Aristeides in the prelude to the battle. Several cities that had originally offered earth and water to Persian envoys as a mark of subservience later recanted once the Hellenic league formed, showing that they had capitulated more out of concern for survival than any belief that life would be better under the Persians.

Yet there is a dark side of Hellenic cooperation with the Persians. Several cities and areas, such as Thessaly (mentioned in the previous post), joined the Persians in order to revenge themselves on their neighbors. As Xerxes army progresses through Greece, Herodotus mentions that the Persian numbers did not diminish since many Greeks joined the Persian cause. While the reader will not find any of Churchill’s fiery contempt for such Quislings, Herodotus opines on the cities and people refusing to fight: “[B]ut if I may speak freely, they were in effect medizing by remaining neutral.” ( from paragraph 73) He also admits that few Ionians lessened their attack after Themistokles’ propaganda (following the battle of Artemesion), describing that many of the Ionians fought lustily.

Artemisia
The reversal of natural phenomena and the confusing role of the Ionians (as posted here) reach their fruition through the character of Artemisia. An Ionian leader (she hails from Herodotus’ city of Halicarnassus), she was the only commander to counsel Xerxes not to engage the Greek fleet at Salamis, saying his armies would be successful without having to engage in battles on the seas. During the battle of Salamis, she sinks one of the Persian ships while trying to escape which causes confusion on both sides. The Greeks recognize that a Persian ship has been sunk but think it is one of their own reponsible for it. Xerxes celebrates because he recognizes her ship as one of his own, but doesn't see that she sunk another of his fleet. This action seems to put an exclamation point on the confusion of how to view the Ionians (as well as possibly undermining Herodotus’ geographic world view?). Xerxes punctuates his feeling toward the topsy-turvy world he has created during his invasion by exclaiming “My men have become women, and my women, men!” (paragraph 88) Herodotus notes, tongue firmly in cheek, that no one from the ship that Artemisia rammed survived in order to accuse her of deliberate sabotage. She later provides Xerxes sufficient rationalizations for leaving Greece with no loss of face and she is charged with escorting Xerxes’ sons back to Ephesus.

Hermotimos
The story of Hermotimos (also spelled Hermotimus) of Pedasa remains one of the most brutal acts of vengeance in all of The Histories. While presented partially as a personal revenge story, Hermotimos' anecdote also invokes the gods’ demand for justice. I haven’t mentioned any of the various portents in this section that would lead someone to believe the gods were watching over or spectrally involved in humans’ lives, but here is a specific sign that mortals viewed the gods as watching and paying attention. Hermotimos appears when Herodotus mentions that he goes with Artemisia as Xerxes’ sons’ guardian back to Ephesus. Here is a quick recap of his story:
Hermotimos had been a prisoner of war and his captors eventually sold him to Panionios of Chios, a seller of eunuchs. Hermotimos, after being castrated, ends up in Sardis as a gift to the king. Eventually he earns Xerxes' esteem and serves as a honored and trusted part of Xerxes' court. While carrying out business for Xerxes, Hermotimos runs into Panionios. Hermotimos thanks Panionios for what he did to him since many possessions and blessings have come his way. In addition, he invites Panionios and his family to live with him so he would provide many of the same benefits he has received (you see where this is going already, don’t you?). Panionios accepts and moves his family in with Hermotimos. I’ll let Herodotus finish the story:

When Hermotimos had him there with his whole family, he said, “Of all men up to this time you are the most impious in your livelihood, which you earn by the most ungodly deeds! What evil did I—myself or any of my people—do to you or yours that you would render me a neuter instead of a man? You thought that the gods would not notice your practice, but they do observe justice, and they have surreptitiously led you, the performer of ungodly deeds, right into my hands; and so you cannot find fault with the just penalty you will receive from me.” After he had cast these reproaches at him, he had Panionios’ sons—all four of them—brought before them, and then compelled Panionios to cut off the private parts of his sons; and because he was forced, he did it. Then, when he had finished, his sons were forced to castrate him. So it was that vengeance at the hands of Hermotimos came to Panionios.
- from paragraph 106

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The Histories discussion: Book Eight: The Troizen Decree

The Troizen decree
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When the allies brought their ships to Salamis, the Athenians put in at their own shore and made a proclamation that every Athenian should try to save his children and other members of his household in any way that he could. Most of them dispatched their households to Troizen, through some sent them to Aegina and others to Salamis. They made a tremendous effort to evacuate everything, not only because they wanted to comply with the oracle, but especially because of the following reason: the Athenians say that a huge snake guards the Acropolis and dwells in the sanctuary, but more to the point, they say that they celebrate a ritual in which they set out an offering of a honey cake every month for it as though it were a real snake. Now before this, the honey cake had always been consumed, but this last time it was left untouched. When the priestess revealed this to the Athenians, they became even more eager to leave their city, believing that the goddess had abandoned the Acropolis. And when they had removed everything to safety, they sailed off to join the naval forces at Salamis.

- paragraph 41. Quotes and spellings are from The Landmark Herodotus with translation by Andrea L. Purvis

Note: this section covers paragraphs 26 through 54 in Book Eight and ends with a look at the Decree of Themistocles or the Troizen (Troezen) Decree.

After the semi-victory at Artemesion, the Greek fleet had to fall back because of the loss at Thermopylae so that the fleet could support the army. Whether or not some Greeks were celebrating an Olympic festival while the Persians were invading, Herodotus uses this device to again show the Persians’ inability to comprehend their enemy: “What kind of men did you lead us here to fight, who compete not for money but for excellence alone?” 'Glory' would have been a nice addition to excellence.

Herodotus paints a bleak picture of intra-Hellenic hatred and squabbling, where cities enthusiastically sign up with the Persians in order to ravage their neighbors. Thessaly assists the Persians in carrying out a scorched-earth attack in the march to Athens, where, among other atrocities, Hellenic women reportedly died from gang rape. The Persian army splits, part of it heading through Boeotia toward Athens while the other section heads to Delphi to plunder the temple. I have mentioned a few of the purposes of the Delphic temple, such as being a diplomatic center in addition to a shrine. The temple would have housed a massive store of wealth received from suppliants, in addition to containing opulent tokens from notable events—for example, winners of battles would send commemorative offerings to mark their victory. Such a store of wealth would be tempting for any army open to raiding a religious shrine. However the temple at Delphi supposedly protected itself—sacred armaments moved on their own accord, thunder filled the skies, and rocks-faces fell in order to save the temple from the Persian forces. In addition, several Persians reported seeing two hoplites, much larger than normal men, chasing their troops.

The Athenians found out the difficulty of benefiting from the coordination of a loose confederation of troops. Instead of protecting Athens, the Peloponnesians fell back to the Isthmus of Corinth in order to protect their lands at that narrow neck of land which would have provided a similar defensive advantage as Thermopylae. The Athenians, however, feel deceived and request the fleet to stay nearby so they can flee. Herodotus makes the decision to flee sound like a last-minute verdict. But in 1959, a farmer near the city of Troizen (often spelled Troezen) offered the stone he had been using as a doorstep to a local display of old artifacts. It turns out the inscription on the stone was a resolution passed by the Athenian assembly for a planned, orderly evacuation of Athens that fit in with a strategic plan of Salamis and the Isthmus of Corinth as the focal points for defense. If this is the case, then the battles at Thermopylae and Artemesion could be viewed only as skirmishes intended only to delay the oncoming Persian forces. I wouldn’t go as far as to say the decree “directly contradicts” Herodotus’ account (as the Wikipedia entry words it) since part of his history is consistent with the decree and previous battles. But it does call into question some of his assumptions and chronology.

Unfortunately, the authenticity of the Troizen decree can’t be conclusively determined. The lettering on the stone dates to the early 3rd century BC, leaving a gap of around 200 years between the events described and the copy of decree. Is it a copy of the original decree? Is it an amalgamation of several decrees issued around that time? Or is it a complete fabrication?

In any event, the Athenians had to flee and regroup while the Hellenic fleet, upon hearing of the sack of Athens, had to decide whether to stay in Salamis or make a stand elsewhere. Themistokles will make another appearance during this debate which will make assessing his actions and motivations even more difficult.

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