Arrian: Book Two—Arrian

All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

I wanted to add a few words on a few things that stand out about Arrian so far in his book on Alexander. Even though Arrian writes about events occurring 400 years earlier and is reworking Ptolemy’s and Aristobulus’ accounts (for the most part, at least according to him), the addition of certain comments and stories add personality to the history. We can’t know the reasons for Arrian’s writing of this history beyond what he stipulates in his prefaces, but questions will continue to circulate on his motives—was some sort of imperial propaganda intended?

Occasionally Arrian will pause and provide background on a certain people, the history of a place, or tidbits he finds interesting. The monument of Sardanapalos at Anchiale is just one of those tidbits:

The monument of Sardanapalos stood near the city’s walls. Upon it stood Sardanapalos himself, his hands brought together as though to clap. An inscription was carved on it in Assyrian characters; the Assyrians said that the epitaph was a line of verse. The sense conveyed by the words was: “Sardanapalos son of Anakyndaraxes built Anchiale and Tarsus in a single day. Eat, drink, and be merry, friend, since all other human things are not worth this”—“this” meaning the sound of a hand-clap. The phrase translated as “be merry” was said to be more vulgar in the original. (2.5.3-4)

It’s the last sentence that makes the quote, and now I’ll never be able to keep a straight face when I hear the sanitized version. There are several such instances pointing out interesting things, although the digressions are on a minor scale compared to Herodotus. But it is just such detours that add warmth and interest for me. Sometimes the anecdotes masquerade as history while other digressions serve an important purpose in his history. Arrian’s discussion of the Herakles of Tyre versus the Greek Herakles may seem pedantic or arcane but I found it important for what followed, not the least of which was Alexander made it clear he wanted to sacrifice to the Tyrian god.

Following the examples of previous historians, Arrian uses speeches to advance the narrative and provide motives/detail/themes/etc. I had mentioned in a post on Book One that there were few speeches in that book but Arrian makes use of them in Book Two, both as direct quotes and paraphrasing what was said. The speech he gives to Alexander before the battle of Issus is a stirring call to arms for the Macedonians and Greeks, with plenty of allusions to themes found in Herodotus. The letters between Alexander and Darius add a nice touch, even if they are suspect. The use of such literary devices or rhetorical techniques doesn’t make the events any less likely to have happened, at least in general, but it does make it difficult to separate the historical facts from the literary aspects.

I haven’t mentioned Xenophon, the writer Arrian must have appreciated above all since he added the writer’s name to his own. That’s because I have only read one work by Xenophon and that was quite a while back so I don’t feel comfortable comparing the two (although I hope to correct my lack of Xenophon soon). I remember some advice I was given when reading Xenophon—pay as much attention to what he doesn’t say as to what he includes. In at least one instance so far with Arrian that proves to be true as well. As I mentioned in the post on the siege of Tyre, Quintus Curtius and Diodorus mention the crucifixion of surviving Tyrian military-age men yet Arrian does not address this claim. We don’t know if Ptolemy and Aristoboulos, Arrian’s trusted sources, mention the atrocity. Probably not since Arrian could not know with certainty that the earlier works would not survive, but that’s just speculation. As Paul Cartledge put it in the introduction of The Landmark Arrian, “in the realm of military ethics, Arrian is determined to portray Alexander as restrained and humane rather than brutal and bloodthirsty, at least in the first half of his narrative.” Obviously we can’t fully understand why Arrian took this approach, but I can’t help but think of Xenophon’s advice at the end of Book Five of his Anabasis (translation by Rex Warner): “Yet it is an honourable thing, and a just and upright thing, and more pleasant too to remember what is good rather than what is bad.” At some point, though, the bad things about Alexander cannot be hidden.

Arrian occasionally slips from behind the page, adding wry or pointed comments in his history. One example, which conveniently supports the “Persian = soft” theme, comes after the battle of Issus and Alexander’s troops capture the “trappings of luxury that accompany the Great King even on campaign”. Arrian throws in some psychological explanations of events. Twice he has explained events with the analysis that people see what they want to see. The first occurrence was in Thebes, where the rumor of Alexander’s death (because he had been away a long time) led to the town’s revolt from Alexander. “The result was just what usually happens under such circumstances: in the absence of accurate information, people formed conjectures in keeping with their wishes.” (1.7.3) A second incident led Darius to leave his superior position at Sochoi, which ended with the decisive defeat at Issus. In Darius’ case, the advice he received to abandon Sochoi gave him “more pleasure at the moment.” (2.6.3-7) Contrast this to Alexander’s well laid-out plans at 2.17.1-4 and you can see some of the differences Arrian wants to highlight.

There are some touches that Arrian adds that I can find no other way to describe than part Herodotean and part cheerleader.

Though I have recorded these incidents, I do not claim that they are either authentic or entirely implausible. But if they did take place, I commend Alexander for the compassion he showed the women and for the trust and respect he showed his friend. And if the chroniclers of his career think it credible that Alexander would have acted and spoken in this way, I commend Alexander on that score as well. (2.12.8)

Putting aside the sexual restraint allusion, this reminds me of Herodotus’ approach of presenting several versions of a story (or noting there are several versions but declining to go into detail). My favorite non-inclusion, though, comes after the athletic games marking the fall of Tyre: Alexander “dedicated the Tyrian ship sacred to Herakles, which he had seized in the naval attack, and affixed an inscription on it, composed by either himself or another, that is not worth recording (which is why I have not taken the trouble to record it).” (2.24.6) I guess it’s nice to know that Arrian didn’t consider Alexander wholly infallible at this stage in his campaign…

Arrian: Book Two—siege, wrath, and amnesty

Aerial photo of Tyre, 1934
Picture source
The mole that Alexander had built out to the city has silted up over time

All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

I didn’t spend much time talking about the battle of Issus but I do need to recommend The Landmark Arrian for making such battles easy to understand since it employs helpful battle maps showing detailed movements. I did want to spend some time on the two sieges in this book, Tyre and Gaza, and some of the meanings and implications from these campaigns. As Alexander marched south toward Egypt he requested from officials in Tyre entrance in order to sacrifice to Herakles at their ancient temple. Tyre, wishing to avoid choosing sides at this point, said they would receive no Persian or Macedonian in the city and would remain neutral. Alexander says this is unacceptable in a brilliant speech that lays out his plans and explains the reasoning why neutrality is not a choice:

”Friends and allies, I see it will not be safe for us to march against Egypt while the Persians control the sea. And for us to leave Tyre behind, its loyalty dubious, to pursue Darius while Egypt and Cyprus remain in the hands of the Persians would be unsafe for any number of reasons, but particularly when one considers the state of affairs in Greece. For if the Persians regain control of the coast while we proceed with our forces against Babylon and Darius, they might, by sending out a larger force, shift the war to Greece, where the Spartans are openly at war with us and our control of Athens is currently founded more on fear than on goodwill. But with Tyre demolished, all of Phoenicia would be in our hands, and the largest and strongest contingent of the Persian navy, namely the Phoenician, would likely come over to us; for the Phoenician oarsmen and marines will not consent to run risks at sea on others’ behalf while their cities are under our control. Thereupon Cyprus will either join us willingly or be taken easily in a naval attack. And if we put fleets from Macedonia and Phoenicia into action, and Cyprus joins us as well, our mastery of the sea would be secure, and hence our expedition to Egypt would be easy. And once we have won control of Egypt, we will have no reason to be concerned about Greece or our own home. Secure at home, our renown increased, we will march against Babylon, having cut the Persians off from the sea completely and from all the territory this side of the Euphrates. (2.17.1-4)

It’s a long speech to quote and who knows it was actually delivered, but it provides a blueprint of Alexander’s intentions in addition to meshing well with his results. The Phoenician navy, seeing their homes fall to Alexander, joined Alexander’s forces at Tyre and contributed siege technology as well as ships. Tyre was a city island a half-mile from shore so Alexander ordered a mole built out to the city. Although the mole helped provide some assistance in taking the city, it played a minor role in the final fall of the city as the navies fought for access to the city. (Just to make it clear, the mole did help accelerate the showdown between the navies.) Note 2.21.1a fleshes out Arrian’s narrative on what the Phoenicians provided Alexander:

Diodorus…goes into more detail regarding the technological innovations introduced by both sides during this siege. … Phoenicians were famous in antiquity for their engineering skill, so it is not surprising that Alexander recruited much of the local talent into his army or that both sides in the conflict made rapid advances in military technology over the course of the seven-month siege.

The Greeks seem to have been slow in developing siege techniques and tactics—the sieges described in Thucydides were usually very long, drawn-out affairs that proved successful as often as not. But I found this siege narrative exciting to read as both sides traded effective blows, forcing each other to improvise or develop the new technology. Eventually Alexander’s forces prevail and, of course, he is in the thick of things as the city wall is breeched and his troops pour in to capture the town. As I have mentioned earlier, Alexander seems to regard the need for a siege as a personal affront and the cities he takes this way do not fare well:

The slaughter was great, now that those advancing from the harbor were already in control of the town and Koinos’ battalion had entered it as well. The Macedonians advanced, most of them in a rage: they were vexed at the delay caused by the siege, and because the Tyrians had earlier seized some of their men sailing from Sidon, the Macedonians made them mount the wall so they might be seen from the army’s encampment, and cut their throats and flung their bodies into the sea. (2.24-3)

Alexander did grant amnesty to those who fled to the shrine of Herakles. Arrian estimates eight thousand Tyrian dead and thirty thousand enslaved as compared to four hundred Macedonian deaths (during the actual fighting—he implies others died during siege tactics). Of further interest is what Arrian leaves out: Diodorus claims all Tyrian military-age men, at least two thousand, were crucified on the mainland beach. Quintus Curtius’ account backs the crucifixion claim, too, although I’m not sure he provides a number. The scale of this atrocity is dumbfounding and Arrian’s silence is revealing. Alexander’s actions swing wildly from viciousness to chivalrous but he wasn’t the only one committing atrocities. Darius had tortured and killed the invalids that Alexander left behind before the battle of Issus (2.7.1), while Quintus Curtius’ account reports worse atrocities by the Persian king.

As the march to Egypt resumes, the only city that attempts to hold out is Gaza. Alexander uses the technology learned and siege-engines constructed for the siege of Tyre at Gaza to take the city in a more efficient manner. All the men of Gaza that resisted were killed while the women and children were enslaved. Alexander resettles the city and will move on to Egypt in Book Three.

As I mentioned in this post, Alexander has been fairly consistent in rewarding friends and punishing enemies, reserving his harshest treatment for turncoats but there are exceptions in Book Two. Alexander’s gallant treatment of Darius’ family provides the obvious example and seems fairly clear-cut—keeping them as hostages would accelerate Darius’ capitulation or insure another direct conflict before too long. Another exception can be easy to miss so I wanted to highlight it. Greek envoys sent to Darius’ court before the battle of Issus are captured and sent to Alexander. Alexander’s behavior stands in marked contrast (for the most part) to how he treats other Greeks allied with Darius:

When they arrived, Alexander immediately released Thessaliskos and Dionysodorous, though they were Thebans, in part out of a certain compassion for Thebes, and in part because they appeared to have acted pardonably; for when their country had been enslaved by Macedonians, they had looked for any help they could find, for both their homeland and themselves, from Darius and the Persians. Alexander was therefore favorably disposed to both men, though he said he was releasing them for individual reasons: Thessaliskos out of respect for his family (who belonged to Theban nobility), Dionysodoros on account of his victory at Olympia. As for Iphikrates, while he lived Alexander kept him at court out of friendship for the city of Athens and in memory of the man’s father [who helped place Alexander’s family on the throne in Macedonia], and when he died of disease Alexander sent his bones back to relatives in Athens. Euthykles, on the other hand, was a Spartan, and since Alexander harbored a pronounced hostility toward Sparta at the time, and could find no substantial reason for a pardon based on personal record, he at first put Euthykles under guard, though without shackling him. Later, however, when Alexander achieved considerable success, he released Euthykles as well. (2.15.3-5)

For Alexander, victory brings slaughter/enslavement or compassion…there rarely seems anything in between at this point. Arrian seems keen on highlighting the gallant actions. While he doesn’t soften much of the body-count that piles up behind Alexander, his exclusion of certain actions, such as the crucifixions at Tyre, seems to demonstrate Arrian intent on shaping Alexander’s legacy as positively as possible. I’ll have at least one more post on Book Two next week that looks at a little bit of Arrian’s techniques and style. A second possible post would be on the theme of destiny running through Alexander’s campaign.

The siege of Tyre
Picture source

Arrian: Book Two—address yourself to me as the king of Asia

Battle of Issus, Albrecht Altdorfer
Picture source
(be sure to click on picture for more detail)

All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

In the previous post I mentioned Alexander undoing the Gordion (Gordian) knot as part of the myth-building process. What I didn’t mention was the legend that went with the knot: “The legend of the wagon also included a prophecy: the man who undid the knot of the wagon’s yoke was destined to rule over Asia.” (2.3.6) I’m sure the legend’s message did not escape Alexander. He has already defeated the Persian army at the Granicus River and he knows that Darius leads an army to face him soon. If he intends to be called the king of Asia, he needs all the credibility he can get.

After the victory at Issus, which included the capture of several members of Darius’ family, an exchange of letters takes place between the two kings. Darius writes first, requesting the return of his family members. He stresses the friendly relationship Persia has had in the past with Macedonia but first Philip and now Alexander pursue unwarranted hostilities toward the Persians. Darius claims he has only acted in defense of his country and, accordingly, was willing to form an alliance with Alexander. (2.14.2-3) The footnote for this passage notes the various versions of Darius’ letter, “contaminated by a fictional collection of Alexander-Darius correspondence that circulated widely in antiquity”, so we’ll just have to go with Arrian’s version of events and letters. The possibility of Alexander providing an alternate letter from Darius to advance his agenda implies a cunning control of events and sentiment, something not beyond Alexander's capabilities, even at this young age.

Alexander’s response makes many charges against Darius and Persia, most of them specious (2.14.4-6). What I’m more interested in is the second half of the letter—Alexander’s claim to be king of Asia:

”Now that I have prevailed in battle—over your generals and satraps earlier, and now over you and your own forces—and the gods have given me possession of the country, I am also responsible for all the men who fought on your side, survived the battle, and fled to me, and who remain with me not unwillingly, but have joined my campaign voluntarily. So regard me as master of all of Asia and come into my presence; if you fear you may suffer some harm at my hands, send some of your friends to receive pledges. Approach me and ask for your mother, wife, children, and anything else you like, and receive them; anything you persuade me to give will be yours. And in future, whenever you send word to me, address yourself to me as the king of Asia and not as an equal, and let me know, as the master of all that was yours, if you have need of anything. Otherwise, I plan to deal with you as a criminal. But if you contest the kingship, hold your ground, fight for it, and do not flee, since I am coming after you wherever you are.” (2.14.7-9)

It’s an arrogant letter, but I wonder if the last point underlies much of that haughtiness. It is difficult to imagine Alexander fleeing from a battle like Darius did from Issus. With the defeat of Darius, Alexander wastes no time claiming the title of king of Asia and demands to be addressed this way in future correspondence. Alexander claim for supremacy over Asia wasn’t just made up on the spot—this was an essential goal of his campaign that he makes clear in other settings. When calming Darius’ family and promising their chivalrous treatment, Alexander asserts his “war against Darius had not sprung from enmity but was a lawful struggle for the sovereignty of Asia.” (2.12.5) Later, when informed Tyre would like to remain neutral, Alexander lays out the campaign plans and how the coastal cities (and other areas) fit in with his desire to attack Babylon and be ruler of Asia. (2.17.1-4)

Whatever the attitude behind writing the letter, Alexander makes his point clear since Darius’ next letter recognizes he’s not dealing with just any twenty-three/twenty-four year old. Darius offers Alexander ten thousand talents for the return of his family, proposes to cede territory from the Euphrates River to the Aegean Sea, agrees to give his daughter in marriage to Alexander, and renews the offer of an alliance. Upon hearing the terms of the letter, Parmenion, once again the literary foil, says that “if he were Alexander he would be content, on those terms, to end the war and run no further risks. Alexander replied that if he were Parmenion, he would do likewise, but since he was Alexander” he would reply differently. (2.25.1-2)

Alexander’s reply was as haughty as the first one, saying

he had no need of Darius’ money nor of any part of the country instead of the whole, since the money and the entire country were his. And he would marry Darius’ daughter if he wished to; he would marry her even if Darius failed to offer her. He urged Darius to come to him in person if he wished to be treated generously. (2.25.3)

Darius realizes there will be no bargaining with Alexander—it’s either submit or fight and Darius chooses to prepares for battle. I find Alexander’s stance remarkable, even taking into account all he has accomplished up to this point. And as we’ll see as the campaigns unfold, his confidence in claiming to be master of Asia proves to be well founded.

The Family of Darius before Alexander, Paolo Veronese
Picture source

Arrian: Book Two—leadership and legend

Alexander cuts the Gordian Knot, Jean-Simon Berthélemy
Picture source

In addition to his brilliance at military tactics and strategy, Alexander proves to be an adept leader of his men. At the same time he takes care to cultivate his reputation, both for current impact and for future generations. All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

So far in the history Alexander takes great care of his men, inspiring their loyalty toward him. In Book One I noted he allowed leave for the recently-married soldiers to winter in Macedonia instead of staying in Asia. After the battle at the Granicus River he visited injured men, letting them inflate their exploits and gallantry, while making sure to honor those that died in battle. We see the same behavior in Book Two, especially after the battle at Issus. Alexander visits the wounded while providing splendid funerals to the fallen soldiers (2.12.1-2). At Soloi he held parades as well as athletic and artistic games which would have helped morale (2.5.8).

Alexander delivers a stirring speech before the battle at Issus, causing his troops to demand he lead them into battle immediately (2.7.3-9). Arrian makes an odd comment though, saying that Alexander spoke as any brave leader would in the circumstance—it may have been meant as a compliment but it seems to diminish the speech a little. Alexander’s speech hit many of the same points as seen in Herodotus and Thucydides. The Herodotean points I found interesting, repeating the stereotype of Persian luxury and softness as well as the concept of battle between free men and slaves. Alexander also invoked Xenophon’s Anabasis as a pale illustration of what his men had and could accomplish. Alexander actions and speeches produce troops that would, as coaches would say, run through a wall for you. Alexander augments this speech by exhorting men by name and mentioning their accomplishments as he rides along the battle lines (2.10.2).

The cultivation of his reputation and that of his troops shows at least one benefit during the battle at Issus. “The action there was fierce, as the Greeks [mercenaries fighting for Darius] tried to drive the Macedonians back to the river and to recover the victory for their own men who were fleeing, while the Macedonians sought not to fall short of Alexander’s already conspicuous success, and to preserve the good name of the phalanx, which at the time was spoken of far and wide as invincible.” (2.10.6) Add to this Alexander’s conspicuous bravery (and foolhardiness) in battles (Granicus, Issus, Tyre, Gaza) and you have a leader whose men will do their best to preserve such a reputation. Recent leadership books on Alexander the Great sell steadily for a reason.

But Alexander seems to be deliberately cultivating more than just his leadership status. His self-promotion aims to create a larger-than-life figure. According to Arrian he showed the desire for such a goal early in his campaign, when he asked the Celts what they feared most and was disappointed the answer was not him (1.4.6-8). After allowing the slaughter of much of Thebes, razing most of the city and enslaving the survivors what does Alexander do (according to legend)? Save the house of the poet Pindar and spare his descendants (1.9.10). Since this became legend instead of the mass slaughter, it looks like Alexander knew what would play to people.

Another legend was Alexander’s undoing of the Gordion knot (usually seen spelled as Gordian). More interesting to me, though, was the motives Arrian ascribes to Alexander in undoing it: “Alexander did not know how to undo the knot, yet he was unwilling to let it remain intact, lest this create public unrest.” (2.3.7) Looking beyond how Arrian or one of his sources knew Alexander’s motives is the desire to appear invincible or larger-than-life, a throwback to the age when legends were made. Obviously he succeeded, with such anecdotes as his reaction to an accusation of treachery from Philip of Acarnania. His ability to laugh at death, whether through defying such warnings or joining his soldiers in opening a breech in a city wall, was guaranteed to solidify such a reputation. If he succeeded, that is. Ever the gentlemen, in appropriate circumstances, Alexander’s behavior toward the captured members of Darius’ family would add to his reputation’s luster. Also, Alexander (so far) never fails to honor the gods after his victories, making clear he viewed himself as subject to the forces of divinity.

A final quote, one that exemplifies Alexander’s philosophy on building his reputation and legend as he approaches the city of Gaza.

When Alexander first approached the city, he made camp where the wall appeared particularly vulnerable, and ordered that siege engines be put together. The engineers, however, argues that owing to the height of the mound it would be impracticable to attempt to capture the city by force. But in Alexander’s view, the harder the conquest, the more it should be attempted; the exploit would greatly astound his enemies by its unexpectedness, whereas a failure to capture the city, if reported to the Greeks and to Darius, would disgrace him. (2.26.2-3)

Alexander the Great Cutting the Gordian Knot, Giovanni Paolo Panini
Picture source

Arrian: Book Two—he firmly refused to suspect his friends and had the strength to face death

In Book One Arrian establishes Alexander as trusting and generous with his friends while not hesitating to punish turncoats. The latter group includes Greeks who found it more expedient to follow or sympathize with the Persians. Greek mercenaries were harshly punished, at least at the battle of the Granicus River. However Alexander spared the small band of Greek mercenaries at Miletus as long as they enlisted in his army. The difference in the two cases may have had to do with the surrender of the mercenaries at the Granicus River as compared to the mercenaries at Miletus making clear they were going to fight until the death, causing Alexander to be “seized with pity for their nobility and steadfastness.” (1.19.6) Even painted in such a positive light, the mercenaries at Miletus may have felt they didn’t have a choice if they had heard about the fate of the other group of mercenaries.

Alexander had punished the city of Aspendos by doubling their tribute when the city renounced their treaty with Alexander. (1.27) Early in Book Two there are additional examples of Alexander’s trust of friends and anger at Greek treachery. This is one of several themes I wanted to follow throughout Arrian’s book. All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

Arrian goes into detail about the anecdote of Philip of Acarnania (2.4.8-11):

Thus Alexander came down with cramps, high fever, and unending insomnia. All of his doctors doubted he would live except Philip of Acarnania, a doctor who kept company with Alexander and who was especially trusted for his medical knowledge and who carried weight in the army for his grasp of affairs in general; this man wanted to treat Alexander with a purgative, and Alexander urged him to do so. It is said that while Philp was preparing the cup, Alexander was given a letter in which Parmenion warned him to be on his guard against Philip; he said he had heard that Philip had been bribed by Darius to poison Alexander. Alexander, it is said, read the letter, and while still holding it, took the cup containing the drug and gave the letter to Philip to read; and while Philip was reading Parmenion’s letter, Alexander swallowed the dose. Philip quickly made it clear that the drug was harmless: for he was not disconcerted by the letter, but merely encouraged Alexander and advised him to follow all his other instructions, saying he would recover if he did so. The medicine took effect and Alexander’s illness lifted; he showed Philip that he was trusted as a friend, and made it clear to the others in his suite that he firmly refused to suspect his friends and had the strength to face death.

Alexander made it clear at the Granicus River that he had the strength to face death during his battlefield exploits. As far as refusing to suspect his friends, he did follow up on the rumors that Alexander son of Aeropos was working with Darius to assassinate Alexander (1.25). It’s not clear how much of a friend the other Alexander was considered, but since he had been one of the first to recognize the legitimacy of Alexander’s claim to the throne he had been rewarded with prestigious and important positions, which made arresting him an embarrassing situation for the king. Even so, Alexander’s dedication to his friends at this part in the story seems mostly unshakable. The anecdote gives Arrian another opportunity to cast Parmenion in a bad light, or it may be Arrian continuing the character assassination from earlier histories. It’s possible Arrian simply uses Parmenion as a literary device to make Alexander’s character shine brighter. There may a more sinister intention here, though. Is the implication that Parmenion knew of Alexander’s sickness and wanted to deny him aid from the one doctor that could help him? Parmenion stood to benefit greatly with Alexander’s death. Arrian’s version isn’t clear on what Parmenion knew and when he knew it, if such a warning even took place, but his account can raise that question.

Shortly after his health was restored, Alexander and his army marched to Soloi (near Tarsus in modern-day south-central Turkey). “From Anchiale Alexander reached Soloi, where he established a garrison and imposed a fine of two hundred silver talents because the city’s inhabitants were more favorably disposed to the Persians.” (2.5.5) The first note for this section helps fill in some detail on Alexander’s actions. “Soloi was largely a Greek town, and so Alexander took its pro-Persian sympathies very seriously.” Many towns facing possible conflict asked themselves who posed the greatest immediate threat—Alexander or Darius? Choosing expediency, most (but not all) towns allied with the force at the gate. In Soloi’s case, as with other cities, that would not be enough to escape retribution if they were perceived unfaithful. How bad was the fine? From the second note to this section: “Two hundred talents was a crushing fine for such a place, to judge by the fact that Alexander later forgave the quarter of it the city had not yet paid… .” Not mentioned here—Alexander took hostages from the city to guarantee payment. Despite the future forgiveness, Alexander took such alliances against him to heart.

Book Two opens with Memnon of Rhodes and his successor commanders retaking some of the cities that had aligned with Alexander, showing little mercy on the “renegade” cities (like Mitylene) as the Persians reneged on promised terms for their realignment with Darius. The rewarding of friends and punishment of enemies by Alexander, including punishing natural allies harshly, wasn’t uncommon. What will be interesting to watch is Alexander’s consistency, the reasons for any deviation from this formula, and impact of his actions on friends and foes as his campaign continues.

Arrian: Book One—additional thoughts during the conference call

A few stray thoughts during the conference call covering Book One of The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch this evening, some have been bubbling beneath the surface while others were spurred by other comments.

One of the first points discussed was Arrian’s assessment as a historian. For ancient historians, Herodotus and Thucydides would be an obvious comparison. And to some extent Arrian invites such a comparison in his two prefaces. Arrian sprinkles a few social comments in Book One along the lines of Herodotus, such as the origin and language of the Sidetans. Commentary such as this example feels natural in Herodotus’ many digressions but they stand out in Arrian’s history since he has fewer examples.

One feature that stands out in the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides are the speeches that provide context and advance the narrative. These speeches convey several topics or events in one neat quote. Arrian’s history uses few speeches in Book One, limited mostly to interaction between Alexander and his general Parmenion. There are two conversations between them in Book One, Alexander rejecting Parmenion’s advice in both situations. There will be at least two more examples of interaction between the general and his king similar to these examples, Alexander rejecting Parmenion’s advice and the Macedonians carrying the day. After the two examples in Book One I get the feeling this is a literary device similar to Herodotus’ or Thucydides’ use of speeches. (For those that don't know Parmenion’s fate at this point, let's just say it’s not good, adding to the feeling of embellishing how good Alexander looks at his general’s expense.)

The question was raised during the call if Alexander is presented as a romantic character in Arrian’s history. Alexander fits the mold of a romantic character on many counts, but… is it possible to be a romantic character in a Greek tragedy? Alexander demonstrates a maturity and ingenuity at the start of his reign that seems to deteriorate over the history. His flaws, self-induced in many ways, may have helped lead to his early demise. Or maybe not. Something to keep in mind as the history unfolds…

Arrian: Book One—Granicus: “Except for the Spartans”

A few additional thoughts I wanted to add to my previous post on the battle at the Granicus River…

To camp or not to camp

1. When Alexander learned of the concentration of the Persian forces, he advanced rapidly and encamped opposite the enemy, so that the Granicus flowed between the encampments. 2. The Persians, resting on high ground, made no move, intending to fall upon the foes as he crossed the river, for they supposed they could easily carry the day when the Macedonian phalanx was divided. 3. But Alexander at dawn boldly brought his army across the river and deployed in good order before they could stop him. In return, they posted their mass of horsemen all along the front of the Macedonians since they had decided to press the battle with these.

Diodorus Siculus, The Library of History, translation by C. Bradford Welles, Book XVII, 19.1-3

I think Diodorus’ narrative makes much more sense, where Alexander camps at the Granicus River the evening before the battle, although it's much less dramatic than Arrian’s version.

The new Achilles

A thousand years, said the histroians, divided the victory at the Granicus from the fall of Troy, which Callisthenes had calculated to occur in the same month as Alexander’s invasion; a thousand years, therefore, between one Achilles and the coming of his rival to the plains of Nemesis, goddess of revenge, as Callisthenes described the site of the battlefield. It was indeed the start of a new age, though none of those who turned away from the site could ever have realized how; not in a new philosophy or science, but in the geographical width of conquest and the incidental spread of a people’s way of life.

from Alexander the Great, Robin Lane Fox

Except for the Spartans

In addition to his biographers, Alexander also knew how to frame things to his advantage. After the battle at the Granicus River, Alexander “sent three hundred sets of Persian armor to Athens as a dedicatory offering to Athena on the acropolis, and even ordered the following words to be inscribed: “Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks, except for the Spartans, dedicated these spoils from the barbarians dwelling in Asia.” (1.16.7, The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch) The invasion of Asia had been cast as a Panhellinic crusade against the “barbarians,” former invaders of Greece (and more). The thousands of Greek mercenaries in Persian employ that Alexander slaughtered at the end of this battle didn't quite fit the narrative.

But my favorite part of the dedication was highlighting the Spartans opting out of the League of Corinth, even after Alexander's appeal to them. The Spartans had replied that they were the ones worthy to lead and would not be led. How much would “except for the Spartans” bother them? My guess is not that much. Apparently I’m not the only one that feels that way.

“Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks except the Lacedaimonians...”

We can very well imagine
how completely indifferent the Spartans would have been
to this inscription. “Except the Lacedaimonians”—
naturally. The Spartans
weren’t to be led and ordered around
like precious servants. Besides,
a pan-Hellenic expedition without
a Spartan king in command
was not to be taken very seriously.
Of course, then, “except the Lacedaimonians.”

That’s certainly one point of view. Quite understandable.

So, “except the Lacedaimonians” at Granikos,
then at Issus, then in the decisive battle
where the terrible army
the Persians mustered at Arbela was wiped out:
it set out for victory from Arbela, and was wiped out.

And from this marvelous pan-Hellenic expedition,
triumphant, brilliant in every way,
celebrated on all sides, glorified
as no other has ever been glorified,
incomparable, we emerged:
the great new Hellenic world.

We the Alexandrians, the Antiochians,
the Selefkians, and the countless
other Greeks of Egypt and Syria,
and those in Media, and Persia, and all the rest:
with our far-flung supremacy,
our flexible policy of judicious integration,
and our Common Greek Language
which we carried as far as Bactria, as far as the Indians.

Talk about Lacedaimonians after that!

“In the Year 200 B.C.” by C. P. Cavafy
C.P. Cavafy, Collected Poems. Translated by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard. Edited by George Savidis. Revised Edition. Princeton University Press, 1992.

Arrian: Book One—Granicus: “Thou art invincible”

Then he went to Delphi, to consult Apollo concerning the success of the war he had undertaken, and happening to come on one of the forbidden days, when it was esteemed improper to give any answers from the oracle, he sent messengers to desire the priestess to do her office; and when she refused, on the plea of a law to the contrary, he went up himself, and began to draw her by force into the temple, until tired and overcome with his importunity, "My son," said she, "thou art invincible." Alexander taking hold of what she spoke, declared he had received such an answer as he wished for, and that it was needless to consult the god any further. Among other prodigies that attended the departure of his army, the image of Orpheus at Libethra, made of cypress-wood, was seen to sweat in great abundance, to the discouragement of many. But Aristander told him, that far from presaging any ill to him, it signified he should perform acts so important and glorious as would make the poets and musicians of future ages labor and sweat to describe and celebrate them.

- From Alexander, Plutarch’s Lives, the Dryden translation edited by Arthur Hugh Clough

For tonight’s conference call on Book One of The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander (see the sidebar for more information) I was asked to begin the discussion on the battle at the Granicus River, Alexander’s first conflict with the Persians. I wanted to post my thoughts here in order to organize them for tonight’s call—the following doesn’t necessarily address all of the discussion questions about the battle. I may raise more questions than I answer as well as engage in a lot of surmising, presuming, and guessing to fill in the blanks of Arrian’s narrative.

The Persians
The Persians did not attempt to stop Alexander when he crossed the Hellespont. Were they content with their army and cavalry strength as compared to the Macedonians and Greeks? By letting Alexander cross freely at the Hellespont it seems like they are daring Alexander to face them on their turf. For the Persians, Memnon of Rhodes had faced the advance Macedonian force led by Parmenion the previous year and had driven them back to wait for Alexander. He was most familiar with their capabilities (some of this comes from sources other than Arrian…I’ll try and limit outside sources from now on except for the opening quote):

Memnon of Rhodes advised them not to take a chance against the Macedonians, whose infantry, he said, was far superior to their own; furthermore, he said, the Macedonians had Alexander present, while on their side Darius was absent. He advised them to march ahead, destroy the grazing land by trampling it with the cavalry, and burn the standing harvest, not even sparing the cities themselves; Alexander would not remain in the country, he said, if provisions were scarce. (from 1.12.9, The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch)

Memnon’s suggestion of a scorched-earth policy, in hindsight, proved to be the perfect tactic to deprive Alexander of the ability to live off the land. If the Persians had followed this advice, Alexander could have supplied his troops to some extent as long as he stayed close to the coast and used his fleet to supply the troops. But for how long? As it was, Alexander disbanded the fleet at Miletus due to monetary constraints. But politics never change—the other Persian commanders questioned Memnon’s motives for avoiding a direct fight with Alexander instead of evaluating the proposal on its own merits.

Alexander
Since Parmenion had already faced the Persians his counsel should have carried more weight than Alexander allowed. Parmenion seems destined to be used as Alexander’s foil or Arrian’s literary device. Even allowing for literary license, Alexander’s behavior demonstrates a mix of recklessness, confidence, and desperation. In Book One, Alexander establishes he can choose or avoid battles to his advantage. Does Alexander’s mad rush into battle, both in general for the entire army and specifically with his behavior, show us how important he viewed this battle? Did he trust the priestess in her claim that he was invincible?

The “early renown in the war” was important to Alexander but that phrase comes from Miletus where he already had achieved several victories (including Granicus). I can’t shake the feeling that the battle at the Granics River for Alexander boiled down to two choices—success or death. If he failed here, his invasion against Persian forces would effectively be over. He uses a similar rationale at Miletus in choosing not to engage in a direct naval battle because of the perceived superior Persian fleet. But at the Granicus River the Persians held a markedly better position, which offset any superiority Alexander thought his troops held, numerical or situational. Did Alexander’s decision at the Granicus River boil down to a choice between marked success and veiled suicide? If Alexander failed in this battle it seems that his intended invasion of Persia would be over, the Greek cities would renege on the League of Corinth, and his reign in Macedonia would be challenged.


There are many other points that could be investigated surrounding this battle. The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander has many appendices pertaining to various aspects of Alexander’s reign and campaigns. I’m happy to say that one aspect that I think gets overlooked or marginalized is addressed in Appendix F: “Money and Finance in the Campaigns of Alexander”. An army cannot march very far beyond where it can afford to go or where it can be supplied, however boring such topics may be to cover.

Arrian: Book One—loyalty and betrayal

There are many aspects of Alexander that could be discussed from Book One such as the ingenuity demonstrated in avoiding the Thracian carts or in crossing the Danube with hay-filled tents. There is a lot to look at in his mature military tactics demonstrated at the Granicus River or his ability to improvise during the siege of Halicarnassus. Not that those aspects aren't important, but I thought it worthwhile to observe Alexander’s demonstrations of loyalty and the loyalty he expected to receive in Book One to provide a baseline for comparison during the rest of his campaigns. All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

After his father’s death, Alexander insures the Greek cities were still supportive of the League of Corinth with Alexander at its head (Sparta excepted). Hearing rumors of revolt in Thrace, Alexander moves to quell dissension in those dependent territories before beginning his march toward Persia. Alexander makes it clear that he considered having a unified home base a high priority when he returns to Thebes after its revolt. Thebes’ destruction and the death and enslavement of its citizens must have been intended to send a message to any other Greek city contemplating revolt. It certainly worked for Athens, who sent embassies to Alexander to assure him of their support.

Early in his campaign, Alexander’s wrath fell on many Greeks that faced him on the battlefield or tried to subvert him. After defeating the Persian forces at the Granicus River Alexander had the Greek mercenaries fighting for the Persians slaughtered. Mercenaries that survived were sold into slavery in Macedonia. Even with entreaties from Athenian emissaries, Alexander refused to release these slaves. Although Arrian does not explain why, Alexander must have felt the slaves provided insurance for continued Athenian support during his campaigns. (Alexander may have had in mind the Spartan hostages taken in the Battle of Sphacteria during the Peloponnesian War, providing Athens with assurance that Sparta would stop invading Attica.) Alexander equated fighting by Greek soldiers in foreign armies against him as breaking the terms of the League of Corinth—while not technically Greek, Arrian makes it clear Alexander thought he was, whether directly or as leader of the League’s forces.

After Alexander’s victory at the Granicus River, many of the Greek cities in Asia Minor opened their gates to Alexander and were usually rewarded...or at least not punished. Alexander must have realized the implications of his slaughter of Greek mercenaries after the Granicus River battle because he saw determined Greek soldiers at Miletus who appeared ready to fight to the death. Seeing their “nobility and steadfastness”, Alexander offered the Greek mercenaries at Miletus clemency if they fought for him.

Arrian mentions several actions by Alexander calculated to insure or increase his troops’ loyalty to him. Macedonian soldiers that fell at the Granicus River were provided heroic funerals and he provided for their families in Macedonia. Alexander mingled with soldiers wounded in that battle, allowing them to chat and brag about their exploits. Later in the campaign Alexander earned praise and honor from his troops by allowing the soldiers that had been recently married before leaving home to return to their homes for the winter. Alexander administered the cities he took in Asia Minor in such a way that would have earned loyalty from many of them. Tribute rates remained the same or were reduced while many oligarchies were replaced with democratic governments. If a city reneged on its agreement with Alexander, though, they could expect retribution. Aspendos delayed fulfilling their terms of capitulation to Alexander which brought about the doubling of their required payments.

Cities trying to hold out against Alexander, causing him to spend an extended amount of time and effort in conducting siege operations, seem to earn his greatest wrath in Book One. Halicarnassus provides the main example of Alexander’s vengeance when it eventually fell to him. Alexander had the city razed except for a couple of citadels he deemed easier to continue to blockade. It’s as if Alexander takes it as a personal affront if has to lay siege to a city. Is it the extra effort? Impersonal fighting during the siege? Wasted time? It's impossible to say, but I want to see if this trait continues.

The example of Alexander son of Aeropus provides an instructive example of Alexander’s early display of loyalty and those that betray it. This “other Alexander” was brother of the two men who killed his father Philip (as Arrian attributes the plot—that the conspiracy of Philip’s murder had other options or had other possibile murderers is not addressed by Arrian). Since the "other Alexander" immediately supported Alexander’s ascension to the throne he was allowed into the royal inner circle and became captain of the Thessalian cavalry. But... Alexander son of Aeropus was soon rumored to be part of a conspiracy with the Persians to murder Alexander. Instead of acting rashly, Alexander convenes a council with close friends who provide frank assessments, leading to the other Alexander’s arrest. (His ultimate fate is not described here.) As I said earlier, this provides a baseline for any future plots, real or perceived, and how Alexander will handle them.

Arrian: Book One—I am the greatest, at least by association

Arrian takes pride in his work, most notably in the two prologues in Book One. In these passages he directly addresses the reader, stressing the greatness of his subject and, by association as his chronicler, of himself. I think it’s worth taking a minute to look at Arrian’s claims in these prefaces or prologues. The second prologue deserves additional scrutiny because of its placement, comparisons, and claims. All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

In the first prologue (often labeled the Preface), Arrian defends his use of Ptolemy and Aristoboulos as his main sources because they both served under Alexander (they were there), both wrote after Alexander died (nothing to gain or lose by telling the truth), and Ptolemy would, as king, would “have been more disgraceful to speak falsely”. The last point makes Arrian appear somewhat credulous, to say the least, but I’m sure it scored some nice points with the emperor in the obvious bow to authority. Arrian has included additional material when they seemed “worth relating and not wholly implausible”. When Ptolemy and Aristoboulos disagree on their accounts, Arrian again goes with the more plausible account.

The first preface ends with Arrian’s charge to any reader surprised at his writing this history of Alexander: “Any readers who are surprised that it would have occurred to me to write this history, after so many others have written theirs, should read the other accounts and then mine—and then let them say they’re surprised.” The first prologue sets the initial tone of the work, but it pales in comparison to the claims of the second prologue at 1.12.2-5. At this point in the narrative Alexander has just crossed the Hellespont, visited the remains of Troy, and laid a wreath on the tomb of Achilles. The symbolism piles up as Arrian reintroduces his work. Arrian claims Alexander had one unfortunate trait—the lack of a worthy history. Achilles had Homer. Is Arrian implying that he’s the equivalent of Homer? I wouldn’t be surprised given his attitude in the rest of this passage. Alexander’s “exploits were not published to mankind in a worthy manner either in prose or in verse. Nor were his praises sung in lyric poetry… .” And Arrian thinks he is just the guy to do it—as he implies, a great figure deserves a great writer.

Arrian takes several shots at Xenophon, providing pointed contrasts between Alexander’s and Xenophon’s accomplishments. While Arrian revered Xenophon since he added the historian's name to his own, apparently the appreciation resided mostly in Xenophon’s writing ability and not his military achievements. Or maybe just when compared to Alexander. There may be (a no longer false) modesty from Arrian in this history regarding a) his distance from the subject (compared to Xenophon who wrote his own history in the Anabasis), and b) his willingness to go unnamed in the work. Arrian claims “these chronicles are my country and my family and my offices, and have been from my youth.” Since Alexander held the “foremost place among warriors”, then Arrian should hold “a foremost place among Greek writers”. Many comments spring to mind from these prefaces, but I’ll limit myself to one point.

Arrian makes it clear in the first preface there were many histories of Alexander’s exploits to choose from when compiling a history. The second preface, though, complains of the void in adequately relaying his deeds in a “worthy manner either in prose or in verse.” I think it worth looking at these two claims. Several options can explain the void despite numerous histories but I keep coming back to two reasons. If Arrian meant there were not many great writers from Alexander’s time down to the second century CE that addressed Alexander's life then Arrian engages in self-promotion consistent with his claims in the prefaces, especially in the second one. Alexander's accomplishments cannot be denied, as Arrian declares, but there may be a tacit admission regarding conflicting views of Alexander. I’m not referring to the conflicting histories Arrian mentions—paring down to just the basic facts provides a somewhat consistent narrative. Where the historian places the emphasis in those facts can make all the difference. I’m looking forward to see how Arrian handles the many facets of Alexander.

Arrian: Book One—a study in contrasts, part two

Alexander’s shrewdness when choosing the appropriate action to advance short- and long-term goals lies in his ability to take differing positions when necessary. This post looks at a few of his different approaches to battles in Book One of The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch (source for all quotes).

Alexander could be headstrong when he felt a battle was called for. Upon arriving at the Granicus River soon after crossing into Asia, the Macedonians see the Persian army prepared to meet them on the other side of the river. Parmenion suggests to Alexander that the Macedonians should camp on their own side of the river and cross early in the morning since the river had deep spots, the troops would be bunched up while trying to cross, and the banks on the opposite side were steep. “Thus our first stumble would harm our present standing and might even spoil the outcome of the larger war” noted Parmenion. 1.13.5)

Alexander’s answer and his action in the battle at the Granicus River would provide a foundation for any perception that he spoiled for a fight, something he notes in his reply:

But Alexander replied, “I know all that Parmenion, But I would be ashamed, after having easily crossed the Hellespont, if this little stream:--such was the phrase he used to disparage the Granicus—“keeps us from crossing as we are. I would consider it unworthy of the Macedonians’ renown and of my quickness to accept risks. And I think the Persians would take courage and think themselves a match for the Macedonians in battle, seeing that up to now their fears have not been confirmed by what they have experienced.”
(1.13.6-7)

Alexander’s reckless behavior in battle, constantly putting himself in the forefront and exposing himself to danger, would be enough to cement his reputation of accepting risks. But that wasn’t always the case in the army’s march. Alexander, at least in Book One, picks and chooses his battles where he feels necessary. At Thebes and Halicarnassus he pauses during the attack to give the cities a chance to respond to overtures for negotiation. Reminiscent of Alcibiades in Thucydides, Alexander welcomes any opportunity to take a city by sedition. Alexander demonstrated an outlook that preserved his troops several times, avoiding battles where a fight was not necessary (such as the Triballoi and Thracians who escaped to the island in the Danube). Any city that reneged on its surrender or agreement of cooperation, like Aspendos, would find a harsh fate with Alexander.

The role of aggressive commander and hesitant assistant changes at Miletus, where Parmenion councils immediate attack while Alexander looks for other ways to succeed.

Nevertheless, Parmenion advised Alexander to fight at sea. Expecting for a variety of reasons that the Greeks would prevail with their fleet, he had been particularly impressed by an omen: an eagle had been seen on the shore near the sterns of Alexander’s ships. It was Parmenion’s view that if they were victorious, it would be of great advantage to their enterprise as a whole, whereas a defeat would not much matter, since the Persians already had the upper hand at sea. He asserted that he himself was ready to embark with the fleet and run the risk. But Alexander declared that Parmenion was mistaken in his judgment and that his interpretation of the omen was improbable. It would not make sense, he said, with so few ships, to fight at sea against a much larger fleet, and to engage the well-trained navies of the Cyprians and Phoenicians when their own was untrained. Furthermore, he had no wish to surrender to the barbarians the fate of his experienced and daring Macedonians on an element so uncertain. A naval defeat would considerably harm their early renown in the war, particularly because the Greeks, elated by the news of a naval defeat, would revolt. Taking these points into account, Alexander argued that this was not the proper time to engage the enemy at sea. Besides, he said, he interpreted the omen differently: the eagle was indeed a favorable omen, but because it was seen on the ground, he rather thought it meant that he would prevail over the Persian fleet from the land.
(1.18.6-9)

Note the importance of “renown in the war”. This has already played an important role in keeping the Greeks in line at home. But before Arrian's history is taken at face value (yes, I know, a little late at this point), let's take a look at Arrian's direct comments to the reader...

Arrian: Book One—a study in contrasts, part one

Part of Alexander’s greatness or shrewdness derived from his ability to choose an action that advanced his short- and long-term goals. The next couple of posts will look at Book I of Arrian’s history and highlight a few of these choices and how they furthered his objectives even though his actions can appear inconstant and vary greatly in practical application. All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

The first quote looks at Alexander countering the revolt in Thebes:

For a short time the Thebans posted at the Ampheion held their ground, but when they were pressed hard on all sides by the Macedonians and by Alexander, who seemed to pop up everywhere, the Theban horsemen dashed through the city and rushed out into the plain, while the foot soldiers tried to save themselves as best they could. After that, it was not the Macedonians so much as the Phocians, the Plataeans, and other Boeotians who, in a rage, slaughtered the Thebans helter-skelter even when they made no move to defend themselves, falling upon some in their houses, upon others who forcibly resisted, and even upon those who tried to approach the temples as suppliants, sparing neither women nor children.
(1.8.7-8)

Any valid history of Alexander has to deal with the body count left in his wake, even in cases like this where his Macedonian troops are not the ones committing the atrocities. Alexander had control over what happened in the city as the next example will make clear, even when blood feuds were being settled. His decision to allow the slaughter of the Thebans must have been meant to send a message to any other “Greek” cities that he would not allow revolt, whether he was nearby or in India. To punish Thebes he stopped his invasion of Asia, setting those plans back several months in order to drive home that point. I’m sure any other city, even if they heard rumors of Alexander’s death (like Thebes had received), would think twice after learning of Thebes’ punishment. How bad was the slaughter? The summary for the section after the above quote describes how it was seen a few centuries later by the author: “Arrian pauses to compare the suffering of Thebes with other great disasters inflicted by one Greek city on another. He finds that all previous cataclysms pale in comparison to the fate of Thebes.”

Alexander could be merciful at times when it benefited him. After his troops take Ephesus, his behavior stands in marked contrast after the recent sack of Thebes:

Reaching Ephesus on the fourth day, Alexander restored all the exiles who on his account had been banished from the city; dissolving the oligarchy, he established a democracy in its place. He then ordered that all the tribute that had formerly been paid to the barbarians [Persians] now be paid to Artemis. When the common people’s fear of the oligarchs had been dispelled, they became eager to kill those who were in favor of calling in Memnon, as well as those who had despoiled the temple of Artemis and those who had thrown down the statue of Philip in the temple and dug up the tomb of Heropythos, the city’s liberator, in the marketplace. Syrphax, his son Pelagon, and the sons of Syrphax’s brothers were led away from the shrine and stoned to death. But Alexander prevented the Ephesians from seeking out and taking vengeance on others, as he realized that if he granted them permission they would unjustly kill the innocent along with the guilty, either to settle private scores or to seize the property of the victims. Never was Alexander’s conduct held in higher esteem than on that occasion, because of what he did in Ephesus.
(1.17.10-12)

That last sentence has an echo later on in Book I when Alexander allows his recently-married soldiers to go home for the winter (instead of staying in Asia).

Some of the Macedonians serving with Alexander had married shortly before the expedition, and he recognized that he should not neglect them. Accordingly, he sent them home form Caria to spend the winter with their wives in Macedonia, having placed them under the command of Ptolemy, son of Selukos, one of the royal bodyguards, and two of the generals—Koinos son of Polemokrates and Meleagros son of Neoptolemos—as these men, too, had recently married. He directed them to enlist as many horsemen and infantrymen from the country as they could before returning and bringing back their cohort. And for this deed, more than for any other, Alexander was held in esteem by the Macedonians. He also sent Kleandros son of Polemokrates to levy troops in the Peloponnese.
(1.24.1-2)

Alexander’s rashness will emerge over his decade-plus adventure in Asia but at the beginning of his reign and campaign we see a shrewdness calculated for maximum effect and calibrated for the situation.

The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander online resources

Picture source

One great thing about the Landmark editions is the support provided within each book: maps, indexes, annotations, appendices help make reading the work more rewarding and enjoyable. Providing an online resource post for a book from the series seems unnecessary but I like to do it anyway.

A database with links to major and minor ancient sources on Alexander’s history. The Arrian work is the translation by E.J. Chinnock (1893).

The Internet Ancient History Sourcebook links related to Alexander

pothos.org, billed as Alexander the Great's home on the web

Excerpts from Penguin Books’ The Campaigns of Alexander, translated by Aubrey de Sélincourt. The introduction by J. R. Hamilton appears to be complete.

The article “The Loneliness of Alexander the Great” by Conrad Clough, focusing on the same topic of Ernst Badian’s Alexander the Great and the Loneliness of Power. Also note the “related article” section in the sidebar.

Alexander's Last Days: Malaria and Mind Games? - an article by John Atkinson, Elsie Truter, and Etienne Truter. Originally published in Acta Classica.

Alexander the Great on the Web: links, links and more links

You can find any post regarding Arrian on my site here, including all the posts at Forbes’ “Booked” blog with historians James Romm and Paul A. Cartledge

The Reading Odyssey should have podcasts, book by book, available on their site after each conference call this year. More information on the schedule can be found in this post.

A review of The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander by Victor Davis Hanson


Some resources from university or class sites:

The University of Warwick’s module for Alexander. Not everything in the sidebar is currently available.

Prof. Nicholas K. Rauh’s site for Purdue’s Spring 2010 class on Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic World. I have only checked out a few pages in the section of lecture notes but they look helpful.

The syllabus, with a few links, of Barbara Saylor Rodgers’ Fall 2006 course on Alexander the Great at the University of Vermont

A Lego version of Alexander (from the FC Historical Figure contest)

Update (10 Oct 2011): Mary Beard has an article titled "Alexander: How Great?" at the New York Review of Books which covers several books on Alexander (and one on Philip)

Update (16 Jan 2012): Scott McCulloch at Ancient Life has a discussion on 5 Recommended Books On Alexander The Great. Be sure to check out the comments for additional recommendations.

Alexander and the Triballoi

Envoys now visited Alexander from all the other autonomous tribes settled near the Danube and from Syrmos, the king of the the Triballoi. Envoys also arrived from the Celts who dwelt on the Ionian Gulf. Men of enormous stature, the Celts had a high opinion of themselves. All the envoys had come desiring Alexander’s friendship, and he exchanged pledges with one and all. He asked the Celts what in the human realm they feared the most, expecting that, since his great name had reached the Celts and gone even farther, they would say they feared him above all. But the Celts’ reply disappointed him. For as they dwelt far from Alexander and inhabited a place that was hard to reach, and as they saw that Alexander’s efforts were directed elsewhere, they said they feared only that the sky might fall on them; and though they admired Alexander, neither fear nor any concern for their advantage had moved them to send these envoys. Alexander declared these men his friends and made an alliance with them before sending them off, though he remarked under his breath, “Big talkers, these Celts!”
(The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, 1.4.6-8, translation by Pamela Mensch)

Estimated location of Triballoi and other tribes
Picture source, although some liberties may have been taken

Discussion questions for Arrian's The Campaigns of Alexander

I wanted share the first few discussion questions on Book I for Reading Odyssey, Inc.'s book group on The Campaigns of Alexander by Arrian. The page numbers refer to The Landmark Series' version of the book. If you're interested in joining the group, see this post for the schedule and a link to the Reading Odyssey's website.


Arrian - Book I Discussion Questions

1. In the Editor’s Preface (p. xxxiv), James Romm quotes P. A. Brunt’s assessment of Arrian: “He was a simple, honest soul, but no historian.” After reading Arrian’s preface on p. 3, what is your first impression? What do we consider to be an historian today? How does Arrian account for sources for this history? How does Arrian’s preface strike you in terms of the validity of his efforts?

2. [Sections 1.1-1.6, pp. 4-13] As Alexander begins his campaign into the Balkans, north of Macedonia, what does each account against hostile forces (i.e. Thracians, Triballoi, Getae, Illyrians, Taulantians) reveal about Alexander? his army? What tactics are included by Arrian in these accounts? What do we learn about Alexander’s leadership in each of these encounters?

3. [Sections 1.7-1.10, pp. 13-21] While Alexander is occupied with events north of Macedonia, intrigues south of Macedonia at Thebes soon force him to deal with uprisings among the Greeks. Why were events at Thebes so significant with respect to the rest of Greece? What are the pros and cons to Alexander’s handling of the revolt at Thebes? How impartial do you think Arrian is in handling the events at Thebes?

4. [Sections 1.11-1.12, pp. 22-26] How significant are Alexander’s first actions as he steps onto Asia from Europe? How significant is the site of these actions? What does Arrian’s second preface [I.12.2-5] reveal, being placed right after Alexander’s entrance onto Asia?

Update (3 May 2011): A little after the fact, but anyone interested in all the discussion questions, which provide a good framework on how to read Arrian, can find them here.

The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander reading group (bumped)

Update: I have attached the schedule for anyone still thinking about joining the reading group--please do! The first call is on Monday. Follow the link in the original post for more details.

Conference Call Schedule 2011
Monday, April 11 - Intro. call
Monday, May 2 - Book 1
Monday, June 6 - Book 2
Monday, July 11 - Book 3
Monday, Sept 12 - Books 4 & 5
Monday, Oct 3 - Book 6
Monday, Nov 7 - Book 7 & Epilogue

---

I’m not familiar with Reading Odyssey, Inc. but their upcoming event discussing The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander looks exciting. Plus the schedule looks feasible for me. While I’m trying to limit my acquisition of books this year, this is one I had planned on including in my purchases (and have already bought). I’ll definitely post on this as it occurs.

I’m looking forward to reading Arrian’s account, having already read the biographies by Robin Lane Fox (highest recommendation) and Paul Cartledge (a thematic biography—recommended if you are already familiar with Alexander’s life). And there are plenty more out there such as Peter Green’s book and Philip Freeman’s recent release.


On a side note, I just noticed this is the 500th post here. This blog started as a place for personal finance bloggers to comment on particular books (hence the ‘bookcents’ name and the first few books focusing on money or wealth), but that project never really got off the ground. After being dormant for a year, I revived the blog as a way to take notes when reading a few Modernist literature works and it has been evolving ever since. Into what, I’m not sure but maybe I’ll figure it out at some point. Anyway, a huge “thank you” to those that read and comment on my ramblings.

Oliver Stone on Alexander the Great (Part One)

See Forbes "Booked" blog for Part 1 of Oliver Stone's dialogue with historians Paul Cartledge and James Romm on Alexander the Great. In the introduction there is a link to a collection of academians’ responses to Stone's film on Alexander.

I have compiled all of Forbes' posts on Alexander in this post.

From James Romm in Part 1: "His power-sharing with the Persians and Bactrians, though it was certainly not on equal terms, was a good deal more generous than it had to be. He may indeed have been “the most generous of rulers” for his time, even if, in the context of our times, he can sometimes seem like an autocrat."

Update: Parts Two and Three of the discussion can be found at the compliation link.

Alexander the Great in Forbes

Since I don’t have time to do anything else today, here is a series of links to a discussion between two of the historians that assisted with Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander. While not intending to shill for the Landmark Series--they have the capability to do it better than I can--I am a big fan of the series to date. I'm happy to see these discussions, too. From the Forbes' series introduction:

[A] series of weekly conversations between historians James Romm [JR] and Paul A. Cartledge [PC], editor and introduction-author, respectively, of the new Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, just published by Pantheon under series editor Robert Strassler. This discussion was created by the Reading Odyssey, a non-profit that aims to reignite curiosity and lifelong learning for adults through lectures, reading groups and webcasts.

12 Dec 2010: Two Great Historians on Alexander the Great, Part One (Introduction; when did "the Great" get added to his name?)

17 Dec 2010: Two Great Historians on Alexander the Great Part 2 (How involved was Alexander in the plot to kill his father?)

20 Dec 2010: Two Great Historians Talk Alexander the Great Part 3 (Sources, along with strengths and weaknesses, of Arrian)

3 Jan 2011: Two Great Historians Talk Alexander the Great, Part 4 (Looking at the Greek attitude toward Alexander)

10 Jan 2011: How Great a General was Alexander? (Part 5)

28 Jan 2011: Two Great Historians Talk Alexander the Great, Part 6 (Looking at Alexander's "attempt to hybridize Greco-Macedonian and Persian styles of monarchy in his own person")

10 Feb 2011: Alexander The Great: Gay or Straight?

Update: 19 Feb 2011: What Caused The Death Of Alexander The Great?

Update: 16 Mar 2011: Oliver Stone Talks Alexander The Great Part 1

Update: 21 Mar 2011: Oliver Stone Talks Alexander The Great (Part Two)

Update: 21 Mar 2011: Oliver Stone Talks Alexander The Great Video 1 (video...contains one f-bomb)

Update: 22 Mar 2011: Oliver Stone Talks Alexander The Great (Part Three)

Update: 22 Mar 2011: Oliver Stone Talks Alexander The Great Video 2