Head to head with Alexander the Great

I found an interesting article on an upcoming paper about Alexander the Great and the possible cause for his erratic behavior: CTE (chronic traumatic encephalopathy), the same problem many American football players experience after multiple concussions. A quote from the article on Alexandra Morris' goal:

“I believe Alexander deserves better than to be thought of as an out-of-control drunk,” Morris said. “A lot of warriors probably had this type of injury. At present, I am probably the only person in the world working on this thesis. Everyone thinks Alexander was an able-bodied warrior, but he wasn’t.”

I hope this gets reviewed seriously. Obviously we're trying to piece together something long ago with limited resources, but it seems plausible. OK, and exacerbated by the "out-of-control drunk" thing.

For examples of CTE effects, my first thought was watching the November 1984 Chicago Bears/Oakland Raiders game, where player after player was carted off the field, only to return later (usually briefly) in the game. It was brutal, and the turning point for my love of football after seeing the damage done to these players. A couple of years ago, an article about a childhood hero of mine, Terry Beasley, cemented that aversion. I'm anxious to see how Alexandra Morris' paper and follow-up research develops.

Note: I had forgotten I had mentioned the Bears/Raiders game in an earlier post. Here's the previous post on capturing the sounds of autumn.

Update (25 Jul 2016): I just read an update on the health challenges that the other half of the picture, Pat Sullivan, has been going through.

Update (1 Dec 2019): It's always sad to hear when one of your childhood heroes passes away. Pat Sullivan died today, and it's remarkable to hear the positive impact he had on others. It's great to hear that someone you idolized when you're young turns out to be a genuinely good person.

Terry Beasley and Pat Sullivan

Alexander's Lost World

Alexander’s Lost World is a 6 x 60” series coproduced with David Adams Films and Sky Vision. Following the course of the River Oxus (Amu Darya) for the first time, Adams takes viewers on an extraordinary 1,500-mile (2400 km) journey through war-torn Afghanistan and Central Asia.

The Ancient Greeks have long been credited for bringing ‘civilization’ to the East. In fact it appears to be the other way round. Alexander the Great discovered a highly developed civilization (a lost world) that pre-dated even the Persians.

As Adams unravels the mysteries of the Oxus Civilizations, its great fortress cities are dramatically recreated in stunning CGI. Travelling through the most remote regions of Afghanistan unarmed, Adams and his Cameraman live as everyday Afghans gaining a most unique insight into the people and our shared heritage.

- from the series Alexander's Lost World website

A little late to the party with this, but I wanted to pass it on anyway...

David Adams has put together a 6-part series based on Alexander the Great's foray in Afghanistan, India, and other central Asian areas. Aired earlier this year in the U.K. and currently airing in Australia and New Zealand, I'm hoping this makes it to the U.S. soon. The episode guide shows a tie-in with the legend of Jason and the Argonauts.

Check out the photo gallery for some remarkable pictures. The website I've linked here obviously has a strong push for joining the network, but there are plenty of enjoyable things for free. Follow up on some of additional YouTube trailers for the series for an idea of how the series approaches the subjects.

Reading Odyssey's conference calls on Arrian

I participated in the Reading Odyssey's reading of Arrian's The Campaigns of Alexander this year and wanted to gather all the conference calls in one place. Reading Odyssey "is a partnership between scholars and readers" aiming "to reignite curiosity and lifelong learning." I enjoyed participating in this program and highly recommend future programs. The listed programs for next year as currently listed:

- Homer's Iliad beginning January 2012,
- Homer's Odyssey beginning May 2012, and
- Herodotus' Histories beginning September 2012.


The Campaigns of Alexander conference calls (2011):

Introduction
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Books Four and Five
Book Six
Book Seven

The Campaigns of Alexander summary

The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander
Edited by James Romm, Series Editor Robert B. Strassler, Translation by Pamela Mensch, Introduction by Paul Cartledge

If you haven’t noticed by now, I am a huge fan of the Landmark series, created by Robert B. Strassler. If you haven’t picked up a volume in the series, check out these sample pages from various parts of The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander. The introduction by Paul Cartledge provides an excellent introduction, especially with his focus on the sources. The appendices, many by editor James Romm, provide context for various aspects of Arrian’s work and Alexander’s time.

Arrian’s work covers Alexander III of Macedon’s reign from his ascension to the throne until his death in Babylon in 323 BC. This twelve-year reign saw remarkable achievements that earned him the moniker “the Great.” Arrian wrote almost five hundred years after Alexander’s reign, his admiring portrait (with an occasional finger wag) meant to be “for the benefit of mankind.” His task was all the harder because it is almost impossible to discover the historical Alexander—the propaganda and myth-making began during his reign with his own appointed historian. Arrian spells out his approach to his subject and his book in his two prologues, both of which provide an important framework to keep in mind when reading and assessing the work.

As I noted early in Arrian’s work, the reading of Alexander’s life would be a study in contrasts and that carried through to his death. Because of the many facets of Alexander’s life he could be a poster child for the adage that each generation writes its own history—depending on which side you emphasize you get a very different portrait. Arrian, to his credit, focuses on Alexander the person (most of the time), a complex man taking every advantage of what was provided and overcoming what wasn’t. A. B. Bosworth’s comment that “The study of Alexander…is in large part the study of Arrian, who provides the constant thread against which the rest of the tradition must be assessed” shows how influential Arrian has become in evaluating the ruler. (From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation. New York, Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1988). In addition to being a history, Arrian’s work has to be evaluated as a literary work. For example, the speeches provide Arrian with an opportunity to “invent” the Alexander he wants his readers to see, following in the footsteps of Herodotus and Thucydides (among others) in using this rhetorical device in their histories.

The following links will give you a flavor for the book, which I hope anyone with even just a passing interest will explore. Highest recommendation.


Posts

Resources
Online resources
A series of weekly conversations between historians James Romm and Paul A. Cartledge at Forbes.com
The link to Reading Odyssey, Inc., which hosted a reading group of the book
A mini-review of James Romm’s Ghost on the Throne: The Death of Alexander the Great and the War for Crown and Empire
The Reading Odyssey's 2011 conference calls on the book

Book One
Alexander and the Triballoi
A study in contrasts, part one
A study in contrasts, part two
I am the greatest, at least by association (a look at Arrian’s prologues)
Loyalty and betrayal
Granicus: “Thou art invincible”
Granicus: “Except for the Spartans”
Book One conference call

Book Two
He firmly refused to suspect his friends and had the strength to face death
Leadership and legend
Address yourself to me as the king of Asia
Siege, wrath, and amnesty
A look at Arrian in his text (so far)
Destiny

Book Three
The oracle of Ammon
Alexander, the great administrator?
Gaugamela
Burning down the house

Books Four and Five
Link to Books Four and Five reading group questions
How Books Four and Five fit in with Arrian’s prefaces
They “do not remain there entirely of their own will”
The good, the bad and the ugly of Books Four and Five
Speeches in Books Four and Five

Book Six
An overview of Book Six

Book Seven
Be gone, all of you!
Consider who you are in comparison to Alexander
For the benefit of mankind

Miscellaneous
Clips from the 1968 TV movie “Alexander the Great”, filmed in 1964 and starring William Shatner as Alexander and Adam West as Cleander
Excerpt from Robert Lowell’s "Death of Alexander"

Map of the Macedonian Empire under Alexander and his journeys
Picture source

The Campaigns of Alexander, Book Seven: For the benefit of mankind

Though I have myself had occasion to find fault with some of Alexander’s deeds in the course of my history of them, I am not ashamed to admire Alexander himself. If I have condemned certain acts of his, I did so out of my own regard for truth and also for the benefit of mankind. That, after all, was my purpose in embarking on this history, and I, too, have been favored with help from god.

- 7.30.3, The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch

I mentioned in the opening post for Book Seven that Arrian inserted himself quite liberally in Book Seven and I thought I should give some examples. I have focused on Arrian’s “appearance” in some earlier posts, especially in his two prologues and how they influence Arrian’s presentation in Books Four and Five. Another example was calling attention to himself in Book Two (not to slight the other Books where he does this, too).

The opening paragraphs of Book Seven prove to be some of Arrian’s most confused writing, where he alternates between Alexander’s ambition and “a better way of thinking” from Indian sages. The sages promote contentment with what one has instead of longing for more, obviously not Alexander’s strong suit. Arrian seems to believe Alexander would have been better off if he had followed the Indian sages’ advice, yet Arrian also admires all he accomplished. As footnote 7.2.2a points out, Arrian tries to have it both ways in these paragraphs, following contemporaneous writings that explored “the contrast between eastern quietism and western imperialism”.

I will skip the premonitions, prophecies, and foreshadowing of Alexander’s death even though they provide plenty of opportunity for Arrian to step from behind the page. Arrian’s assessments on Alexander’s life and death are some of Arrian’s most forward passages. During comments on the oracles of Bel, Arrian opines

And perhaps it was better for him to depart at the high point of his fame and of the world’s longing for him, before any of the calamities of man’s lot befell him—the kind of calamities that, in all likelihood, prompted Solon to advise Croesus to look to the end of a long life and not to declare any human being happy until then.

"Perhaps" allows a lot of leeway in judging this quote. Not to mention Arrian had hindsight of seeing the empire disintegrate after Alexander’s death, seeing the calamities that befell many of his inner circle.

Arrian saves some of his most scathing comments for Kleomenes, satrap of Egypt. Calling the official “a despicable man” and “a villain”, Arrain doesn’t hold back on his judgment (7.23.6, 8), which proves to be humorous since these comments come during Arrian’s judgment on Alexander’s overwrought behavior following Hephaistion’s death. Pointing out the waste of time and effort on trivial matters to honor Hephaistion, Arrian also deplores Alexander’s leniency to Kleomenes.

Arrian sums up his subject at the end of Book Seven by assessing Alexander’s character. Arrian begins by praising Alexander’s for his body (including his self-control!), his mind, and his military genius. Given his admiration it's not surprising Arrian finds Alexander’s actions mostly honorable as was his concern for benefiting others. Arrian pauses to look at some of the criticisms leveled at Alexander, starting with the excesses of action, claims to divine parentage, and his blending of Macedonian and Persian customs and troops. Arrian views these as methods to either reinforce his authority or inspire his men. I quoted the first part of the final chapter in the previous post, where Arrian warns average men to refrain from judging someone superior. Arrian closes with the opening quote of this post, but I want to note previous section since Arrian believes Alexander may have had some divine component:

I suppose there was no race of men, no city at that time, no single person whom Alexander’s name did not reach. I therefore assume that a man unlike any other in the world would not have been born without the intervention of the gods. Oracles are said to have indicated this at Alexander’s death, as did various apparitions that were seen and dreams that were dreamt, the honor in which Alexander has to this day been helf by mankind, and the memory of him, which surpasses the merely human. (from 7.30.2)

There’s another way Arrian inserts himself in the text, or rather he inserts Roman reputation and influence in Alexander’s empire. Arrian speculates on Alexander’s travels had he remained alive, exploring the claim that “he was already unsettled by the Romans’ growing renown.” (7.1.3) Later in the Book, Arrian quotes other writers saying the Romans sent an embassy to Alexander while on his way to Babylon and he “spoke prophetically about the Romans’ future power, as he had observed that their people were orderly, hardworking, and free, and he had also learned about their constitution.” (7.15.5) Although Arrian believes the embassy from Rome unlikely he still includes the story in his narrative.

Despite pointing out disapproval for occasional acts of Alexander, Arrian remains an enthusiastic admirer of the ruler. His delivers his criticism with a light hand, usually providing excuses or putting a positive spin on events. Arrian makes clear in the last chapters that there were things to reproach about Alexander but that his success in so many other areas outweighs the negatives. I think Arrian has no doubt he succeeded in his implied claim in the second prologue that he has provided a worthy publication of Alexander’s epic exploits.

The Campaigns of Alexander, Book Seven: consider who you are in comparison to Alexander

Anyone who reproaches Alexander should not simply cite those deeds that deserve to be reproached. Instead, after collecting in one place all of Alexander’s qualities, let his critic then consider who he is and what sort of fortune he has had that he reproaches Alexander, a man who became so great and attained such a peak of human success as the undisputed king of both continents whose name reached every land—whereas he is a lesser man, toiling at lesser things and not even handling them with any ability.

- 7.30.1, The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch

Compare to the excerpt from Robert Lowell’s "Death of Alexander" from History (1973):

No one was like him. Terrible were his crimes—
but if you wish to blackguard the Great King,
think how mean, obscure and dull you are,
your labors lowly and your merits less...

The Campaigns of Alexander, Book Seven: Be gone, all of you!

”I was now going to send back those of you who are unfit for war, to be envied by those at home. But since you all wish to go, be gone, all of you, and report, when you get home, that Alexander, your king, who conquered the Persians, Medes, Bactrians, and Sacae, who subjugated the Ouxioi, Arachosians, and Zarangians, who acquired the lands of the Parthians, Khorasmians, and Hyrcanians as far as the Caspian Sea, who crossed the Caucasus beyond the Caspian Gates, and Oxus, the Tanais, and the Indus, too, which none had ever crossed by Dionysos, and the Hydaspes, the Akesinos, and the Hydraotes, and who would have crossed the Hyphasis had you not shrunk back, and who burst into the Great Sea by both outlets of the Indus, and who traversed the Gedrosian desert, which none had crossed with an army, and along the way acquired Carmania and the land of the Oeitae, the fleet having already sailed from India to Persia—tell them, why don’t you, that when you returned to Susa you abandoned him and departed, turning him over to the safekeeping of the barbarians you had conquered. Such a report may win you renown from men and will, no doubt, be holy in the sight of god. Now go!”

- 7.10.-5-7, The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch

This may prove to be my favorite Book in Arrian’s work on Alexander even though Arrian inserts himself quite liberally in the text (and that may be some of the appeal). With this post I want to look at Alexander’s increasingly erratic behavior and the mounting tension between him, his officers and his troops.

The replacement of many satraps (and execution of some) drive home Arrian’s point that Alexander had “become quicker to accept accusations as wholly trustworthy and to impose severe punishments on those who were convicted even of minor offenses, on the assumption that in the same state of mind they might commit serious ones.” (7.4.3) We are a long way from the trust Alexander placed in Philip of Acarnania’s medical advice (2.4) despite charges from other trusted advisers. Did Alexander hope to make these satraps and their abuse of power an example? The high-profile exception to this distrust was Alexander’s leniency toward the Egyptian satrap Kleomenes. Alexander looked away when Kleomenes’ enriched himself at the expense of Greece and other areas (see footnote 7.23.6b), and offered to fully pardon him if Kleomenes appropriately honored the dead Hephaistion.

The troops appear to distrust both Alexander and his officers—at several points the tension between the levels of command surface in this Book. Alexander attempts the generous gesture of paying off his soldiers’ debts but they do not trust him—they believe, given his recent behavior, that the offer is a test to find out who was extravagant or living beyond their means. Only when Alexander changed the procedure so that monetary help was anonymous did most of the soldiers take advantage of the offer. Commissioning thirty thousand adolescents from non-Macedonian areas, training them in the Macedonian arts of war and calling them the Epigonoi (“offspring”, implying replacements) isn’t going to win Macedonian supporters to your cause. Such moves left Macedonians feeling vexed and distressed at the perceived slight. (7.6.1-3) Just like Alexander’s adoption of Persian court symbolism, the resentment over the introduction of the non-Macedonian troops was going to cause plenty of friction.

Alexander appears to have known his actions would be contentious but part of the reason for the direction he followed seems to include winning support of the Persian upper classes. The “fifth hipparchy” he created contained a division of the sons of Persian nobles as a way to win their support, whether through providing favors or holding their sons hostage (or some combination of the two). When decommissioned troops are to go home to Macedonia, he orders that children of any mixed marriages (Macedonian soldiers and Persian wives) are not to go home with them (7.12.2), an acknowledgement that Persian arrangements would “introduce strife into Macedonia”.

At Opis, instead of accepting decommission of older and unfit soldiers, the Macedonian troops revolt and call for immediate release of all Macedonian soldiers so Alexander can “wage war by himself along with his ‘father’” (7.8.3), a mocking reference to his proclaimed descent from Ammon. A common theme for the Macedonian veterans has been the feeling of disrespect from Alexander…but they haven’t seen anything yet. Alexander wades into the crowd and orders thirteen of the ringleaders executed. Following that up, Arrian gives Alexander his greatest speech in the book. Alexander calls their bluff and says they are free to leave if they want to but wants them to keep in mind a few things. First Alexander praises his father Philip and what he did for them, civilizing them and training them to master those around them. Alexander’s praise of his father stands in marked contrast to his reaction of the taunts of Kleitos (back in 4.8) but then Alexander claims his accomplishments trump those of his father. Alexander lays out some of the accomplishments but says they were all for his people—he hasn’t benefited any more than they have. He highlights the wounds he has received and reminded the soldiers of his generosity, then closes with this post’s opening quote.

By itself the speech might have shamed his men into compliance, but Alexander spends the next three days alone and then accepts only Persian officers into his presence, compounding the Macedonians' sense of alienation. This is too much for the Macedonians, who end the Opis revolt by rushing to the palace and begging forgiveness. The tension between Alexander and the troops appears to have been resolved, at least temporarily. Right before Alexander’s death, though, the mistrust between soldiers and leaders surfaces again. The men do not trust the reports of Alexander’s sickness from the top officers (just as they had not believed their messages after Alexander’s punctured lung in India), forcing their way into the palace to see him as he is dying. As pointed out here and other summaries of this period, the mistrust does not bode well for troop cohesion after Alexander’s death.

Even with the increasing tension and mistrust between troops and leaders and Alexander’s erratic or impulsive behavior, his plans and accomplishments show a continuation of his previous achievements and underscore a mature view of what it would take to govern and protect the empire. Upon the return to Persia, Alexander subdues some of the surrounding tribes that had not submitted to him. Up to the days before his death he pushes ahead with an invasion of Arabia. His engineering projects in the area were meant to simultaneously improve the empire while providing increased military advantage. The plans for establishing permanent sea routes show some of the ways Alexander intended to maintain and run his empire.

Unfortunately Arrian does not include major events fitting in with the increased tension between leader and subjects (although there are some missing passages in Arrian’s text that may have discussed these events). During this period, Harpalos, Alexander’s friend and treasurer, returns to Greece with a sizeable fortune. Harpalos had fled earlier, although was reconciled at Alexander's prodding, so he may be viewed as flighty (pun not fully intended). Why flee after the return of Alexander to Persia? Was he seeing a change in Alexander, especially after the purge of satraps? Or was he simply escaping before Alexander found out about his profligate lifestyle during his absence? Also missing is mention of the Exile’s Decree that increased animosity with the Greeks, which would prove to be an animating factor (along with Harpalos’ money) in Greek revolts after Alexander’s death.

The Campaigns of Alexander: Book Six

Alexander's return from India
Picture source: section 3D

In an attempt to get back on track with Arrian and the Reading Odyssey book group I’ll do a post for Book Six on Arrian’s The Campaigns of Alexander. With so much material, one post obviously won’t cover everything but I’ll highlight a few things I found interesting.

The first topic occurs in the opening paragraph, where Alexander was planning to sail down the rivers feeding the Indus: “Since he intended to sail down the rivers to the Great Sea, he ordered the preparation of ships for that purpose. The ships were manned by the Phoenicians, Cyprians, Carians, and Egyptians who were accompanying the army.” (6.1.6, all quotes from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch). Alexander had dismissed or left many men behind on his campaigns—why did he keep people known for naval expertise and shipbuilding skills? As pointed out in a footnote, “Arrian’s language here seems to imply that Alexander had brought naval crews with him into India, perhaps anticipating that he would eventually reach Ocean by marching eastward.”(Footnote 6.1.6b) This would be consistent with his speech to his officers after hearing of the troops’ discontent at the Hyphasis River (5.25.3-5.26). In that speech he claims he wants to “show the Macedonians and their allies” that he could sail from the Indian gulf to the Persian gulf all the way to the Pillars of Herakles, making the entire earth their empire as they do so. I found it interesting to see possible confirmation that these might have indeed been his plans.

As Alexander marches/sails down the rivers feeding the Indus it’s impossible to ignore the slaughtered bodies and razed cities in his wake. He knew he was leaving India, so what did he hope to accomplish with this carnage? Several local leaders he trusts enough to leave in charge end up revolting (much to their detriment), and Arrian points out a couple of times Alexander cannot find a local guide, hinting that the local population fears him too much to help him. In all this body count I also have to question Alexander’s targeting of Brahman holy men in the territory of the Malloi (6.7.4-6) and the slaughter of the Brahmans taking part in a revolt further down the Indus (6.16.5). Alexander has shown a high degree of religious tolerance to this point (and Arrian will point out more respect for Indian holy men in Book Seven) which makes these crackdowns stand out for their cruelty.

The punctured lung Alexander receives during the attack on a Malloi city receives a lot of attention in any write-up on Alexander and I’ll spend time with it, too, focusing on how his troops react. These are the same troops that cried tears of joy after Alexander concedes in their refusal to go any further than the Hyphasis River (at 5.29.1).

While Alexander remained there to be treated for his wound, the first report to reach the camp from which he had set out against the Malloi was that he had died of it. At first, as the news passed from one to another, the entire army raised a wail. But when they had ceased wailing, the troops grew disheartened and perplexed as to who would command the army, since a great many officers were held in equal esteem by both Alexander himself and the Macedonians … . (6.12.1-2)

Arrian stresses the troops' concern on returning home safely since they were surrounded by hostile people and some of the so-called friendly people would revolt upon hearing of Alexander’s death. Upon seeing Alexander alive the troops “sent up a shout, some of them lifting their hands to the sky, others toward Alexander himself; many even wept in spite of themselves at the unhoped-for boon. (6.13.2) They were “disheartened and perplexed as to who would command the army” even though the officers are esteemed--it's clear the men know none have the presence or ability of Alexander.

The march across the Gedrosian Desert also receives a lot of attention because of the brutal toll it takes on Alexander’s army. Often portrayed as Alexander’s revenge for his army’s refusal to continue the campaign, there are other considerations that are highlighted in footnotes to the text.

6.20.1a The improvements ordered at Patala [in the Indus River delta]… show that Alexander was planning to make this an important naval station, facilitating shipping and communications with the center of the empire. The land route into India, across the Indian Caucasus/Paropamisos (modern Hindu Kush), was arduous in summer and impossible in winter, so a sea route had to be develop if India was to be integrated with the other Asian territories. This goal does much to explain the otherwise irrational march through Gedrosia… .

...

6.20.4a Nearkhos’ ships, like most ancient sailing vessels, were not designed to carry large quantities of supplies, they were expected to put to shore each night to resupply themselves. Digging wells was thus the principal mission of Alexander’s land army during this march. Without them the fleet had no way to keep itself watered.

The march mentioned in the last note was a preliminary expedition before the main trek across the desert but fits in nicely with the picture of the troops headed through the desert, in part to provide short-term support for Nearkhos’ ships as well as establishing infrastructure for sea routes. Of course, that doesn’t mean Alexander wasn’t getting back at his troops but it does provide additional reasons for the arduous and costly journey. Another factor, which Arrian mentions here and Alexander mentions in his speech at the Opis revolt in Book Seven, is that no other army had crossed the desert. Accomplishing something that had never been done before seems to play no small part in Alexander's motivations.

The Campaigns of Alexander: Speeches in Books 4 & 5

Thus, even wholly trustworthy writers who kept company with Alexander at the time do not agree in their writings about events that were public and known to them personally.

- From 4.14.3, all quotes from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch

Arrian seems to give the game away on his history—how much can you rely on him given this admission? If public events cannot be trusted because of disagreement between writers, how much can we trust anything else, including the speeches?

I’ll start by looking at Kallisthenes’ speech opposing Alexander's requirement for proskynesis, the Persian custom of prostrating before the king. Editor James Romm notes that “There is no consensus as to how closely the speech that follows reflects Kallisthenes’ actual words. It contains much that could have been easily invented, but nothing that obviously has been. … Clearly Arrian wanted to give full play to the themes developed here … .” (footnote 4.11.2a) Kallisthenes begins by confirming that Alexander deserves to be honored as a human but he should beware of claiming divine honors. There are some echoes of Kleitos’ earlier speech (which ended in his death at Alexander’s hand) reminding Alexander he is the son of Philip and that “Even Herakles himself did not receive divine honors from the Greeks during his lifetime”. But then Alexander seeks to attain things Herakles did not achieve.

Kallisthenes ends his speech by pointedly asking Alexander how he intends to be greeted once he returns to Greece or Macedonia. Will he “compel the Greeks, the freest of men, to bow before you, or will you keep your distance from the Greeks but impose this dishonor on the Macedonians?” (emphasis mine) This assumes Alexander intended to return home, although as I explored in a previous post this might not be a valid assumption. In addition, there is an undercurrent in the speeches by Kleitos and Kallisthenes when they remind Alexander of his mortal parentage. Why did they feel the need to remind him that Philip was his father? Was it something to do with his behavior after the visit to the oracle of Ammon in Egypt?


Alexander’s rousing speech in 5.25-26 to his officers after learning of the weary troops' discontent about pressing the campaign across the Hyphasis River demonstrates a masterful spin on what he hopes to accomplish. Of course it may be a fabrication or a mixture of fact and fancy, but it is a stirring read. Alexander begins by saying he itends to persuade the officers to continue the campaign or be persuaded by them to "turn back" (again note that doesn't mean go home). He lists their conquests and how much they control. Hitting the high points of the remainder:

- Alexander says that there is not much more land to conquer as they are near the Eastern Sea,
- As long as the empire has borders they run the risk of attack and rebellion,
- This labor will add to our glory and immortal fame, and
- I fight with you to increase your wealth.

The final paragraph of the speech contains that last point and more:

”Certainly, if I had led you into toils and dangers without incurring these myself, I would understand it if you lost heart before I did, since you would have borne the toils alone and reaped their rewards for others. Bus as it is, we have shared the toils, and have shared just as much in the dangers, and the prizes are there for all of us. The country is yours, and you govern it as satraps [he is addressing only his officers]. As for treasure, the larger share is already coming to you; and when we have completed the conquest of Asia, then by Zeus, when I have not merely fulfilled byt exceeded your hopes of wealth, I will send home those who wish to return to their own country or will lead them back myself, and make those who remain here the envy of those who depart.” (5.26.7-8)

Once again, maybe I’m reading too much into some of these speeches but there seems to be a constant theme of being worshipped or revered or considered non-mortal while alive. Arrian then gives Koinos, later described as one of Alexander’s most trusted Companions (intimate friends in war, society, and politics), an equally remarkable speech. Koinos says he speaks not for the officers, since they are there and can speak for themselves, but for the average soldier. Koinos paints a bleak picture for those soldiers that have followed Alexander since the beginning of the campaigns, saying most of them have been wounded, killed, taken ill, or left behind to populate cities far from their home. Koinos frames his arguments as best for Alexander—return home, get new, young, fresh troops (unafraid of war…I like that touch) to conquer the rest of the world. When we show them how wealthy you have made us, they will make eager soldiers. The ending has several barbs: “Finally, sire, nothing is so honorable as self-restraint in the midst of good fortune. For while you are in command of such an army we have nothing to fear from our enemies, but it is not in men’s power to anticipate and thereby guard against what comes from god.” (from 5.27.8) Not only does he target Alexander’s increasing lack of self-restraint but it also recalls Solon’s advice to Croesus in Book One of Herodotus’ Histories (no man can be called truly fortunate until he is dead since bad things can happen at any moment).

These speeches in Books 4 & 5 are the longest in Arrian’s history, probably included because they fit nicely with some of the themes Arrian wanted to advance about Alexander, including his lack of self-restraint and wanting to be viewed as divine (among other themes). Arrian makes sure we see that the speeches are argued in order to appeal to the desires and well-being of their target. The ultimate irony resides in the results—those arguing for something fail to benefit from the speeches:

- Kallisthenes is soon after put to death, and while Alexander backs off his demand for Macedonian/Greek obeisance, the initial requirement has damaged his relationship with his friends and troops,
- Alexander’s troops still insist on going home, frustrating his desires for an unlimited empire, and
- Koinos dies shortly after his speech (although not presented as suspicious by Arrian), and
- the troops will pay a terrible price for their lack of support in Alexander's desires.

The Campaigns of Alexander: The good, the bad, and the ugly of Books 4 & 5

Alexander and Porus, Charles Le Brun (1673)
Picture source

I wanted to highlight a few of the good, bad and really bad things that happen in these pages. If pointing out Alexander’s dark side makes me “mean, obscure and dull”, so be it.

The Good
Alexander solidifies his reputation for military genius in many different and difficult circumstances. Through his actions Alexander reinforces his contention at Gaza that “the harder the conquest, the more it should be attempted” (quotes come from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch). The difficulty in capturing impregnable fortresses such as the Sogdian Rock and the Aornos Rock demonstrates his determination to succeed at the impossible. His plan and his troops’ execution against the Indian king Poros at the Hydaspes River battle highlights Alexander’s cleverness in set-piece battles. Unlike the three battles against Darius’ army, Alexander did not have the older generals Parmenion (killed by an ordered assassination) or Kleitos (murdered by Alexander’s hand) to rely on, thus putting his own distinctive stamp on this battle.

The Bad
Alexander proved himself a master of propaganda and troop morale but his touch fails him at times in these books. His insistence on the ritual of proskynesis, following the Persian ceremony of bowing before the king, grated on the Macedonians and Greeks in Alexander’s retinue. Such a ritual would be offensive to Hellene sensibilities, seeing the adoption of a barbarian custom as well as appearing to ask followers to revere a human instead of a god. To this point Alexander’s leadership has been skillful so a misstep this simple, ignoring the religious implications in requiring this social act, hints at ... something. Kallisthenes’ reproof highlights the religious implications and the average Macedonian response to it, meaning Alexander would not be blind to future reactions to his request for divine recognition. It’s easy to wonder at what point his close friends acknowledged the changes in Alexander (as we’ll see in the remaining books).

Since Alexander seems to take enemy resistance as a personal affront, the public rebukes by Kleitos and Kallisthenes all but sealed their deaths. Koinos’ speech at the Hyphasis River, and the soldiers’ reaction to it, makes it clear that that Alexander’s men still support him but not his desires—they want to go home. The trend we see with Koinos, Kleitos, and Kallisthenes speaking out against Alexander appears to mark a change in Alexander and his relationship to his men. Even Arrian, a dedicated apologist for Alexander, feels the need to either speak against him or tortuously defend him.

The Ugly
This category has many possibilities: the mutilation of Bessos, the murder of Kleitos, the massacres at Massaka and Aornos Rock are a few possibilities. Arrian’s formula for Alexander shows generous behavior when vanquished foes behave honorably, such as Khorienes (provisions Alexander’s army) or Poros (noble behavior on the field of battle and in defeat). For any person or group of people that terribly vexes him, though, no mercy is shown. The massacres at Massaka and Aornos Rock, despite Arrian’s excuses, appear as a calculated act of political terrorism. Alexander’s dark side, which seems to be increasingly on display, is just getting warmed up for the marches down the Indus River valley and across the Gedrosian desert. And more.

The Campaigns of Alexander: They “do not remain there entirely of their own will”

We had a lively conference call on Arrian’s The Campaigns of Alexander Monday evening and once again I will recommend participating in the Reading Odyssey programs, even if it is only to listen to the conference calls (which you can do with the latest one at this link). In this call we had an interesting “side topic” discussion on people left behind to populate and garrison certain cities.

Many times in Arrian’s text Alexander leaves mercenaries, injured and old soldiers, and trusted companions to man and control a city. During the soldiers’ revolt at the Hyphasis River, Koinos highlights the disappointment or resistance against this forced action (from 5.27.5): “Of the other Greeks, those who have been settled in the cities you founded do not remain there entirely of their own will”.

We’ll never know all of Alexander’s intentions when he left Macedon, including how far east he intended to go in subduing Asia. My guess about his quest for an unlimited empire developed as circumstances drove him east, first to capture Bessos and then to subdue the eastern regions of Persia…but it can only be a guess.

Arrian never gives us the reaction of the people left behind, although many must not have liked it--hints of Alexander's death leads many of them to leave Bactria and Sogdiana. Not to mention how quickly these men in certain regions revolted or deserted after his real death. It’s clear the troops expected to return home at some point if Koinos’ speech was representative of their feelings. One factor that muddies the water was Alexander’s disposal of most of the royal property before leaving Macedon. From Plutarch’s Life of Alexander (translation by John Dryden):

However narrow and disproportionable the beginnings of so vast an undertaking might seem to be, yet he would not embark his army until he had informed himself particularly what means his friends had to enable them to follow him, and supplied what they wanted, by giving good farms to some, a village to one, and the revenue of some hamlet or harbour-town to another. So that at last he had portioned out or engaged almost all the royal property; which giving Perdiccas an occasion to ask him what he would leave himself, he replied, his hopes. "Your soldiers," replied Perdiccas, "will be your partners in those," and refused to accept of the estate he had assigned him. Some others of his friends did the like, but to those who willingly received or desired assistance of him, he liberally granted it, as far as his patrimony in Macedonia would reach, the most part of which was spent in these donations.

There are several ways to spin this disposal in addition to the surface explanation of leaving finances in order before departing. Alexander may have expected to return with the Persian treasury so anything wanted could be reacquired. He may not have intended to return, setting up his rule in Persia, but would allow soldiers to return if they so wished. Or some other option or combination. In any case, the revolt at the Hyphasis River included the request of the soldiers to return home. Alexander would provide them with an example of being careful what you wish for.


Note: Cross posted at Reading Odyssey, with changes. Check out the main site and programs for 2012, including Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey as well as Herodtus’ Histories.

Explain the logic one more time...

Bust of Alexander the Great
Picture source

Robert Lowell, in "Death of Alexander" from History (1973):

No one was like him. Terrible were his crimes—
but if you wish to blackguard the Great King,
think how mean, obscure and dull you are,
your labors lowly and your merits less...

The Campaigns of Alexander: Arrian’s prefaces and Books 4 & 5

I tried to keep both prefaces in mind when reading Arrian’s book because they frame everything that follows. Arrian defends his reliance on Ptolemy and Aristoboulos in the opening preface but the disagreement between their reports as well as discrepancies with additional sources stand out in this section. Arrian highlights these differences, lays out several reports and offers his belief on what happened in a Herodotean fashion. These differences question the veracity of the sources while dovetailing nicely with the claim Arrian made in the second preface (1.12.2-5)—Alexander did not have someone like a Homer or a Xenophon to record his great achievements until Arrian's account. Books 4 and 5 provides many examples in Arrian’s hagiography of Alexander such as praising his foresight, magnifying his achievements, and highlighting the minimal cost (to the Macedonians).

Not only does Arrian sound like Herodotus when explaining his reasoning on what happened but also during the digressions of these books. The first digression, 4.7 – 14, allows Arrian to appraise Alexander on a moral basis. With the murder of Kleitos, the experiment in Persian ceremony, and the murder of Kallisthenes, Alexander’s moral failings regarding temperance and moderation come to the foreground. Even when rebuking these actions Arrian sounds subdued, blaming Kleitos and Kallisthenes for being the main cause of their own deaths. The brief mention of Alexander’s behavior toward Darius’ wife, coming immediately after these murders, serves to reestablish Arrian’s reverential tone toward Alexander and highlight some of his good moral points. Book 5’s opening digression about the origins of Nysa by Dionysus accentuates myth building and Alexander’s willingness to see the works of “his ancestors” in his travels. Arrian uses the geographic discourse about India to expand the magnitude of Alexander’s accomplishments in terms of the amount of land conquered, number of rivers forded, and height of mountain ranges crossed.

While adding another contradiction about Alexander to examples I’ve mentioned in earlier posts, Alexander’s lack of moderation in personal matters, presented as a moral failing by Arrian, proves to be the trait Arrian believes makes Alexander great. His dream of unlimited expansion runs counter to his men’s desire to return home, though. As many other commenters have noted, Alexander’s trek was stopped not by foreign armies but by his own men and their lack of the same ambition as their leader. There are hints of abominable weather but Arrian simplifies the comparison between Alexander’s desires and those of his men.

I have highlighted some thematic and stylistic topics in this post at the expense of Alexander’s substantive acts such as his impressive military victories, the murders of Kleitos and Kallisthenes, or the remarkable speech at the Hyphasis River (all of which I hope to review). I mentioned some similarities with Herodotus in the digressions and manner of presenting conflicting report, but Arrian also echoes some of his language as well as that of Thucydides—hopefully I’ll have time soon to expand some of these observations into posts, too.

He’s dead, Alexander

I wanted to pass on a couple of links I found through Rogueclassicism recently.

The first is a paper on the death of Philip, linked through History of the Ancient World. It’s an intriguing read by Amalia Skilton, written a few years ago when she was a student at Tempe Preparatory Academy. The pdf version can be found here:

This paper will answer the question of Philip’s murder with attention to both ancient authors’ claims and their sources, as well as to the arguments of modern writers. It will ultimately lay the blame for Philip’s assassination on the shoulders of Amyntas, Philip’s nephew and the son of King Perdikkas II.1 However, it will disregard neither the motives of the assassin himself, Pausanias, nor the possible complicity of other groups in the crime.

I don't know that the paper "answers the question", but it does present a compelling story.

The second link resurrects a fun TV movie: “Alexander the Great”, filmed in 1964, eventually released in 1968. The reason for watching it? William Shatner as Alexander, Adam West as Cleander, and starring Joseph Cotton and John Cassavetes (other names for movie buffs: John Ducette and Cliff Osmond, among others—see the IMDb.com page for more) The best part? Go to this article for YouTube clips of the movie. Honestly…it can make your day. It did mine.

”It was so long ago,” Shatner said of the fizzled project, which started life as a 1964 television pilot but was shelved before it reached the air. “It was great fun to make. It was a pilot that was monumental for ABC just before I went and did ‘Star Trek.’ And I was deeply, deeply, horrendously disappointed when this series didn’t sell and then the following year or so I started work on ‘Star Trek.’”

The pilot depicted the Battle of Issus with a then-unknown Shatner as Alexander leading his Macedonian army in triumph and less-than-famous West as his compatriot, Cleander, who enjoyed a good party as much as a good fight.

Yes, before they took on their iconic roles on “Star Trek” and “Batman,” actors William Shatner and Adam West worked together on a buddy project called “Alexander the Great” that never aired – maybe no show was big enough to hold those outsized on-screen personas.

“It was so long ago,” Shatner said of the fizzled project, which started life as a 1964 television pilot but was shelved before it reached the air. “It was great fun to make. It was a pilot that was monumental for ABC just before I went and did ‘Star Trek.’ And I was deeply, deeply, horrendously disappointed when this series didn’t sell and then the following year or so I started work on ‘Star Trek.’”

The pilot depicted the Battle of Issus with a then-unknown Shatner as Alexander leading his Macedonian army in triumph and less-than-famous West as his compatriot, Cleander, who enjoyed a good party as much as a good fight.

“Bill was a very good Alexander and as the general Cleander I was the wine, women and song, Errol Flynn kind of guy,” West said. “However, just between us, it turned out to be one of the worst scripts I have ever read and it was one of the worst things I’ve ever done. We had wonderful people involved like John Cassavetes and Joseph Cotten and Simon Oakland in the cast.”

Shatner said he had high hopes that the show would find an audience for its spirit of adventure – it was made just eight years after Richard Burton’s big-screen turn in writer-director-producer Robert Rossen’s “Alexander the Great” – but it was destined to occupy a far different place in pop culture.

Watch the first clip and then continue with the “Up Next” clips. Keep an eye out on how to command from the captain's....that is, king's...chair.

“I came to put an end to wars forever.”
“We cannot conquer the world!”
“Then we shall build a new one. For Greece, and for all she stands.”
“We shall build a graveyard instead.”

Returning to Alexander: reading group discussion questions

It will be a few days before I have time to read anything so I'll take an opportunity to post a few things I've been meaning to mention about Arrian and Alexander. (On a side note, I'm listening to a few lectures on Arrian's teacher Epictetus...funny how things tie together at times.)

Reading Odyssey's next conference call will be on September 12 to discuss Books 4 and 5 of Arrian's The Campaigns of Alexander (see this post for the schedule). Our discussion leader posted a series of questions that will be helpful when reading these books. Here is the summary for these books and the first two topic areas listed:

Books IV & V include Alexander’s campaigns in Central Asia and the Indus river valleys in India spanning the years 329-326 B.C. Book IV begins at the Tanais/Iaxartes river on the western side of the Indian Caucasus mountains and ends with Alexander reaching the Indus River on the wastern side. Book V involves Alexander’s campaign on the river plains of five rivers that merge into the Indus, a campaign which is his farthest east.


1. Between the Scythians and Spitamenes [4.3.6-4.6.5, pp. 156-160]
As Alexander continues to subjugate and, to some extent, colonize the northeast corner of the former Persian empire, he finds himself dealing with rebel tribes as well as intervening incursions from the Scythians. His most pressing moment at the beginning of Book IV comes when “Alexander suddenly faces two new difficulties: Scythians threatening his northern frontier and an uprising led by Spitamenes against his troops in Marakanda” (p. 156, side note). Why does Arrian decide to include the anecdote about the omen in connection with the Scythian battle? How does Alexander manage to rout the Scythian cavalry given that he has a river to cross and that the Scythians on the other side are famous for their mobile cavalry? How does Alexander manage to chase off Spitamenes and his forces? What do these two very different encounters have in common when it comes to Alexander’s strategy and planning?


2. Alexander and the limits of power [4.7.3-4.14, pp. 160-172]
Alexander’s mutilation of Bessos raises some very pressing questions for Arrian and for us. How does Arrian assess Alexander’s decision making at this point? Why does Arrian compare the Bessos episode with a later episode that involves Alexander killing his fellow officer and friend Kleitos? What important issues does the altercation between Alexander and Kleitos raise in terms of Alexander’s overall mission? or his ability to lead? How does the episode of Kallisthenes and Alexander’s concern for his image relate to the previous anecdotes? As Arrian relates the “Pages’ Conspiracy” against Alexander, what does Hermolaos say that resonates deeply among the Macedonian officers? Is Kallisthenes’ ultimate punishment the result of paranoia or cruelty on Alexander’s part? or is it rational and practical?

I highly recommend the Reading Odyssey's reading group format--the calls have been fun, fast-flowing and informative. It's not too late to sign up (link to do so can be found in the "Welcome!" post at their site) and enjoy Arrian's history of Alexander!

Arrian: Book Three—burning down the house

All quotes and references are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander (translation by Pamela Mensch) unless noted.

As I mentioned in an earlier post, the paradoxical figure of Alexander continues to emerge in Book Three. I wanted to look a little at Alexander’s relationship with the Greeks, leading to the dismissal of Greek troops at Ecbatana (3.19.5-8) and the burning of the royal palace of Persepolis (3.18.10-12).

The relationship between Alexander and the Greeks proved to be a combination of admiration and distrust, a balancing act aiming for gentle subjugation—Appendix M by James Romm provides a great summary of the relationship over time. Alexander did more to spread Greek culture to the world, yet he was also responsible for the slaughter of a tremendous number of Greek civilians and troops in addition to undermining liberty in many of the city/states. The Theban revolt (1.7-9) laid bare the feelings of some Greek leaders. Footnote 1.7.11b highlights the divergence between the histories of Arrian and Diodorus, although according to Diodorus the Thebans did more than hurl` insults at Alexander: “In response, the Thebans with equal spirit proclaimed from a high tower that anyone who wished to join the Great King and Thebes in freeing the Greeks and destroying the tyrant of Greece should come over to them. (Diodorus Siculus, The Library of History, translation by C. Bradford Welles, 17.9.5). Such taunts and calls could not and did not end well for Thebes. The attitude that Alexander was the “tyrant of Greece” resonated in other cities, notably Demosthenes of Athens, who provided what support he could to Thebes. The appeal to accept Persian support against Alexander, though, demonstrates how some leaders viewed the relative threat of Alexander.

Why did Alexander limit his use of potential Greek troops and ships in his invasion of Asia? While he may have believed he didn’t need them or he simply didn’t trust them, Alexander’s calculation had to consider where Greek forces could do him the most damage. He understood the dynamics in Greece and evidently was comfortable with the Macedonian garrisons and oversights in leaving possibly unfriendly Greek forces in his rear. Several times Alexander expresses concern about the Greeks rebelling while he is in Asia (see notes 1.18.8a, 2.14.6a, and 3.16.10a for a few examples). Not only were the numbers of Greek forces used in his campaign limited, compared to what was available, but they rarely show up in places of importance during the battles. Alexander exhorted them with reminders about revenge but reserved a lot of the main fighting for his tested and trained Macedonian forces. There’s a short comment during the battle of Issus (2.10.7) highlighting the ethnic rivalry between Greek mercenaries fighting the Macedonians and it’s difficult to imagine that enmity didn’t carry over to those fighting on the same side. Since the invasion of Asia seems to have been more about Alexander’s desire for expanding the Macedonian empire with a thin veneer of Greek unity and revenge, the decision to dismiss the Greek forces at Ecbatana makes sense—the excuse and the forces were an opportunistic prop. Once no longer needed, the fiction no longer had to be maintained in theory or in practice.

Leaving Pindar’s house unscathed during the destruction of Thebes, sending 300 sets of Persian armor to Athens after the battle of the Granicus River, and returning statues taken by Xerxes to Athens would have played nicely for their symbolic meaning but they did little to restore freedom for the Greeks still under the practical direction of Macedon. The burning of the royal palace in Persepolis follows along the same lines but on a much grander scale, raising many questions that don’t ring completely true (to me) in Arrian’s account. The deliberate burning of the palace would have been a tremendous symbol of revenge for the Greeks. But Alexander was about to dismiss the League of Corinth forces—was this act meant as a parting gift, something the forces could carry home as propaganda aimed to mollify the Greeks? At the same time, Alexander was in the midst of lining up Persian support for his rule of Asia, especially since he had not captured or killed Darius yet. Such an act would not sit well with them unless it was meant as an example of Alexander’s power and control, similar to the destruction of Thebes. When Alexander returns to Persepolis at the end of Book Six he regrets the destruction of the palace—there’s the possibility the arson wasn’t intended but was “spun” for propaganda purposes after the fact. Or it could be some combination, an intended event that went different than planned.

While Macedonian and Greek conflict centered on political power and freedom, Alexander’s move to the east will add cultural components in the attempt to reconcile the Macedonian leadership with the Persians.

Cross-posted, with minor changes, at Reading Odyssey

Arrian: Book Three—Gaugamela

"Alexander deserves the glory which he has enjoyed for so many centuries and among all nations; but what if he had been beaten at Arbela [Gaugamela] having the Euphrates, the Tigris, and the deserts in his rear, without any strong places of refuge, nine hundred leagues from Macedonia?"
Napoleon, from The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: From Marathon to Waterloo, Sir Edward Creasy

Gaugamela covers a significant part of Book Three in The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander (translation by Pamela Mensch), the battle covering chapters 8 through 16. Alexander continues to emerge as a paradoxical figure on many levels and I wanted to look at a few examples surrounding the battle that highlight contradictions or changes in his behavior. Parmenion proves to be a troubling point in evaluating Alexander—the general responsible for anchoring one wing while Alexander attacked the other side ends up being a victim because of his success. Parmenion’s role in the Persian campaign’s battles could be summed up as having to avoid annihilation while Alexander wins the day. Gaugamela proved to be the one battle where Parmenion almost failed on that assignment.

It is also one of the few times in Arrian where Alexander takes Parmenion’s advice, in this case before the battle in order to scout the battlefield for any Persian traps or ploys. Arrian returns to form, however, with Alexander’s rejection of Parmenion’s suggested night attack as a cowardly tactic. The motives for a day attack may have been sound (Arrian certainly thinks so in his commendation) but once again another jibe gets aimed at Parmenion, actual or apocryphal. One of the most interesting questions of the battle centers on the Persian forces attack of the Macedonian baggage train—did their greed cause the Persian defeat? During the breakthrough of his ranks, Parmenion certainly thought he was in danger of loss and sent a message to Alexander for assistance. Fortunately the greed of the Persians led them to plunder the baggage train instead of circling Parmenion. Once reinforcements arrived to assist, Parmenion’s situation had improved. Even though Alexander had to break off his pursuit of Darius, his return to Parmenion insured the ruin of much of Darius’ troops, making Gaugamela into the decisive battle it turned out to be.

After the battle at the Granicus River, Alexander visits the wounded and provides elaborate funerals for those that fell, not to mention generous tax breaks were provided to their relatives. Arrian does not mention such actions after Gaugamela and chances are they didn’t happen because of Alexander’s initial haste to pursue Darius. Even given allowances for the situation, the impending execution of Philotas and assassination of Parmenion (to happen within the year) stand in marked contrast to the rewards provided exemplary behavior at the Granicus River. From here it’s easy to see these murders as a harbinger for future carnage. The slaughter by Alexander’s army to this point in the campaign, often not discerning between troops and civilians, could be tied to retribution against an enemy at least on some level. The murders of key Macedonian leaders portend a consolidation of power into a selected cabal, one that Alexander could not carry out at until Darius had been effectively defeated. The discipline Alexander demanded from his troops before the battle of Gaugamela proved to be insufficient for some leaders didn’t fit into his plans.

There are many more paradoxes in Alexander to be seen, a few of which were displayed post-Gaugamela which I’ll look at in the next post. Before ending, though, I wanted to look at a line from Herodotus that seems to sum up an aspect of Gaugamela even though the battle was not exclusively between two Greek armies:

“As a matter of fact, according to what I hear, the Hellenes are in the habit of starting wars without the slightest forethought, out of obstinacy and stupidity. For whenever the declare war on one another, they seek out the finest and most level land and go to fight, so that the victors depart from the field only after great damage has been done, and I won’t say anything at all of the defeated, for they are completely destroyed.” Mardonios to Xerxes in The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories, translation by Andrea L. Purvis (7.9.ß.1)

Cross-posted at Reading Odyssey

Arrian: Book Three—Alexander, the great administrator?

Book Three sees several changes in Alexander’s administrative choices and style. To date, most of the officers installed by Alexander as he marched through Ionia and the Levant have been Macedonians friends or trustees. The exceptions in the first two books, such as Queen Ada who had surrendered Alinda and “adopted” Alexander (1.23.7-8), stand out because they are so different from his other appointees. Starting with Egypt, though, we begin to see him implementing a structure that separated duties, oftentimes leaving locals or natives in charge politically while trusted assistants were in charge of the military. Alexander rewarded loyalty, even if the allegiances had been to Darius (such as Phrataphernes 3.23.4) or to his opponents (Andronikos, in charge of Greek mercenaries facing Alexander 3.24.4-5).

One possible reason for the change in appointments is that Alexander moved from areas that had, at least at one time, a favorable history with the Greeks and into more hostile territory. Alexander seems to take a pragmatic approach toward Egypt and Persia. Was he setting an example by leaving much of the administration intact in areas that peacefully surrendered in order to minimize resistance, at that locale in addition to the areas he campaigned next? It’s not as if those surrendering had much choice since Darius had fled, but Alexander’s actions might have helped influence the ease in transition. “You’re welcome to govern yourself, to some extent, as long as you submit to me” seems to be the message.

Such a message would not have been lost on the Greeks back home or in Alexander’s employ in Asia. After Darius’ forces had been defeated at Gaugamela, Alexander effectively dissolved the forces from the League of Corinth. If the Persian campaign was sincere as retribution, the Greek troops would not have been needed beyond the breaking of Darius’ defense except for possibly garrisons or related security. But then the Greeks never seemed to play an important role in Alexander’s invasion from the start. Did Alexander trust the Greeks? Other than the cavalry from Thessaly, I don’t recall seeing troops from the south of Macedonia taking important roles in the invasion. Athens had the capability of contributing a fleet the size Alexander cobbled together (and maybe more) but he didn’t seem to want to rely on the Athenians during the invasion. He clearly didn’t trust Sparta, nor did they trust him. The Theban revolt that Alexander suppressed in 335 BCE (1.1.7-8) may have just been the tip of the iceberg of unsteady relations with the Greek cities. The money sent to Antipatros for a “war with the Spartans” highlights continuing tensions in Greece (3.16.10).


There seems to be another issue in administration that Alexander had to deal with at some point—what to do with the older generation of Macedonian leaders (and their influence) who had been Philip’s chosen men. Unlike the League of Corinth that was needed more for propaganda purposes, Alexander required the full support of Philip’s appointments in order to defeat Darius. When a plot against Alexander allegedly included Parmenion’s son Philotas, most likely for his failure to report it, Alexander used this opportunity to execute his commanding general. The resulting shake-up in command of the Companions adds another layer of checks and balances as spelled out in 3.27.4. The splitting of cavalry command into two leaders follows the dividing trend Alexander started in Egypt: he raises his long-time friend Hephaistion to the level of hipparch at the same level as Kleitos (who saved Alexander’s life at the Granicus River). Arrian attributes the division to not wanting “one man, not even his dearest friend, to have charge of so many horsemen” (also see note 3.27.4b). Since Hephaistion wasn’t qualified for such a position, his sole promotion would not been palatable to his troops. Splitting the command was necessary in a practical sense, and as pointed out in Appendix E §8, Plutarch says there was still resentment over this move. Where previous assignments had split the governance between locals and Macedonians, his moves after Guagamela add a generational layer to this division of power. Parmenion had been a faithful general for both Philip and Alexander, but his sphere of influence (he was more than 40 years older than Alexander) must have been viewed by Alexander as a threat.

What did it take to lose Alexander’s trust? Hapralos, a friend since boyhood, tested this question several times. Harpalos had proved his loyalty when exiled due to his closeness to Alexander—Philip sent several of Alexander’s close friends away after the clash between father and son at Philip’s wedding to Eurydike/Cleopatra. Alexander constantly rewarded his friends, giving Harpalos control of the treasury. Harpalos repays this trust by fleeing to Megara just before the battle of Issus, which Arrian also terms an “exile.” Yet Alexander promised no harm would come to Harpalos if he would return to his employ. Harpalos evidently believed Alexander enough to return so I think Alexander’s hierarchy of trust presents itself in at this point. Loyalty to him was the primary requirement but there couldn’t be a perceived threat from that individual, either. Alexander lack in seeing Harpalos’ potential threat to flee again must have been offset because of their long friendship. The clemency granted Harpalos stands in marked contrast to Alexander replacing his appointed satrap of Syria for failing to prepare for the march inland to his satisfaction.

One question, among many, not addressed here but something I wonder about is why Alexander was adamant in his desire to capture Darius alive, or am I reading Arrian incorrectly on this? Alexander may have wanted the legitimacy of the ruler’s mantle passed from Darius to him. I don’t see Darius growing old in Persia or in exile, though, since Alexander seems to embark on a steady eradication of anyone he believes is or could be a threat. Instead, I imagine the peaceful handing over of the title and Darius meeting an unfortunate end when the opportunity arose. Obviously this is speculation, but I don’t see how Alexander would have left Darius live for very long after formally assuming power. The upside of Darius fleeing and the chase after Bessos resulted in Alexander pacifying and solidifying his control over the eastern part of Persia within a short period of time. This is a campaign he probably would have had to make at some point but Alexander, seizing opportunities presented to him, took advantage of the situation and solidified power in Persia quickly.

All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.
Cross-posted at Reading Odyssey

Arrian: Book Three—The oracle of Ammon

Chapters 3 and 4 of Book Three cover Alexander’s visit to the shrine of Ammon, but questions raised by this trip linger long after the close of these chapters. Even though Arrian provides detail about the journey, full of marvels and supernatural events, his list of Alexander’s motivations and the uncertainty of the trip’s results elevate its strangeness.

A sudden desire now seized Alexander to visit and consult Ammon in Libya, both because the oracle of Ammon was said to be truthful and because Perseus and Herakles had consulted it… . Alexander was engaged in a rivalry with Perseus and Herakles, as both heroes were his kinsmen. Moreover, he sought to trace his own birth to Ammon, just as the myths trace the births of Perseus and Herakles to Neus. In any case, he set out with this in mind and imagined that he would obtain more precise knowledge of his own affairs, or at least would say he had obtained it.

(3.3.1-2), The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch, and used for all quotes and references to notes.

Alexander’s “sudden desire” has seized him several times already in Arrian’s history, most recently in the form of a “sudden passion” to found the city of Alexandria in Egypt. Look for variations on this phrase (it has appeared several times already)—from a literary standpoint it provides a basis for Alexander’s increasing impetuosity. Continuing the imputation of Alexander’s desires, Arrian notes the shift in Alexander’s mythical/divine comparison—he seems no longer content in being associated with Achilles and actively seeks to be associated with Herakles. (Later in Arrian’s account Alexander makes the association more with Dionysus—a progression from a son of a god to the son of Zeus to a god.) The comparison with Herakles has previously appeared in his dream before the siege of Tyre, but it’s the last clause in the quote, “at least would say he had obtained it”, that stands out for its ambiguity. While open to interpretation, I don’t believe Arrian meant that Alexander would lie about the oracle since Arrian makes it clear in the work’s opening that it was more disgraceful for a king to lie than anyone else. Another interpretation of this phrase isn’t so cynical and has to do with the ambiguity of oracles. My guess is that Arrian references a doubt that anyone, including Alexander, can claim to interpret oracles precisely. This option makes more sense for Arrian’s comment here and the related one at the end of the next chapter.

In addition to why Alexander chose this detour to the oracle, an obvious question is “why now?” One of Alexander’s most effective traits as a general has been his speed in moving the army and his tenacity once engaged. These traits appear often, especially during his pursuits of Darius and Bessos later in this book. He has had success at the Granicus River and at Issus, successfully besieged Tyre and Gaza, and secured Egypt. Why not press the battle directly to Darius at this point instead of providing additional time for Darius? Obviously there is no way of knowing what Alexander was thinking but the delay caused by the sieges cost him about a year, already providing time for Darius to regroup and possibly diminishing any sense of urgency for a confrontation. Add Alexander’s mastery of self-promotion and pragmatism when an opportunity arose and he must have seen the trip to the shrine of Ammon as a way to elevate his standing to friends and foes alike while calculating (correctly) that Darius wasn’t going anywhere.

The trip to the oracle provides several opportunities for the gods to assist Alexander, at least according to the sources Arrian uses. A statement such as “And I can confidently declare that divinity aided him in some way, since such a view accords with what one might reasonably expect” says more about Arrian’s opinion toward Alexander than the veracity of the sources. It’s as if the oracle’s reply is of secondary importance, somewhat confirmed when he says that Alexander “heard what his heart desired (as he said)”. In addition to my interpretation noted above, this phrase provides (probably) unintended irony since Arrian has provided two examples of the listener hearing what they wanted to believe, first by the Thebans upon hearing Alexander was dead (1.7.3) and then by Darius following advice to leave the favorable ground at Sochoi (2.6.6). Nothing good came from the Thebans or Darius hearing what their heart desired.

Cross-posted, with minor changes, at Reading Odyssey

Arrian: Book Two—destiny

All quotes are from The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, translation by Pamela Mensch.

Many signs and divinations appear throughout Arrian’s account of Alexander’s campaigns. The seer Aristrandros interprets the omens extremely well, at least according to Arrian. Factor in Alexander’s insistence on propitiating the gods, before and after an action, and you have a religious tone being set on the campaigns.

The aspect of the religious tone I wanted to touch on involves the interpretation of the gods’ blessings for Alexander’s operations that makes his conquests seem foreordained. Plutarch provides a foretaste of Alexander’s regard with his visit to the oracle at Delphi where he was told he was invincible. Of course that declaration could have been the priestess’ reaction to a pushy kid insisting on a consultation on her day off.

Darius’ move away from his superior position at Sochoi (before the battle of Issus) is referred to as an influence of some deity in order to assist Alexander. As footnote 2.6.7b in The Landmark Arrian notes, Darius’ move from Sochoi in no way guaranteed Alexander’s victory at Issus since the narrow field of battle limited Alexander just as much as it limited Darius. Arrian notes the divine help several times. Darius notes in his first letter to Alexander that the “outcome had doubtless accorded with the will of some god” (2.14.3), putting the outcome out of his control. Alexander acknowledges and reinforces the idea in his reply: “[T]he gods have given me possession of the country” (2.14.7).

An entire post (or several) could be devoted to Alexander’s deliberate tie-in with characters and events from the heroic age. He aligns himself with the Iliad in many ways, whether as an heir of Achilles or in restaging several events from the epic while he was at Troy. But I’ll end my posts on Book Two (until the book group's conference call, at least) with some questions on Alexander’s destiny. It’s clearly expanded from Philip’s creation of the League of Corinth, established to punish the Persians. At some point it’s clear Alexander has more in mind, but what does he see as his destiny? Does it change during the campaign? Is his army on board with it? Do they even comprehend Alexander? Just some questions to keep in mind as the campaigns continue…